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This thesis investigates anxiety in contemporary American literature from 1990-present. 
Through analysis of the work of Paul Auster, Siri Hustvedt, David Foster Wallace, and Junot 
Díaz, I develop a theory of literary anxiety that is attentive to the ways in which anxiety’s 
presence in texts disrupts established narratives, unpicks both characters’ and authors’ 
senses of identity, and fuels contemporary constructions of temporality in which the future 
is uncertain or even entirely denied.  
 
The thesis’ opening chapter considers anxiety in Paul Auster’s and Siri Hustvedt’s illness 
narratives, reflecting on the position of liminality these narratives occupy between fiction 
and non-fiction. Chapter Two analyses short stories by David Foster Wallace and Junot Díaz 
in order to demonstrate the form’s particular suitability for the representation of anxiety, as 
well as the ways in which this anxiety interacts with form. Chapter Three thinks about 
anxiety and masculinity in the context of the #MeToo movement and allegations of sexual 
harassment made against Junot Díaz in 2018. Lastly, Chapter Four investigates the links 
between anxiety, trauma, and temporality in Wallace’s and Husvedt’s writing.  
 
With attention to the slippery, contentious, and multiple conceptualisations of anxiety, 
which range from apparently quotidian or ‘natural’ states of anxiety through to clinical 
diagnoses of anxiety disorders, I examine patterns in anxiety’s representation in American 
literature, as well as in the sources of this anxiety. While remaining grounded in literary 
analysis, I employ a range of methodologies drawing from studies of phenomenology, 
accelerationism, and queer theory, among others, with a view to approaching anxiety from 
as many angles as possible. This allows for a fuller understanding of anxiety as a whole, as I 
believe such an understanding, contingent as it is on insights into the unsettling and 
precarious nature of our current existence under neoliberal capitalism, relies on an 
interdisciplinary approach. 
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Introduction: An(other) Age of Anxiety 
 
 
      Though dunes still hide from the eye 
      The shining shore, 
      Already by a certain exciting kind of discomfort 
      I know the ocean near. 
 
      For mind and whining gull 
      Are saying something, 
      Or trying to say, about time 
      And the anxious heart.1 
 
-- 
     
      We belong to our kind, 
      Are judged as we judge, for all gestures of time 
      And all species of space respond in our own 
      Contradictory dialect, the double talk 
      Of ambiguous bodies, born like us to that 
      Natural neighbourhood which denial itself 
      Like a friend confirms; they reflect our status, 
      Temporals pleading for eternal life with 
      The infinite impetus of anxious spirits, 
      Finite in fact yet refusing to be real.2 
 
 
We live in anxious times. In his poem ‘The Age of Anxiety,’ written during the Second World War and 
published in 1947, W.H. Auden presents four characters in a New York bar, all of whom are dealing 
with the physical and psychological resonances of war, during which ‘everybody is reduced to the 
anxious status of a shady character or a displaced person.’3 At several junctures in the text, Auden 
emphasises the enduring nature of these psychological resonances through the explicit binding of 
anxiety and time; it is the immediate panic and tension of war, and the subsequent unravelling of 
religious faith and a sense of ‘having enough time’ in the context of this conflict, that prompts his 
labelling of his time of writing as an age of anxiety. Despite Auden’s use of the phrase prompting its 
widespread popularisation, many writers before and after him have characterized their existence as 
being in a collectively anxious time and temporality. In recent years, however, the term has been 
subject to a particularly noteworthy resurgence, with books, magazine articles and songs borrowing 
 
1 W.H. Auden, The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue, ed. by Alan Jacobs (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), p. 55-56.  
2 Auden, p. 107. 
3 Auden, p. 3. 
 7 
the title: in one such piece from 2019, journalist Talia Lavin goes as far as to say that ‘America seems 
to be in the midst of a full-blown panic attack.’4 With National Institute of Mental Health figures 
from 2017 indicating that over 30% of U.S adults will have an anxiety disorder at some point in their 
lives, and American Psychiatric Association polling finding that Americans generally have become 
increasingly anxious since 2018, there is, at the very least, a sound statistical foundation to this 
claim.5 From the observation in David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King (2011) that ‘pretty much every 
red-blooded American in today’s (then) late-Vietnam and Watergate era felt desolate and 
disillusioned and unmotivated and directionless and lost,’ to the families in Paul Auster’s Sunset Park 
(2010) fleeing debtors ‘in a collapsing world of economic ruin and relentless, ever-expanding 
hardship,’ this anxiety has also emerged at individual and collective levels in America’s literature, 
especially in the last four decades.6 
 This is not in any way to suggest that anxiety does not have a long literary history, because 
of course, it has, in many shapes and forms. Indeed, as Marc-Antoine Crocq notes in his history of 
anxiety, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations ‘shows that anxious affect is distinguished from sadness […] 
mak[ing] an interesting distinction between anxietas that designates trait anxiety or the fact of being 
prone to anxiousness, and angor that refers to state anxiety or current anxiety.’7 In making this 
distinction between being prone to anxiousness (a clinical anxiety, perhaps), and feeling anxiety at a 
particular moment, Cicero speaks to anxiety’s slipperiness, and to the challenges thus inherent in its 
study, categorisation, and identification in literary texts. Crocq also observes that ‘between classical 
antiquity and modern psychiatry, there was an interval of centuries when the concept of anxiety as 
 
4 Talia Lavin, ‘Age of Anxiety,’ The New Republic (26 February 2019), 
<https://newrepublic.com/article/153153/age-anxiety> [accessed 5 April 2020]. 
5 ‘Any Anxiety Disorder,’ National Institute of Mental Health (November 2017), 
<https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/any-anxiety-disorder.shtml> [accessed 5 April 2020]; ‘Americans’ 
Overall Level of Anxiety about Health, Safety and Finances Remains High,’ American Psychiatric Association (20 
May 2019) <https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/americans-overall-level-of-anxiety-about-
health-safety-and-finances-remain-high> [accessed 5 April 2020], respectively. 
6 David Foster Wallace, The Pale King (London: Penguin, 2012), p. 215; Paul Auster, Sunset Park (London: Faber 
and Faber, 2010), p. 4, respectively. 
7 Marc-Antoine Crocq, ‘A History of Anxiety: From Hippocrates to DSM,’ Dialogues in Critical Neuroscience, 17, 
(2015), 319-325, (p. 321). 
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an illness seems to have disappeared from written records. Patients with anxiety did exist, but they 
were diagnosed with other diagnostic terms.’8 Clinically, then, anxiety was largely treated as part of 
a sub-set of symptoms for other conditions such as melancholia, neurasthenia, and neuroses. It was 
only in 1980, upon the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)-III, that anxiety 
disorders were introduced as part of their own category, comprised of subsections on phobic 
disorders, anxiety states, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In some senses, this more overt 
categorisation might make it easier to identify anxiety, anxious symptoms, and anxious drives in 
literature, but it also constitutes a drive to pathologise affects and sensations that may resist neat 
clinical categories, or that simply aren’t labelled or defined in this way in-text. I will return to these 
difficulties in defining anxiety later, but in light of this developing language around anxiety, and the 
increasing prevalence of anxiety diagnoses in the U.S, we may turn to one of this thesis’ central 
questions: what is it about the nature of our existence in contemporary conditions of the Global 
North (particularly America) that lead to its definition as a new age of anxiety, and how is this 
anxiety expressed in American literature written in these conditions? 
 In order to answer this question, it is first important to establish what precisely anxiety is, 
and how this study will define it, particularly given that anxiety is often used as an umbrella term for 
a wide range of feelings, sensations, and disorders. Some further questions that have been central to 
my own definition(s) of anxiety include how to distinguish between feeling anxious and suffering 
from anxiety (that is to say, between anxiety as an affect and as a chronic condition); how anxiety 
differs from fear; whether anxiety can be anticipated or mastered; whether anxiety should be 
thought of as a disability; how to figure the sometimes interchangeably acute and chronic nature of 
anxiety; and how anxiety can be experienced simultaneously as physical and psychological, and as 
both individually and collectively felt. It is also important to note anxiety’s role in what Raymond 
Williams calls ‘structures of feeling’: ‘meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt […] 
 
8 Crocq, p. 321. 
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characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone;’ that is, ‘not feeling against thought, but 
thought as felt and feeling as thought.’9 
In line with many other thinkers, ranging from Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein to Adam 
Frank and Eve Sedgwick, I consider anxiety to be an affect, which by its nature is always embodied.10 
As an affect, anxiety is distinct from, but closely related to other affects, including sadness, shame, 
guilt, and most notably, fear. In her study of fear, Joanna Bourke summarises the difference 
between fear and anxiety thus: ‘the word ‘fear’ is used to refer to an immediate, objective threat, 
while anxiety refers to an anticipated, subjective threat.’11 However, she emphasises that while such 
a definition may be useful for psychologists and psychoanalysts, historians must be attentive to the 
risks of imposing ‘distinctions on emotional states in the past’ – that is, it is not necessarily helpful or 
productive to make assumptions or even diagnoses of anxiety when approaching historical 
accounts.12 Instead, she distinguishes fear and anxiety through social and hierarchical responses, 
which mean that ‘in fear states, individuals are consciously able to take measures to neutralise or 
flee from the dangerous object, while purposeful activity fails individuals whose subjective 
experience is anxiety.’13 Bourke also draws attention to the frequent conversion of fear to anxiety, 
and vice versa. She argues that this was particularly noticeable in America during the twentieth 
century, as fear was pathologised and thus ‘converted’ into anxiety as a result of ‘the greater 
cultural resonance of therapy in that country.’14 Anxiety’s status as an affect, then, is permeable – it 
may be converted to fear dependent on the reaction of the person to that which is inducing anxiety, 
and on the cultural conditions that predispose certain societies to particular ways of interpreting 
anxiety. 
 
9 Raymond Williams, ‘Structures of Feeling’ in Structures of Feeling: Affectivity and the Study of Culture, ed. by 
Devika Sharma and Frederik Tygstrup (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), pp. 20-28 (p. 23). 
10 Works by these authors that discuss anxiety include, but are not limited to, Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms, 
and Anxiety (1925), Klein’s paper ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,’ (1946) and Frank and Sedgwick’s co-
edited book, Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (1995). 
11 Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London: Virago, 2006), p. 189. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Bourke, Fear, p. 190. 
14 Bourke, Fear, p. 192. 
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 Similarly, Francis O’Gorman distinguishes between ‘household, everyday, functional 
“worry”,’ which he argues is ‘ready and waiting, like a shadow, but [is] not a pathological 
condition.’15 He adds that:  
 
”anxiety” sometimes implies a condition of mind that takes greater hold of a sufferer than 
worry – as if it is something flatter and squatter. “Anxiety” is a term more frequently used in 
relation to panic attacks, phobias, perfectionism, visible obsessions, antisocial behaviour […] 




Although I agree that anxiety generally ‘takes greater hold’ than worry, I also feel this interpretation 
relies too heavily on a pathologisation or medicalisation of anxiety. As well as the risk Bourke 
highlights of such an interpretation leading to anxiety being inappropriately ‘read in’ to the past, it 
also disregards experiences of anxiety that involve an eventually normalised baseline of worry and 
anxiety: so normalised that the sufferer will be aware of its presence, but will still be able to perform 
everyday tasks. For example, in David Foster Wallace’s microfictional story ‘A Radically Condensed 
History of Postindustrial Life,’ three characters grapple with their anxiety about being liked, ‘anxious 
as [they were] to preserve good relations at all times.’17 Although the characters wear ‘the very 
same twist to their faces,’ which speaks to the ways in which anxiety may force people into social 
performances, they are still able to do things and go places: indeed, failing to do so might reveal a 
flaw or weak spot, rendering them vulnerable or abnormal, and ‘one never knew, after all, now did 
one now did one now did one.’18 This is the more chronic end of the anxiety spectrum, whereas 
O’Gorman is referring to what I would deem to be acute experiences of anxiety. I acknowledge that 
it is not helpful to use the terms worry and anxiety interchangeably, and I do not think there is the 
same level of permeability between worry and anxiety as there is between anxiety and fear. As such, 
 
15 Francis O’Gorman, Worrying: A Literary and Cultural History (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 10. 
16 Ibid. 
17 David Foster Wallace, Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (London: Abacus, 2001), p. 0. 
18 Ibid. 
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this study assumes that one can worry without being anxious, but that it is unlikely that someone 
will be anxious without worrying. 
 Nevertheless, many definitions of anxiety are necessarily clinical, as they will be used in a 
medical context in order to diagnose and prescribe medications. These definitions are useful not 
only in enhancing our understanding of anxiety, but also in helping to provide one kind of language 
for the vocalisation of challenging and tumultuous feelings that may otherwise resist or defy 
straightforward linguistic expression. As Siri Hustvedt puts it in What l Loved (2003), anxiety, which is 
characterised as ‘that vague form of fear,’ is ‘a crude lump of feeling that relies on words for 
definition.’19 Here, anxiety’s slipperiness is presented as requiring words, yet it is acknowledged that 
it is something vague and hard to conceptualise: a ‘psychic storm,’ as Wallace says, that is not easily 
explained.20 Adhering to the work of Freud, which I will return to later, the DSM-V (2013), which is a 
guide for clinicians, defines anxiety disorders as constituting ‘excessive fear and anxiety and related 
behavioural disturbances,’ adding that ‘fear is the emotional response to real or perceived imminent 
threat, whereas anxiety is anticipation of future threat’.21 It clarifies that:  
 
obviously, these two states overlap, but they also differ, with fear more often associated with 
surges of autonomic arousal necessary for fight or flight, thoughts of immediate danger, and 
escape behaviours, and anxiety more associated with muscle tension and vigilance in 
preparation for future danger and cautious or avoidant behaviours.22 
 
 
On the question of the difference between anxious feelings and an anxiety disorder, the DSM-V 
states that:  
 
anxiety disorders differ from developmentally normative fear or anxiety by being excessive 
or persisting beyond developmentally appropriate periods. They differ from transient fear or 
anxiety, often stress-induced, by being persistent (e.g. typically lasting 6 months or more), 
 
19 Siri Hustvedt, What I Loved (London: Sceptre, 2003), p. 344. 
20 David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (London: Abacus, 2014), p. 53. 
21 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition 
(Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), p. 188. Original emphasis. 
22 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, p. 188. 
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although the criterion for duration is intended as a general guide with allowance for some 




While such categorisations are helpful at a broad level, and provide a baseline or skeleton language 
for anxiety, the DSM-V was a controversial edition, with the NHS drawing attention to ‘bitter 
criticism’ of the guide that was centred around ‘an unhealthy influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry on the revision process,’ and ‘an increasing tendency to “medicalise” patterns of behaviour 
and mood that are not considered to be particularly extreme.’24 Both an open letter written by 
members of the Society for Humanistic Psychology and articles written by Professor Allen Frances, 
who chaired the DSM-IV taskforce, drew attention to changes to the diagnostic criteria for 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), which meant that the symptomatic duration and criteria for 
GAD were reduced. This blurring of the distinction between ‘normative’ or ‘transient’ fear and 
anxiety and anxiety disorders further complicates anxiety for both sufferers and clinicians, causing a 
potential diagnostic anxiety as people may feel they ‘need’ to be diagnosed because of their 
fulfilment of more lax criteria. Siri Hustvedt makes direct reference to this over-medicalisation in her 
illness narrative The Shaking Woman or a History of my Nerves (2010) when she observes that at the 
Payne Whitney Psychiatric Clinic, ‘I found myself close to particular human beings who suffered from 
complex illnesses that sometimes bore little resemblance to the descriptions catalogued in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’25 That is to say, while medical language and 
categories do provide linguistic foundations for anxiety and its study/diagnosis, this language 
attempts to universalise a condition that varies wildly from person to person, and which cannot be 
clearly identified as a broken leg or a heart attack might be. The disconnect between DSM 
descriptions and lived experiences of anxiety might prompt feelings of isolation or doubt that 
exacerbate anxiety, which in turn emphasises the inadequacy of such broad definitions.  
 
23 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, p. 188. 
24 ‘Controversial Mental Health Guide DSM-5,’ NHS, (15 Aug 2013), <https://www.nhs.uk/news/mental-
health/news-analysis-controversial-mental-health-guide-dsm-5/> [accessed Apr 7, 2020]. 
25 Siri Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman or A History of My Nerves (London: Sceptre, 2011), p. 6. 
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 An early draft of The Pale King also speaks directly to the challenge of defining anxiety, 
describing David Wallace’s father’s panic at missing a train, which ‘provokes some kind of strange, 
involuntary anxiety or urgency – I don’t think there’s even a specific word for it, psychologically, 
though it’s possibly related to primal, prehistoric fears that you would somehow miss getting to eat 
your fair share of the tribe’s kill.’26 In this typescript, Wallace footnotes this quotation from his draft 
with ‘[[DW: There is such a term: Turschluss-Panik- see FBI notebook p.190]],’ yet this note is 
deleted from the final novel, and is not referenced.27 This quote and deleted footnote emphasise 
how anxiety and panic so often elude language: even though Wallace discovers a relevant term, 
which is a German phrase that, loosely translated, means door-shut-panic, pertaining to a sense that 
time is running out, it is decided that it’s better to maintain that the character’s feelings can’t be 
named. Etymologically, definitions of anxiety are attentive to its physical and psychological 
resonances, with the classical Latin anxietas meaning ‘worry, solicitude, extreme care, over-
carefulness’ as well as ‘discomfort in the chest’ in post-classical Latin.28 The first definition of anxiety 
in the current Oxford English Dictionary is ‘worry over the future or about something with an 
uncertain outcome; uneasy concern about a person, situation, etc.; a troubled state of mind arising 
from such worry or concern.’29 It is worth noting that this definition is prioritised over a medicalised 
one: the specific entry on anxiety in the context of medicine is listed third. As I have already stated, 
one of the challenges inherent in trying to define anxiety is that it is both a condition and an 
affective state, both physical and psychological, both individual and collective, and both chronic and 
acute. Accounts of it must be attentive to direct experience as well as these myriad contradictions. 
What is clear, then, is that the study of anxiety has spanned psychoanalytic, philosophical, 
and medical thought, with the definitions outlined above being influenced by the work of 
 
26 University of Texas at Austin, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, MS-5155 Series IV, Container 36.3. 
Formatting replicates the original. 
27 MS-5155 Series IV, Container 36.3. 
28 ‘anxiety, n.,’ Oxford English Dictionary, (March 2013), 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8968?redirectedFrom=anxiety&> [accessed 10 April 2020]. 
29 Ibid. 
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Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and, most notably, Freud. For Kierkegaard, anxiety is inextricably linked to 
Adam and original sin, and is unique from ‘fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite’ 
as it operates as ‘freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.’30 As such, his definition is 
particularly attentive to anxiety’s formlessness, and its connection to infinite possibilities and futures 
which may haunt the sufferer. Heidegger echoes this sense of indefiniteness in his analysis of 
anxiety, stating that anxiety is not about ‘a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility 
for it.’31 Rather, ‘the threat itself is indefinite,’ as although ‘anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of 
something, but, as a state-of-mind […] is also anxiety about something,’ this something is not an 
object, but the very state of ‘Being-in-the-world.’32 Importantly, then, anxiety has a noteworthy 
philosophical function here: it is one of Dasein’s ways of being-in-the-world that opens up the 
possibility of an authentic relationship to Being in general.  
Freud revisited his definitions of anxiety on several occasions, which culminated in the 
publication of Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1925). In his earlier work, he describes anxiety as 
a transformation of accumulated tension, or a ‘transformed libido.’33 Rather than viewing anxiety as 
transformational, Freud amends his argument to posit that anxiety is instead reactive, and can be 
both an affect (a visceral, subjectively experienced emotion that catalyses certain actions and 
reactions) and an affective state (where precipitates of traumatic experiences that remain in the 
mind re-emerge when similar situations occur). It can be ‘realistic anxiety’ that is attached to a real, 
known danger, or it can be ‘neurotic anxiety’ which is attached to an unknown danger.34 Further, if 
the danger is real, the subject will experience ‘physical helplessness,’ while if the danger is 
instinctual, that is, based on previous experiences that were upsetting or dangerous, the subject will 
 
30 Søren Kierkegaard, ‘The Concept of Anxiety,’ in The Essential Kierkegaard, ed. by Howard V Hong and Edna H 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 138-155 (p. 139). 
31 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1962), p. 232. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sigmund Freud, ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety’ in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 




suffer from ‘psychical helplessness.’35 Freud deems the latter form of helplessness to be a traumatic 
situation, whereas anxiety about real danger is a danger-situation – ‘anxiety is therefore on the one 
hand an expectation of a trauma, and on the other a repetition of it in a mitigated form.’36  
Temporally, this also implies that anxiety has the capacity to bend or stretch the experience of time - 
something which is examined further in this thesis’ first and fourth chapters. The tension Freud 
highlights between anticipatory and reactive anxiety in turn points to the potentially chronic bind of 
anxiety, which may force the sufferer into a paradoxical cycle of awaiting and prematurely reacting 
to or repeating trauma. Similarly, the reactive quality of anxiety that Freud describes emphasises its 
subjectivity – its status as an affect and condition is defined by the experiences of the individual 
sufferer, which must be prioritised in all analyses of anxiety. 
With regard to the question of whether anxiety is a disability, in the US, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act 1990 defines a psychiatric disability as one which ‘substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of [an] individual.’37 Similarly, in the UK, anxiety is deemed to be a disability 
under the Equality Act 2010 if it has a ‘long-term effect on your normal day-to day activity.’38 The 
UK’s definition is temporally grounded – a person can claim certain disability benefits if their 
condition has lasted, or is likely to last, for 12 months or more. The US definition is somewhat less 
rigid, though both acts of legislation state that the person’s life must be significantly affected for 
their anxiety to be deemed a disability. These definitions, while helpful as guidance, pose more 
questions than they answer, and the wide variety of anxiety symptoms different people will 
experience may not satisfy these definitions while still proving disabling. For example, psychological 
symptoms can include ‘restlessness, a sense of dread, feeling constantly ‘on edge,’ difficulty 
concentrating, [and] irritability,’ while physical symptoms can include ‘dizziness, tiredness, a 
 
35 Freud, ‘Inhibitions,’ (p. 166). 
36 Ibid. 
37 ‘EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities,’ The U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (5 March 2009), <https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html> 
[accessed 12 April 2017]. 
38 ‘When a Mental Health Condition Becomes a Disability,’ Gov.uk, (5 April 2017), <https://www.gov.uk/when-
mental-health-condition-becomes-disability> [accessed 12 April 2017]. 
 16 
noticeably strong, fast or irregular heartbeat, muscle aches and tension, trembling and shaking, dry 
mouth, excessive sweating, shortness of breath,’ and many more.39 While one or a combination of 
these symptoms may not substantially limit life activities for 12 months, they are, nonetheless, 
disabling in the sense that they may stop someone from leaving the house, or from being able to 
breathe properly, or from being able to work for short or longer periods of time. Although in terms 
of legislation, there are fixed temporal points at which someone will be deemed disabled, this 
approach is not attentive to the idiosyncrasies of anxious experience, and in reality it is not possible 
to choose a fixed point at which someone’s anxiety should be deemed a disability. Rather, this 
distinction should be made on the basis of when a person self-defines as feeling unable to manage 
everyday tasks and the passage of day-to-day life. As Andrea Tone argues in her study of anxiety 
throughout American history, ‘anxiety’s reality is confirmed by the place it has occupied in people’s 
lives.’40 
The question of whether anxiety can be thought of as chronic as well as acute also depends 
almost entirely on the experiences of the anxious person. As established in DSM definitions, a 
diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder requires a clinician to judge that a person’s anxiety is 
chronic – that it will be ‘more constant’ than for those who have difficulty controlling their worries, 
and that it will ‘affect their daily lives.’41 For Tone, anxiety’s so-called ‘expressions’ include ‘worry, 
doubt, panic, [and] fear’ – affects that many people will experience without a diagnosis of anxiety.42 
However, prioritising legal or clinical definitions in deciding whether anxiety is chronic or disabling 
(in a legal sense) is subjective, and not attentive to how any one person’s anxiety may make them 
feel. Further, even if a person is not diagnosed with anxiety, they may still feel anxious on a daily 
basis. Many other people will have received treatment for anxiety and feel generally able to 
 
39 ‘Generalised Anxiety Disorder in Adults - Symptoms,’ NHS Choices, (1 February 2016), 
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Anxiety/Pages/Symptoms.aspx> [accessed 12 April 2017]. 
40 Andrea Tone, The Age of Anxiety: A History of America’s Turbulent Affair with Tranquilisers (New York: Basic 
Books, 2011), p. xi. 
41 ‘Generalised Anxiety Disorders in Adults’, NHS Choices, (1 February 2016), 
<http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Anxiety/Pages/Introduction.aspx> [accessed 12 April 2017]. 
42 Tone, p. xi. 
 17 
manage, but may find that anxious aspects of their personality persist throughout their lives – this, 
too, could be considered as a form of chronic anxiety, as it may never fully ‘go away’ or be ‘cured.’ 
Anxiety is neither wholly predictable nor unpredictable. In some senses, it could be deemed 
familiar – once a person has experienced feelings of anxiety, these feelings may well recur and 
become present most of the time. Once a person is aware of their tendency to feel anxious or suffer 
from anxiety, they may be able to anticipate that anxiety to a certain extent. They may have 
awareness of the symptoms most common to them, or triggers for their own anxiety. Yet it can also 
be vastly unpredictable and coloured by uncertainty – indeed, Dan Grupe and Jack Nitschke argue 
that uncertainty is ‘inextricably linked to the phenomenological experience of anxiety.’43  A person 
may experience certain symptoms and triggers at one time, and wholly different ones at another. 
They may suddenly have a panic attack without an obvious or immediate ‘cause’ – this is what Freud 
calls neurotic anxiety. For some, the anticipation of anxiety may render it a ‘normal’ state – 
something that is familiar and expected, and thus, in some senses, quotidian. Further, someone may 
come to fear anxiety, such that it becomes reified through fear, and can become an object or state 
to be afraid of. This could render anxiety less indeterminate, but it also has the potential to become 
a feedback loop whereby a person experiences anxiety about anxiety.  
It is precisely because of these wide-ranging questions, the struggle to contain anxiety in one 
theorization or definition, and the particular anxiousness and precarity of our current socio-political 
moment, that I feel it is pertinent both to apply theories of anxiety to literature, and to analyse 
anxiety in literature. At present, there are very few book-length studies of anxiety in literature. By 
examining anxiety with attention to the theories and questions I have outlined, with a particular 
focus on phenomenological readings of anxiety, I will provide an account of literary anxiety that is 
uniquely attentive to the first-person experience of anxiety, which in turn, will highlight both 
literature’s particular suitability for representing the interiority of anxious experiences, and what 
 
43 Dan Grupe and Jack Nitschke, ‘Uncertainty and Anticipation in Anxiety: An Integrated Neurobiological and 
Psychological Perspective,’ Nat Rev Neuroscience, 14 (2013), 488-501 (p. 490).  
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literature might teach us about anxiety. My study takes 1990 as a starting point as this year marked 
the publication of William Styron’s Darkness Visible, a ground-breaking memoir of depression which 
prompted a proliferation of illness narratives and literary texts dealing with anxiety. As I have 
already mentioned, this is not to say that anxiety had not been present in literature before this 
moment, but as diagnoses of anxiety rose, information about it was made more widely available, 
and writers began to address the ‘taboo’ of mental illness by speaking more directly and thoroughly 
to experiences of it in their work. 
With a view to conducting as thorough a study as possible, I have opted for a selection of 
authors who have different writing styles, backgrounds, and identities. This is motivated by a desire 
to think about the gendered and racialised implications of anxiety: not only do women and people of 
colour experience specific forms of discrimination that might fuel anxiety, their representation in the 
media and their wider socialisation might lead to a sense of pressure to perform certain versions of 
femininity or race in order to assimilate and feel part of certain communities. While Auster, Díaz, 
Hustvedt and Wallace are united in their representations of late modernity and their broadly 
postmodernist influences, each has a unique perspective on what causes anxiety, how it feels to be 
anxious, and how best to represent this anxiety in-text. 
Chapter One considers three illness narratives that feature anxiety: Paul Auster’s Winter 
Journal (2012) and Report from the Interior (2013), and Siri Hustvedt’s The Shaking Woman or a 
History of My Nerves (2011). With attention to Philip Lejeune’s concept of the autobiographical pact, 
as well as Michael Sayeau’s conceptualisation of the event in literature, I argue that anxiety’s 
presence in illness narratives forces such texts into a position of liminality between fiction and non-
fiction. This liminality is particularly noteworthy because of the expectations readers will bring to 
illness narratives, with Ann Jurecic noting that many view such writing as an ‘[act] of testimony 
about trauma, or at least about the dislocations and transformations caused by disease and 
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disorder.’44 Yet the issue here is that ‘the term testimony […] sets a high standard,’ meaning that 
‘few illness memoirs – constructed representations of the interior experience of illness – can fulfil 
such a standard.’45  
As a result of the pressure such expectations exert, which causes an additional anxiety (that 
is registered and explored textually) around how anxious experiences are represented, I argue that 
Auster and Hustvedt’s texts visibly bear this weight through their formal liminality, their framing of 
anxiety as an ‘event’ in the body and in their life stories, and their introduction of proxy bodies into 
their writing. In this chapter, I adopt a phenomenological methodology which is foregrounded by 
Dylan Trigg’s assertion that reading anxiety phenomenologically ‘helps to outline the singularity of a 
given experience,’ and which is substantiated by Maurice Merleau Ponty’s conceptualisations of the 
habitual and lived body in Phenomenology of Perception (1945).46 In doing so, I begin to trace the 
impact anxiety has on bodies, language, and literary form in the texts at hand, operating as a kind of 
narrative rupture therein. 
Chapter Two takes this analysis of anxiety’s interaction with literary form and applies it 
directly to the short story, which has particular resonance in the American literary tradition. Given 
my assertion that anxiety has the power to disrupt established narratives and alter literary form, this 
chapter pays close attention to the ways in which the short story’s immediacy, brevity, and sense of 
claustrophobia is an especially appropriate home for interiority more generally, and the 
representation of anxiety in particular. In this sense, I argue that the short story form also performs 
anxiety, reflecting and reiterating it intra- and extra-textually while adhering to Raymond Carver’s 
statement that the form embodies ‘a sense of mystery, of something happening just under the 
surface of things.’47 
 
44 Ann Jurecic, Illness as Narrative (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), p. 10. 
45 Jurecic, p. 10.  
46 Dylan Trigg, Topophobia: A Phenomenology of Anxiety (London, Bloomsbury, 2017), p. xxxiii, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 
respectively. 
47 Kasia Boddy, ‘A Conversation,’ in Conversations with Raymond Carver, ed. by Marshall Bruce Gentry and 
William L. Stull (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1990), pp. 197-203 (p. 198) 
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In order to consider this relationship between anxiety and the short story, this chapter 
analyses ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face’ from Junot Díaz’s collection Drown (1996), and ‘Incarnations of 
Burned Children’ from David Foster Wallace’s collection Oblivion (2004).48 Each of these stories 
features children or young people, which leads me to argue that the short story is also especially 
able to house identities that are in flux, and that have been formed under conditions of late 
modernity. In turn, this, along with the physical and psychological trauma experienced by these 
young characters, leads me to the thesis’ first in-depth consideration of the relationship between 
anxiety and trauma: a relationship that is explored further (in specific relation to time) in the thesis’ 
fourth chapter. Having attended to the aforementioned questions of form, my second chapter then 
moves to consider recurring metaphors relating to masks and masking in anxious short stories, 
arguing that these masks are introduced in order to address, conceal, and represent anxious 
feelings. 
Chapter Three addresses the relationship between anxiety and hypermasculinity in Junot 
Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao (2007) and This is How You Lose Her (2012). My analysis 
is framed by information regarding allegations of sexual harassment made against Díaz in 2018 
during the height of the #MeToo movement, which I use in order to further interrogate the 
misogynistic, abusive, and hypermasculine behaviour of many of Díaz’s male characters. I had 
intended to write this chapter before these allegations came to light, with a focus on the 
contradictory anxieties Díaz’s characters experienced around masculinity: the compulsion to 
perform hypermasculinity coupled with the knowledge that doing so would reinforce stereotypes 
about Latino (and particularly Dominican) masculinity. Once allegations against Díaz were made 
public, however, I felt it was my responsibility to address his actions in relation to this chapter. In 
solidarity with those affected by Díaz’s actions, and in accordance with my own personal views 
regarding such actions (which I condemn in the very strongest terms), I will not conduct any future 
 
48 Junot Díaz, Drown (London: Faber and Faber, 1996), and David Foster Wallace, Oblivion (London: Abacus, 
2004), respectively. 
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research on his work. As it was necessary to keep Díaz’s work in this thesis, I opted to tackle it head 
on, acknowledging his actions as highly relevant to the chapter’s central questions through its 
highlighting of the ramifications of toxically masculine behaviour for both victim and perpetrator, 
and the relationship between questions of race and ideas of toxic masculinity. 
With this in mind, Chapter Three’s argument proceeds with attention to the turn in critical 
masculinity studies towards interpreting masculinity as crisis, brought about in part due to liberation 
movements providing ‘a frontal assault on the traditional way that men had defined their 
manhood.’49 This formulation of masculinity as crisis draws attention to anxiety’s centrality to the 
formation of masculine identities and their performance, particularly surrounding the perceived 
threat of femininity and/or homosexuality. I go on to argue that this crisis is all the more pressing for 
Díaz’s characters, who are Dominican immigrants to the U.S, as they must grapple with the anxiety 
of a racialised dual existence alongside the anxieties inherent in hypermasculinity’s performance. 
Lastly, Chapter Four thinks through the complex relationship between anxiety and trauma in 
relation to the future, particularly a future that has been denied or cancelled in light of what Paul 
Saint-Amour describes as the state of ‘perpetual interwar’ in which we now exist.50 Using examples 
from Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American (2008) and Memories of the Future (2019), and 
David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996), I argue that the anxieties characters express about the 
future in these texts can be thought of as shaping a new, future-oriented form of trauma.51 Informed 
by relationships to traumatic pasts, this new kind of trauma has its own set of physical, 
psychological, and textual iterations. It operates as a pre-emptive form of haunting that occurs 
before the future has been completely cancelled, drawing attention to anxiety’s influence on 
temporality and narrative time. 
 
49 Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 202.  
50 Paul K. Saint-Amour, Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 311. 
51 Siri Hustvedt, The Sorrows of an American (Sceptre: London, 2008); Siri Hustvedt, Memories of the Future 
(Sceptre: London, 2019), and Wallace, Infinite Jest, respectively. 
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Drawing on Matthew Ratcliffe’s ‘sense of a foreshortened future’ as well as Paul Saint-
Amour’s notion of a ‘pre-traumatic stress syndrome,’ this chapter analyses both the conditions of 
our present time that lead characters to believe that time is running out, and the more free-floating 
anxieties these characters experience around traumas that are yet to come.52 Through close 
readings of characters’ relationships with time and technology, and the anxieties both of these 
subjects provoke, I am able to analyse the precarious conditions which prompt future-anxiety 
through the lens of trauma. In turn, this allows for new means of interpreting the affective 
structures, temporalities, and forms of the texts at hand. 
 Each of these chapters employs different methodologies in order to address anxiety’s 
multiplicities, as there is no one linear approach that will suffice. In adopting at different junctures 
perspectives from phenomenology, queer theory, and accelerationist movements, to name just a 
few, I aim to test different ways into anxiety which put methodologies into practice through close 
readings. Anxiety demands this kind of interdisciplinary approach, as it cannot be contained within 
one conceptualisation. In response to this anxiety around method, and the potential overwhelm this 
might cause, taking different lenses to anxiety itself has proved to be the most fruitful approach 
throughout the course of the thesis, and the one that has yielded the clearest picture of what 









52 Matthew Ratcliffe, Mark Ruddell, and Benedict Smith, ‘What is a “sense of a foreshortened future?” A 
phenomenological study fo trauma, trust, and time,’ Frontiers in Psychology, 5, (2014), 1-11 (p. 1); and Saint-
Amour, p. 7. 
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Chapter One - Agency, Authorship, and the Anxiety-Event: Selfhood in Illness Narrative 
 
 
I think of [Winter Journal] as a literary composition – similar to music – composed of 
autobiographical fragments. I’m really not telling the story of my life in a coherent narrative 
form.53 
 
During the promotion of his book Winter Journal (2012), Paul Auster was keen to emphasise that it 
was neither a work of memoir nor an autobiography – an intention reaffirmed by the absence of 
both these words from the synopsis on the text’s back cover. Yet Auster also made it clear during 
interviews in this period that he did not view Winter Journal as a piece of fiction, reiterating the 
forceful declaration in his anecdotal essay ‘The Red Notebook’ that ‘this really happened…it is a true 
story.’54 As such, Winter Journal, which focuses on Auster’s physical life, and its partner text, Report 
from the Interior (2013), which focuses on his psychological life, occupy a curious space on the 
borderline between fiction and non-fiction, recounting the various iterations of his anxiety, among 
other conditions. In my view, this liminality originates from, and is accentuated by, the 
representations of illness (particularly anxiety) in these texts, with the recounting of such illness 
therein demanding a more indeterminate form. In her consideration of illness narratives, which she 
views as ‘defined by multiplicity,’ Stella Bolaki argues that such narratives by their very nature 
‘challenge chronological causality and unity.’55 As Auster himself acknowledges, his illness narratives 
do not adhere to a coherent narrative form, and while this is common within the genre, the 
fragmentation he mentions is catalysed and accentuated by anxiety. 
While Siri Hustvedt’s The Shaking Woman or a History of My Nerves (2010) appears to be 
more explicitly non-fictional, offering a historical, psychological, and neurobiological account of 
shaking bodies, it, too, occupies this position of formal liminality. Early in her account, Hustvedt is 
 
53 Wayne Gooderham, ‘Paul Auster interview,’ Time Out London, 
<http://www.timeout.com/london/books/paul-auster-interview> [accessed 1 November 2016] [n.d.]. 
54 Paul Auster, ‘The Red Notebook,’ in Collected Prose (New York: Picador, 2005), pp. 243-264 (p. 264). 
55 Stella Bolaki, Illness as Many Narratives: Arts, Medicine and Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2016), p. 1 and p. 6 respectively.  
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diagnosed with ‘a version of a panic disorder’ and referred to a pharmacologist.56 However, the 
doctor says her fits ’didn’t correspond to panic disorder because [she] wasn’t worried in advance’ of 
public speaking (which prompts her first experience of shaking), never felt endangered when she 
shook, and knew she wasn’t dying.57 Nonetheless she is prescribed Lorazepam, a benzodiazepine 
used to treat panic attacks and epileptic seizures. In her account of her diagnostic journey, Hustvedt 
is accompanied by a second version of herself and her body, (characterised as the titular shaking 
woman), who lends fictional and figurative qualities to the text that frustrate and complicate its 
ostensibly autobiographical status.  
The multiplicity that Bolaki mentions, then, operates on a number of levels. It can apply to 
the very nature of Auster’s and Hustvedt’s texts, which employ a ‘multiplicity of styles,’ and which 
‘[refuse] easy categorisation’ through their simultaneous fictional and non-fictional status.58 Equally, 
this multiplicity applies to the bodies presented in both writers’ texts: The Shaking Woman 
represents two Hustvedts, the ‘familiar self’ and the shaking woman, a ‘shuddering stranger,’ while 
Winter Journal repeatedly emphasises how anxious experiences conjure new and different versions 
of Auster’s body.59 Lastly, in her consideration of illness and narrative identity, Shlomith Rimmon-
Kenan asks ‘what happens when the present is so different from the past that subjects experience 
themselves as others?’ 60 For Auster and for Hustvedt, this results in their texts containing past 
(‘well’) versions of self as well as present ones which have been altered by illness, and which find 
themselves grappling with ‘a future that can no longer be what the subjects imagined or used to tell 
themselves before the illness.’61 In Auster’s case, this illness constitutes all manner of physical 
symptoms as well as anxiety, whereas for Hustvedt, the exact nature of her illness remains unclear, 
though her imagination of the different future(s) that this opens up is fraught with anxiety.62 For 
 
56 Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman, p. 31. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Bolaki, p. 1. 
59 Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman, p. 7. 
60 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, ‘The Story of “I”: Illness and Narrative Identity,’ Narrative, 10 (2002), 9-27 (p. 10). 
61 Rimmon-Kenan, p. 18. 
62 I will examine the specifics of future-oriented anxiety in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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both writers, then, their illness narratives automatically contain multiple selves and multiple bodies, 
both well and unwell. Equally, both writers experience at different junctures anxiety about illness, as 
well as anxiety as illness. 
As I have argued in my introduction, anxiety’s slipperiness makes it difficult to strictly define 
it as an illness or a disability, but in both Auster’s and Hustvedt’s illness narratives, anxiety operates 
as a fundamental part of their experiences of ill-health, noteworthily shaping and interacting with 
their narratives. In Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (1988), which is 
often considered to be the first major study of illness narratives, Arthur Kleinman defines such 
narratives as ‘a story the patient tells, and significant others retell, to give coherence to the 
distinctive events and long-term course of suffering.’63 He adds that ‘the plot lines, core metaphors, 
and rhetorical devices that structure the illness narrative are drawn from cultural and personal 
models for arranging experiences in meaningful ways and for effectively communicating those 
meanings.’64 Kleinman’s invocation of the word illness ‘conjures up the innately human experience 
of symptoms and suffering,’ and refers to ‘how the sick person and the members of the family or 
wider social network perceive, live with, and respond to symptoms and disability.’65 It is the ‘lived 
experience of monitoring bodily processes’ and the ‘appraisal of those processes as expectable, 
serious, or requiring treatment.’66 As both Auster and Hustvedt’s experiences of anxiety are crucial 
‘distinctive events’ in their stories, their suffering, and their monitoring of their own bodies, for the 
purpose of this chapter, I will consider anxiety as an illness within their illness narratives. This is not 
to say that this thesis will always consider anxiety as an illness or mental illness, nor that it operates 
in precisely the same way as illnesses in illness narratives as they are conceptualised in the work of 
critics such as Arthur Frank or Rita Charon. It does, however, share some similarities with such 
 
63 Arthur Kleinman, Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (New York: Basic Books, 
1988), p. 49. 
64 Kleinman, p. 49. 
65 Kleinman, p. 3. 
66 Kleinman, p. 4. 
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illnesses, while also producing other noteworthy effects in illness narratives, which this chapter will 
proceed to consider.  
 The question of the boundary between fiction and non-fiction, as well as whether it is 
helpful to imagine such boundaries at all, is closely bound up with what readers expect from fictional 
and non-fictional texts. These expectations are heightened when it comes to autobiography, 
because many readers may expect and/or accept that the text they’re encountering is ‘true’. 
Philippe Lejeune calls this the autobiographical pact, which assumes the reader’s acceptance of the 
author’s affirmation of identity in-text – the ‘identicalness’ of author, narrator, and protagonist. In 
turn, the author’s duty in this pact is to ‘demonstrate their intention to honour his/her signature.’67 
When it comes to texts such as Auster’s and Hustvedt’s, there seems to be an expectation that this 
pact will be adhered to particularly strictly, because, as Ann Jurecic argues, ‘a subset of reviewers 
and readers sees illness memoirs as acts of testimony about trauma, or at least about the 
dislocations and transformations caused by disease and disorder.’68 However, this presents a 
problem, as: 
 
The term “testimony” […] sets a high standard, implying that such accounts should be 
verifiable and authentic. Few illness memoirs – constructed representations of the interior 
experience of illness – can fulfil such a standard […]. Those who write about illness, an 
experience that can break a life in two, face the nearly impossible task that confronts all who 
write about trauma: how to speak the unspeakable. If illness is beyond expression in language, 
translation of the experience into words misrepresents, even contaminates, the real event.69 
 
Here, Jurecic is suggesting that illness memoirs must exist in a liminal space between fiction and 
non-fiction. This is because the act of writing illness automatically changes the nature of how it is 
experienced, and, indeed, proves an inadequate means of representing illness in any case, as it 
‘contaminates’ the real, non-fictional event, and replaces it with an account that can only be 
contemplated as fictional. As well as using their illness memoirs to describe their experiences of 
 
67 Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography, ed. by Paul John Eakin, trans. by Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 14.  
68 Jurecic, p. 10. 
69 Ibid. 
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anxiety, then, both Auster and Hustvedt are grappling with an anxiety about how best to represent 
their illnesses, and how to convey the ‘truth’ of their experiences, or at least the truth of how those 
experiences felt for them. In turn, as readers, the extent to which we believe an illness memoir to be 
true will shape our interpretation of the text, as well as how potent, relatable, and accessible that 
text will be to us. 
With attention to these questions of ‘truthfulness’, fictional liminality, and the slipperiness of illness 
memoir, this chapter will consider Paul Auster and Siri Hustvedt’s texts with attention to three main 
issues. These are: whether authors of illness narratives should or do conform to an autobiographical 
pact given the complicated position of such narratives on the boundary between fiction and non-
fiction (and the anxiety these questions cause for the author on the one hand, and the reader on the 
other); how and to what extent anxiety is represented as an event in Auster and Hustvedt’s 
narratives; and whether the metaphorical invocation of multiple bodies in-text offers an opportunity 
for Auster and Hustvedt to reconstruct themselves given the fragmentation anxiety and illness more 
generally has wrought upon their stories. In order to attend to the challenges inherent in writing 
potentially unspeakable experiences such as anxiety, and to address the complicated translation of 
these experiences into language that Jurecic highlights, the chapter will adopt a phenomenological 
methodology informed by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945). Reading experiences of anxiety in this way allows for a focus on how its triggers, symptoms, 
and iterations differ for each individual person (and for each individual version of the self that 
writers present in-text), as well as for a better understanding of the interiority of anxiety. Dylan Trigg 
notes that reading anxiety phenomenologically ‘helps to outline the singularity of a given 
experience,’ but that such a reading also ‘cannot remain content with speaking with the centrality 
and certainty of the first person voice.’70 Rather, it ‘must contend with multiple voices speaking 
through the body,’ with attention both to the reaction of the subject to that which is causing anxiety 
 
70 Trigg, Topophobia, p. xxxiii and p. xxxix respectively. 
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(if such a cause is clear), and whether this anxiety fits into a pattern of triggers or not – that is, 
whether it is chronic or not.71 Answering these questions will begin to develop a picture of the many 
ways in which anxiety alters and disrupts the forms and narratives of texts, framing literary anxiety’s 
particularities, while also speaking to an idea which will recur throughout the thesis, shaped by 
Elaine Scarry’s work, which is that anxiety can be thought of as a form of psychological pain. 
 
                                          Fictional Liminality and the Autobiographical Pact 
 
Before proceeding to close readings of Auster’s and Hustvedt’s texts, it is necessary to consider the 
significance of fictional boundaries in texts representing anxiety. Invoking and rejecting the 
autobiographical pact is a means of challenging these boundaries, which in turn can alter and 
frustrate the reader-author relationship. Just as the selves presented in illness memoirs are 
inherently multiple, anxiety, too, is experienced as and through complex pluralities. Further, Sianne 
Ngai argues that ‘the state of unease or agitation eventually codified as “anxiety” gradually replaced 
melancholia as the intellectual’s signature sensibility.’72 Although all autobiography contains fictional 
elements, in the sense that remembering is an inaccurate process that is shaped and framed by the 
unique and potentially biased perspective of the storyteller, readers will bring a particular set of 
expectations to autobiographical texts that rest on the assumption that what they are reading is 
‘true.’ While these expectations may not involve literal, complete truth, particularly in texts 
associated with postmodernity, where autobiographical play and questioning the nature of truth is 
common, readers are still likely to associate certain conventions with autobiography, and an overall 
‘reality’ surrounding the writer’s life, body, and illness experience. Equally, readers may 
subconsciously be measuring truth according to what they expect of the form – that is, whether the 
work is ‘true’ to their expectations of what an autobiography does, even if they are aware that this 
 
71 Trigg, Topophobia, p. xxxix.  
72 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 214. 
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may not always correspond to an objectively verifiable truth. However, when authors define, 
present, or frame a text as autobiographical while also introducing multiple versions of themselves 
in-text, as both Auster and Hustvedt do, Lejeune’s autobiographical pact begins to break down. 
Given that illness disrupts the body both intra and extra-textually, who the narrator is and how they 
are embodied in texts becomes complex. 
Describing how we define a text as fictional or non-fictional, Susan Lanser notes that we 
tend to make this distinction on the basis of ‘the flimsy and accidental’ placement of a text ‘within 
categorical space: the “fiction” or “nonfiction” shelves in a bookstore, the blurb on a book cover, the 
information in the library catalog.’73 To Lanser, these boundaries are inherently fluid and subjective, 
and indeed, they are historically determined, too, yet it cannot be denied that readers will approach 
and react to texts differently depending on their labelled category, which they will inherit along with 
the assumptions associated with any given genre. Technically, Auster’s and Hustvedt’s texts begin 
autobiographically in the sense that they lay out past experiences and conversations from their real 
lives, and employ what can broadly be described as realist accounts, language, and literary 
techniques. Both also adhere to the autobiographical pact in the sense that their narratives reiterate 
and conform to biographical accounts of their lives by presenting ‘true’ information that can be 
verified by the reader. Yet, for both Auster and Hustvedt, anxiety pushes their narratives clearly into 
the realm of metaphor and fiction, because the pain and panic it causes is almost inexpressible, 
manifesting as ‘a vertiginous jangle’ that ‘shuts down’ the body.74 Anxiety as and about illness also 
drives both authors to write as an act of cathartic self-preservation and revision of identity, 
especially for Hustvedt, whose identity is repeatedly shaped and challenged by diagnoses in The 
Shaking Woman. 
 
73 Susan S. Lanser, ‘The “I” of the Beholder: Equivocal Attachments and the Limits of Structuralist Narratology’ 
in A Companion to Narrative Theory, ed. by James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 
pp. 206-219 (p. 207). 
74 Paul Auster, Winter Journal (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), p. 128. 
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 Here, the term identity is used in the sense of knowing who one is, at least at fixed points in 
time – identity as inherently linked to one’s past as well as a tangled web of interconnecting factors 
including gender, sexuality, ability/disability and race, some of which may be more or less important 
to a person’s sense of self. While everyone’s identity, as perceived by self and others, is constantly in 
flux as a result of environment and passing time, the impossibility of returning to the well self in 
illness makes it particularly difficult for people to figure who they are. In some senses, being well 
generally becomes a category of selfhood. However, provided they are prepared to adapt their own 
stories to accommodate the changes in selfhood illness causes, both author-narrators can move 
towards a fuller understanding of their altered selves, while also challenging what we may expect 
wellness to be. Rita Charon argues that ‘Recognising – or even being – one’s self unfolds in narrative 
language, includes attention to others, and takes account of the body. Narrativity is a hallmark of 
postmodern theorizing about autobiography, that is, that identity is both declared and created with 
narrative.’75 Nevertheless, as both Hustvedt and Auster’s writing is not purely autobiographical, and 
given that their lived bodies are interrupted by illness, it is important to note that their identities are 
necessarily subject to change. As a result of both the constant revision of identity any person will 
undergo, as well as the forced revision of identity that comes as a result of illness, both Auster and 
Hustvedt must make decisions about what illness means for their selfhood. Returning to the well self 
may not possible, which can lead to the idealisation of the well body as an ideal version of the self.  
In phenomenological terms, there is the objective body and the lived body. The objective or 
biological body is viewed in the third person – it is the body of medical science. The lived body is 
always with us, constantly experiencing and linked to the world. When a person is healthy, the 
objective and lived bodies align, and, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the lived body operates mostly 
habitually. However, if a person is unwell, the habitual body is disrupted, as the ‘intentional arc 
which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility […] goes limp in 
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illness.’76 This means that the lived body is rendered unstable – it must adapt and change as a result 
of illness, and develop new habits to accommodate this change. Thus, writing about anxiety can 
simultaneously allow writers to try to preserve the lived body they had before, or discover and 
understand more about the new lived body through writing. The alienation from self that illness can 
cause is reminiscent of Lacan’s mirror stage, as the person becomes less and less acquainted with 
their body in illness, and must acknowledge the unattainability of bodily wholeness, as well as how 
the wholeness they may have experienced before was a misrecognition – a falsehood. This is not to 
say that the anxious body is temporally locked into before and after, though, as some aspects of the 
self will, of course, remain or change regardless of illness.  
In the case of Winter Journal, the very narrative Auster has established is ruptured by illness, 
while for Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman is precisely about documenting the way illness has and is 
rupturing her life and her means of expressing herself – it is by nature a narrative of rupture. Though 
Charon argues that narrativity has the power to reshape the teller, to restore a sense of agency 
amidst the chaos of illness, it is important to note that if the subject’s anxiety is chronic, their 
identity, which is housed by the lived body, may repeatedly be in flux. As a result, it can be very 
difficult to create or describe a ‘whole’ or complete self during illness, in spite of the potential 
compulsion to do so in order to speak back to one’s illness. Auster and Hustvedt must be able to 
change their conceptions of themselves in order to address their anxieties – their identities cannot 
be fixed and stable, as illness forces change upon them.   
Although The Shaking Woman may seem more straightforwardly autobiographical than 
Auster’s life writing, as Petra Gelhaus notes, it is, in fact, ‘a book that is not easily categorised […] on 
the one hand, it is an autobiographical report about an illness of the author, a nosography. On the 
other hand it is a more general deliberation about the mind-body problem and the disease-illness 
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problem.’77 Gelhaus also acknowledges Hustvedt’s ‘skilful and elegant prose,’ which does not give 
away ‘private aspects of the author’s person.’78 In this sense, The Shaking Woman’s autobiographical 
status is immediately called into question. By manipulating her narrative using the style and 
techniques employed in her fictional writing, Hustvedt can ensure she does not give away too much 
of herself in the text. Indeed, Hustvedt shapes the shaking woman as she would a fictional character, 
admitting that she has created a ‘fantasy story about the shaking woman,’ a story that is slowly 
replaced by reality as ‘one by one, living persons replace my imaginary doctors.’79 Equally, in the 
early stages of the text, Hustvedt makes sense of the ‘uncontrollable other’ that is the shaking 
woman and ‘the strangeness of [this] duality in [her]self’ through fiction, answering the self-posed 
question of ‘who owns the self’ by ‘com[ing] to think of the shaking woman as an untamed other 
self, a Mr. Hyde to [her] Dr. Jekyll, a kind of double.’80 While this fictionalisation serves as a coping 
mechanism and a means of initially understanding her episodes of shaking and her anxiety 
surrounding them, as Hustvedt herself acknowledges, this story eventually unravels, at least 
partially. Further, this process is only partially in her control: her splitting of self occurs as part of her 
narrativization of her shaking, but also as an inevitable and automatic result of this shaking. 
 Although Gelhaus argues a close connection between autobiography and nosography in her 
account of The Shaking Woman, few other critics share this view. Generally, a nosography is thought 
of as a systematic classification of diseases, grounded clinically and written in the third person. A 
nosography may form part of a patient’s case report, which is typically left to clinicians. However, as 
Brian Hurwitz argues in his essay on form and representation in case reports, self-written case 
reports are favoured by some for the ‘precision and richness of description,’ which they can offer, 
‘for when the physician’s ‘I’ becomes the object of observation and description, both the first-person 
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presence of the patient and the importance accorded to subjective experience cannot be 
downplayed easily.’81 Hustvedt does provide clinical levels of detail about her condition during the 
course of the text, such that it can be thought of as an autopathography, yet in writing in the first 
person, she also claims a form of agency over the description of her symptoms. In allowing herself 
and the shaking woman to alternate between roles as first and third person, Hustvedt is able to take 
a more nosographic approach to her work, which again complicates its status as straightforwardly 
autobiographical. Over time, as Hustvedt attempts to rationalise her shaking, appointments with 
professionals begin to push her narrative out of the realm of fantasy and into reality – closer to her 
‘real life,’ made up of clinical information and the ramifications of potential diagnoses. However, 
Hustvedt implies that this switch can just as easily happen the opposite way around, noting that 
medical analysis is ‘a peculiar form of storytelling,’ and that such analysis would mean ‘in the end – 
and there is supposed to be an end - we would have a story about my pseudoseizure, and I would be 
cured.’82 It is for this reason that Hustvedt chooses to include elements of nosography in her writing, 
as it allows her to employ her own specialism (writing) to a field in which she is less expert, and to a 
narrative which is made unpredictable by illness, which does not conform to the laws of storytelling.  
Given that Hustvedt never receives a satisfying diagnosis, the illness narrative she and her 
collaborators, the medical professionals, create does not offer the ending many may desire – 
namely, a cure, or failing that, some kind of explanation for her shaking. The text has the potential to 
build anxiety in the reader, who may echo and follow Hustvedt’s desire to know what exactly is 
wrong with her and whether anything can stop her from shaking.  This is what Teresa Brennan calls 
the transmission of affect, the process of sensing and absorbing the affect(s) of another. Brennan 
argues that this process, which is ‘social or psychological in origin,’ ‘is responsible for bodily changes; 
some are brief changes, as in a whiff of a room’s atmosphere, some longer lasting.’83 It also, ‘if only 
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for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The “atmosphere” or the 
environment literally gets into the individual,’ and ‘physically and biologically, something is present 
that was not there before.’84 In this case, some readers, conscious of Hustvedt’s desperation to find 
answers, will absorb the anxiety transmitted by Hustvedt, who, in her frustration and urgency, 
creates an atmosphere of panic during the unsuccessful diagnostic process.  Her initial reluctance to 
engage in a diagnostic process at all is emphasised by her having conversations with ‘some figment 
of her imagination,’ namely Erik Davidsen, ‘a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst’ depicted in The Sorrows 
of an American (2008) whom she describes as ‘the boy never born to the Hustvedt family.’85 While 
later open to a multitude of explanations for her first experience of shaking, Hustvedt considers and 
dismisses the option of psychanalysis, noting that ‘some part of [her] is afraid of an analysis’ because 
of a ‘vague sense that there are hidden recesses of [her] personality that [she is] reluctant to 
penetrate.’86 Knowing that she ‘needed help,’ she then speaks to a ‘psychiatrist friend’ and a 
pharmacologist, who, as already noted, prescribes her Lorazepam.87 There is an invitational quality 
to her openness about her concerns which draws the reader in from early in her diagnostic journey, 
and as such, the reader may feel as if they are accompanying her as friend and confidante for what is 
to come. 
While the Lorazepam helps prevent shaking during one talk, soon she bluntly states ‘I 
continued to shake. I shook even with lorazepam […] it takes great control not to be distracted by a 
violent convulsion of your own body, and I began to wonder if I could bear up.’88 Her ‘journey, both 
imagined and real, had led [her] in a circle, and the cause of her fits “was still unknown.’89 As a 
result, ‘everything associated with performance made [her] anxious and distressed,’ because ‘at any 
moment the unruly saboteur inside [her] might appear and disrupt the proceedings.’90 Here, 
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Hustvedt’s anxiety follows her shaking, rather than being a sign of anxiety in and of itself. On the 
advice of another friend, Hustvedt later takes Inderal, which she has previously (unsuccessfully) used 
for migraine, and finds it effective in preventing shaking. Yet on the same page, this solution also 
fails, as an ‘electric buzz’ runs up and down her limbs: ‘I scolded myself internally, saying repeatedly: 
“Own this. This is you. Own it!” Of course, the fact that I spoke to myself in the second person 
suggests the split that had already taken place – a grim sense that two Siris were present, not one.’91 
As before, the frankness and intimacy with which Hustvedt describes her experiences here treats the 
reader as the subject of a direct and personal address. This passage concludes with Hustvedt saying 
‘While a pharmacological solution inhibited the outward problems, it didn’t solve the mystery. It did 
not tell me what had happened.’92 Between her intense symptoms, her frustrated self-talk, and her 
defeated tone, the reader is now connected to her ‘relentless anxiety about shaking.’93 This affective 
link between reader and writer cements the autobiographical pact in the sense that the truth-claims 
made by Hustvedt have the potential to become bound up with a kind of personal bond, cemented 
by the shared experience of anxiety about diagnoses. This relationship is a problematic one in the 
sense that, as I have argued previously, autobiography is a form of storytelling defined by the 
narrating subject, who has a unique role as author, narrator, and character. However, as this chapter 
notes, Hustvedt does not present us with a straightforwardly autobiographical text. Rather, she 
deliberately draws attention to how she has fictionalised aspects of her own story, most notably ‘the 
story of the shaking woman,’ who acts as the embodiment of Hustvedt’s symptoms, and who is 
distinct from ‘[the] narrating self, [the] conscious, telling self’ who speaks to the reader, who 
‘continued on while the other shook.’94 
Hustvedt’s use of the first-person in The Shaking Woman is a feature which further 
contributes to the overall indeterminacy and liminality of the text. Johanna Shapiro notes the 
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‘mistakes, omissions, distortions and blatant lies’ at play in autobiographical texts, stating that ‘all 
narratives are the results of authorial decisions’ which mean ‘we are likely to portray ourselves as 
kinder, cleverer, funnier and more successful than we really are.’95 Hustvedt is honest about the fact 
that her illness ‘dissolve[s] the boundaries of the self,’ and repeatedly expresses anxiety at this ‘grim’ 
dissolution.96 Given that all autobiography contains an element of fiction, and as it is impossible to 
accurately remember exact events and conversations when recounting one’s life, Hustvedt’s text 
contains an additional fictional layer as her sense of self has been compromised and divided by 
illness: ‘the shaking woman cuts me in two.’97 This enigmatic character has entered her life and 
violated it, replacing ‘wholeness and harmony’ with ‘disruption and division,’ which is then 
replicated in the writing as much as it is transcended.98  
This calls to mind Merleau-Ponty’s arguments about the duality of the body, namely that 
‘our body comprises as if it were two distinct layers, that of the habit-body and that of the body at 
this moment.’99 Merleau-Ponty considers this proposition through the example of a phantom limb – 
the habitual body performs ‘manipulatory movements’ that are no longer present in the actual 
body, and thus the habitual body provides a false guarantee to the actual body. The duality of body 
Hustvedt experiences places her body as the habitual one, and the body of the shaking woman as 
the actual or biological one. Once she has experienced her first shaking fit, her habitual body cannot 
function in the same way, as her actual body is constantly at risk of shaking. Over time, Hustvedt 
appears to assimilate the fictional character she has created into her own body in the text as a result 
of her thorough research into whom the shaking woman may be. Nonetheless, her illness narrative 
ends in ambiguous literary territory. Having spent the penultimate paragraph of the text reflecting 
on the construction involved in autobiography and ‘the stories we spin about ourselves,’ she 
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gestures to the ‘vast sea of unconciousness, of what we don’t know,’ as well as ‘the “I” of 
autobiography, who is no one without a “you.”’100 Reflecting further on the co-dependence of 
author and reader in autobiography, she asks ‘For whom do we narrate, after all?’101  
Despite defiantly claiming ‘I am the shaking woman’ at the close of the text, Hustvedt 
precedes this with a personification of ambiguity as an ‘unrecognisable figure or phantom or 
memory or dream that cannot be contained or held in my hands’ which she ‘chase[s] with words 
even though it won’t be captured.’102 Having acknowledged that vast portions of life are impossible 
to record as they reside in the unconscious, her inability to gain a concrete answer about her illness 
and the relentless pursuit of a response to ambiguity call into question her statement that she has 
become the shaking woman, and has accepted her ill self.  Indeed, it can be argued that at this stage, 
the ill self has become the real – a previously fictional character has become part of Hustvedt’s 
illness narrative, which she then presents to us as non-fiction. Hustvedt considers how, at least in 
the past, this division may have been linked to hysteria, which she describes as a ‘systemic divide 
that allows a renegade part of the self to wander off unguided.’103 Yet, despite Hustvedt’s focus on 
hysteria at several junctures in the text, I associate her shaking and her contemplation of her duality 
with anxiety. Hustvedt’s own categorisations demonstrate how, in psychoanalytical terms, it’s often 
suggested that ‘only male subjects are capable of experiencing genuine anxiety or dread, whereas 
female subjects are allotted the less traumatic and therefore less profound. […] affects of nostalgia 
and envy.’104 
 In its telling of the story of the shaking woman, which is interwoven with Hustvedt’s wider 
illness narrative and which also features philosophical and psychiatric musings, the text occupies 
both fictional and non-fictional space.  Auster’s Winter Journal and Report from the Interior, 
however, fluctuate more wildly and overtly between these fictional and non-fictional categories. 
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Auster himself is content to label the former as ‘autobiographical fragments,’ resisting strict formal 
labels. In his descriptions of anxiety in Winter Journal, Auster repeatedly diverts from his established 
narrative style, moving swiftly from a mundane, journalistic voice reporting an ‘inflamed 
esophagus…no doubt aggravated by the heavy dose of lemon in your sandwich’ to a ‘sudden, 
monstrous attack that ripped through your body and threw you to the floor.’105 This abrupt change is 
undoubtedly a result of the panic attack that ensues. Through the various panic attacks Auster 
suffers in Winter Journal, he undergoes a number of metaphorical transformations – his body is 
transfigured to the bestial, to an inanimate stone, and to an embodiment of death personified. 
Indeed, Auster deliberately creates these additional bodies in order to expel his panic as a defence 
mechanism and figuratively represent his psychological trauma in physical form. While this is not 
technically truthful, it is a truthful representation of how anxiety makes Auster feel. Though 
metaphor in and of itself is clearly not enough to break Lejeune’s autobiographical pact, these 
repeated transfigurations challenge the truth of the body in Winter Journal. The reader will be aware 
that Auster’s descriptions of panic attacks are metaphorical, but the fluctuation in tone from actual 
symptoms connected to organs to anthropomorphic terror is a jarring example of the liminal 
fictionality of Auster’s illness narrative.  
During the course of Report from the Interior, Auster states on numerous occasions that he 
sometimes loses track of who he is: ‘it was as if the being who inhabited your body had turned into 
an impostor, or more precisely, into no one at all […] you felt your selfhood dribble out of you.’106 In 
these moments of feeling like ‘an uninhabited shell of flesh and bone, a nonperson,’ Auster slips into 
‘a new configuration of time and space, looking at [his] own life with blank, indifferent eyes.’107 The 
act of writing is a remedy to this feeling of selflessness, as is particularly evident through Auster’s 
use of the second person pronoun in Winter Journal, which also challenges its status as 
autobiography. Indeed, the text’s narration can be thought of as an act of reiteration and 
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confirmation of Auster’s selfhood, as well as a means of accepting aging.  Anxiety as to who he is, 
and around whether he is in control of his body, culminates in the appearance of a whole new space 
in which to contemplate these questions, a space from which Auster can view his own body, albeit 
indifferently at this stage. Auster’s rejection of realist representation in moments of anxiety, coupled 
with his creation of explorative spaces and bodies to contemplate his anxiousness, render his writing 
only semi-autobiographical. The liminal space between fiction and non-fiction allows much of the 
exploration discussed to take place, because it allows for an interpretation of the self that fuses the 
literal and metaphorical body. 
 
The Disruption of Narrative and the Anxiety-Event 
 
In his consideration of illness narratives, The Wounded Storyteller (1995), Arthur Frank argues that 
‘stories have to repair the damage that illness has done to the ill person’s sense of where she is in 
life, and where she may be going.’108 In response to the narrative wreckage wrought by illness, Frank 
asserts that the body can communicate illness most effectively through quest narratives, which 
‘[afford] the ill person a voice as teller of her own story’ and ‘[speak] from the ill person’s 
perspective […] hold[ing] chaos at bay.’109 Yet these quest narratives demand a linearity and 
teleology that is at odds with the nature of anxiety as presented by Auster, and dangerously frame 
the narrator as the hero of their story, working towards what can often be an ultimately 
unachievable redemption. As Angela Woods cautions, ‘promoting (particular forms of) narrative as 
the mode of human self-expression, in turn promotes a specific model of the self – as an agentic, 
authentic, autonomous storyteller; as someone with unique insight into an essentially private and 
emotionally rich inner world; as someone who possesses a drive for storytelling, and whose stories 
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reflect and (re)affirm a sense of enduring, individual identity.’110 Such narratives also introduce the 
question of ‘mastering’ illness, where the focus is on defying illness, rather than living with it.  
Hustvedt’s The Shaking Woman or A History of My Nerves, however, remains somewhat 
teleologically unsatisfied, as it leads both author and reader on an ultimately unsuccessful journey 
toward a concrete diagnosis to explain her convulsions. With this in mind, this chapter will now 
investigate how anxiety can interrupt, disrupt, or even defy narrative altogether, especially when 
that narrative lies on the boundary line between autobiography, memoir, and fiction. Furthermore, 
the impact anxiety has on narrative will be considered in connection with what Wolf Schmid defines 
as a narrative event – ‘a special occurrence […] defined as a change of state.’111 When it is anxiety 
that provokes this change of state, we can think of it as an anxiety-event that can catalyse both 
bodily and psychological change, as well as changes to the established tone and style of a text’s 
narrative. Interpreting anxiety as an event as well as a condition in literature allows for the 
establishment of certain chronologies that anxiety may otherwise resist, which in turn, may assist 
with thinking through the structure(s) of anxiety, slippery though that may be. Examining the 
changes anxiety-events cause either individually, or in combination, dependent on the subject’s 
experience of this event, is vital in order to understand the narratology of anxiety, and what Auster’s 
and Hustvedt’s work reveals about it. 
This section will use Michael Sayeu’s conceptualisation of the event in literature as its 
foundation, but before proceeding to this analysis, it is important to consider the thinking that 
influenced this conceptualisation – most noteworthily, Alan Badiou’s Being and Event (1988), and 
Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense (1969). For Badiou, ‘An event can always be localized […] [it] is 
always a point in a situation, which means that it ‘concerns’ a multiple presented in the situation, 
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whatever the word ‘concern’ may mean.’112 Further, ‘the event is attached, in its very definition, to 
the place, to the point, in which the historicity of the situation is concentrated. Every event has a site 
which can be singularized in a historical situation.’113 He adds that if a situation is ‘natural, compact, 
or neutral, the event is impossible.’114 In the context of Auster’s and Hustvedt’s work, the site of 
events is both the body and their narratives: events occur when their bodies are subject to anxiety 
or other symptoms associated with their illnesses, but also when their narratives shift in tone and in 
style – a shift that is usually prompted by anxiety-events. Whereas for Badiou, events are presented 
as inherently large-scale and unnatural, as singular within the multiple, for Deleuze, ‘every event’ 
has a ‘double structure.’115 This double structure consists of, on the one hand, the idea that every 
event has ‘a present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a 
state of affairs, an individual, or person,’ and that ‘the future and the past of the event are evaluated 
only with respect to this definitive present.’116 On the other hand, ‘there is the future and the past of 
the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of 
affairs […] it has no other present than that of the mobile instant which represents it, always divided 
into past-future.’117 In this sense, for Deleuze, the event is always multiple, and need not necessarily 
be momentous - it is always part of a pattern or ‘series’, is ‘not what occurs (an accident),’ but rather 
is ‘inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us.’118 
Anxiety operates as an event in literature, then, because it can be localised physically and 
psychologically in the body and mind, and can be localised in narrative terms in-text in the words on 
describing it on the page. In turn, anxiety’s anticipatory nature, and its relationship to traumatic 
pasts and futures, links it to the Deleuzian double-structure of the event, again signalling towards its 
evental structure. Anxiety’s status as an event is also twofold in the sense that it operates as a past 
 
112 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 178. 
113 Badiou, p. 178-9. 
114 Badiou, p. 179.  
115 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), p. 151. 
116 Deleuze, p. 151. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Deleuze, p. 149. 
 42 
event in Auster’s and Hustvedt’s illness narratives, particularly in instances of panic, as well as an 
event for the reader, who encounters this anxiety as an event in the present as they read. The 
distinction here between authorial experience and reader experience is crucial, as these experiences 
of anxiety-events are occurring in and through different chronologies and temporalities.  As I will go 
on to argue, the anxiety-event is most obviously discerned in Auster’s and Hustvedt’s work in times 
of panic, and particularly during Auster’s panic attacks. In using the term panic attack here, I refer to 
the clinical interpretation, which broadly conceived, defines such attacks as ‘a sudden episode of 
intense fear that triggers severe physical reactions when there is no real danger or apparent cause,’ 
and during which the sufferer may ‘think [they’re] losing control, having a heart attack or even 
dying.’119  
By considering moments of anxiety as events in literature, these moments come to act as 
transformative breaks in the form and/or tone of a text. In this sense, anxiety-events have unique 
potential, in that they can transform not only the structure of a text, but also the physical and 
psychological norms and behaviours that given characters have exhibited previously. The idea of 
anxiety itself being anticipated challenges anxiety’s status as an event, because if it is normal to a 
person, it cannot be an event, a transformation. However, it can also be argued that certain 
moments of anxiety can never be deemed ‘normal’ or ordinary, because of the devastation they may 
cause – particularly in the case of panic attacks. Even if a state of anxiety is deemed normal by the 
subject, and does not generally prove disabling, the normality of this state is ruptured by panic. 
Freud speaks of ‘anxiety-states,’ which are defined by a ‘specific character of unpleasure,’ ‘acts of 
discharge,’ and ‘perceptions of those acts.’120 In turn, these states must have ‘motor manifestation’ 
in order to be differentiated from other unpleasurable states such as mourning.121 Although Freud 
defines an anxiety-state as a ‘reaction to earlier danger,’ its grounding in the past does not 
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necessarily mean a person will be able to anticipate when they will enter an anxiety-state – rather, it 
means that it may be possible for a person to predict scenarios or phenomena that will prompt 
anxiety, though it’s not necessary or guaranteed that sources of anxiety have or can be brought to 
consciousness. When and whether something will make them anxious is more difficult to predict.  
While it is unhelpful to measure anxiety solely through events, as it does not always 
manifest itself in such an obvious way (that is, through corporeal, psychological, or, in the case of a 
text, narrative change), identifying moments when anxiety is evental provides a means of mapping 
the wider experience of anxiety. Further, it demonstrates the instructive potential of narrative when 
it comes to the behaviour of anxiety as an event. Literary anxiety is a particularly interesting case for 
considering anxiety as having an evental structure. In some senses, representing anxiety in literature 
creates a paradox, in that it inevitably inserts anxiety into the chronology of a text, which may 
contradict anxiety’s general resistance of teleology. However, in reading anxiety as an event in 
literature, it is possible to establish revealing new timelines and chronologies of anxiety, which, by 
virtue of their transformational status, separate from the main narrative of a text, have the potential 
to operate against teleology. The study of literary anxiety must also address additional questions of 
who has the right to narrate anxiety, how to represent anxiety given it is sometimes thought of as 
inexpressible, and what potential this representation holds for developing wider conversations 
about anxiety and honing the empathetic capabilities of readers. 
The decision to retrospectively structure anxiety as an event in literature may be read as an 
attempt to reassert a semblance of control over an experience that otherwise feels completely out 
of their hands. This decision also exemplifies the distinction between fear, which has an object, and 
anxiety, which is objectless, and thus folds back to become its own event. Although medication and 
therapeutic treatment for anxiety is now widely available, this cannot necessarily be considered as 
mastery of the condition, though it does offer the potential for people to manage and understand it 
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better.122 Indeed, the USA’s privatised healthcare system means that many will be unable to afford 
access to treatment, and those who do must navigate an often-misleading field of medication 
advertising. Tone comments on advertising for Paxil, a Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI), 
which features the line ‘empowered by Paxil,’ and which directly associates taking medication with 
‘personal liberation and professional advancement.’123 In promising a form of mastery over a 
condition that can be very difficult to anticipate, pharmaceutical companies are able to exploit a 
person’s desire to manage or control their anxiety, despite this being difficult to do because of the 
challenge of constructing a tangible narrative for any illness story. Indeed, feeling a lack or loss of 
control could provoke anxiety, or be a symptom of anxiety in and of itself. For many, accepting this 
lack of control or ability to master illness can help the subject move forward. 
Just as Lejeune argues that writing about oneself triggers an autobiographical pact, Michael 
Sayeau argues that starting any story ‘is to enter into an implicit contract with your listener or reader 
that, at some point soon, something will happen and this something will be meaningful.’124 In turn, 
this contract is traditionally dependent on events, which help lend temporal and narrative structure 
to texts. Sayeau is deeply sceptical of the narrative event in literature, describing it as a ‘troubled 
and troublesome aspect of literary construction,’ a ‘literary technique [that] enact[s] cultural 
anxieties about the everyday.’125 Although ensuring a narrative is driven forward by and through 
events can be a means of resisting and rejecting the quotidian to maintain a reader’s interest, 
reading anxiety itself as an event in literature allows us to focus on the ways in which narrative is 
altered and disrupted by anxiety. Further, Sayeau’s assertion that events are ‘read in’ to literature to 
quell anxiety about the everyday, or rather, to dispel any impression that a story is boring because it 
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is uneventful, does not attend to the difficulties of structuring and understanding anxiety in 
literature, given that its sudden appearance in many narratives is not an act of deliberate 
construction on the author’s part, but a reflection of its unpredictability and gravity, which 
automatically renders it evental.  
While Sayeau investigates the tension uneventfulness causes in Modernist writing, and how 
this has prompted an anti-evental turn in Modernist literature, contemporary autobiography in 
particular is under immense pressure to conform to a structure defined by narrative events, not 
least because it is telling the story of people’s lives. In this sense, Sayeau’s analysis is inadequate for 
the analysis of autobiography and memoir. Anxiety is not merely what Schmid calls ‘a change of 
state,’ though it is clear that climactic moments of anxiety in texts can be read as events. As such, I 
will argue that anxiety-events in texts are noteworthy for their resistance and defiance of 
established narrative structure. In autobiography and indeed in most stories, this structure is usually 
already evental – driven forward, chronologically or not, by events. Thus, anxiety is an event within 
an event, yet also distinct from the event of storytelling by virtue of its disruption of previous 
narrative. As Forster puts it in Aspects of the Novel (1927), a plot is ‘a narrative of events, [with] the 
emphasis falling on causality.’126 For Forster, stories do not have this same emphasis, and given the 
centrality of causality to any nosography or even autopathography, the anxiety-event can also be 
distinct from mere storytelling in that it will always involve symptoms that have a clear and 
potentially lasting effect on the sufferer. The anxiety-event’s presence remains felt and has 
consequences beyond the event in and of itself. The most prevalent example of an anxiety-event 
would be a panic attack, though experiencing associated symptoms of anxiety such as excessive 
sweating, exaggerated thinking, nausea and palpitations could also be anxiety-events.127  
 Peter Hühn describes a narrative event as ‘an unexpected, exceptional, or new turn in the 
sequential dimension, some surprising “point,” some significant departure from the established 
 
126 E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel - Penguin Classics Reprint (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 87. 
127 For details of symptoms, see ‘Generalised Anxiety Disorder in Adults – Symptoms,’ NHS Choices (1 February 
2016) < http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Anxiety/Pages/Symptoms.aspx> [accessed 12 April 2017]. 
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course of incidents.’128 What is unique about the anxiety-event, though, is that while an author may 
intend to write anxiety, the experience of anxiety itself cannot always be predicted or anticipated, 
given the suddenness with which it may appear and impact a person, as in a panic attack. While the 
author is recording and retelling anxiety, meaning the anxiety-event is in the past, it may also 
produce an event for the reader in the present during the reading process. The very etymology of 
panic, which comes from words such as ‘sudden’ and ‘urgent’ denotes its relevancy to particular 
kinds of events.129 Even in chronic anxiety, when a person knows they are likely to feel anxious, 
particularly in certain settings or in anticipation of certain things happening, their symptoms may be 
more or less apparent on certain days, making it difficult to know how the subject may experience 
their anxiety at any given time.130 Though an anxiety-event does certainly constitute a significant 
departure from the established course of incidents, the sufferer may subsequently attempt to 
grapple to re-establish the narrative structure they adhered to before, or experience further anxiety 
which renders their narrative consistently subject to change. Ato Quayson describes a similar 
phenomenon when disability enters a text, referring to an ‘aesthetic nervousness’ that arises at this 
moment. In his words, this nervousness ‘can be discerned in the suspension, collapse or general 
short-circuiting of the hitherto dominant protocols of representation that may have governed the 
text.’131 When an anxiety-event occurs in a text, it can be thought of as introducing aesthetic 
anxiousness to the text – not just changing patterns of representation and narration, but rupturing 
them completely. 
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In considering how narrative is affected by anxiety, it is first worth noting what kind of 
narratives are established in the texts examined within this chapter, and what purpose anxiety 
serves within these narratives. Attempting to force a purpose onto a narrative is in itself 
problematic, and Auster in particular resists this teleological drive – as Robert Lehnert writes, 
‘Winter Journal’s grand theme […] makes clear that the book does not strive for a complete or 
balanced presentation of the facts with respect to any single telos.’132 Additionally, whether the 
author intends it or not, illness disrupts teleology, while simultaneously forcing us to consider it 
further. Frank argues that ‘a sense of temporality’ is the central resource of a storyteller, because 
‘the conventional expectation of any narrative […] is for a past that leads into a present that sets in 
place a foreseeable future.’133 Although this interpretation of narrative is rather too neat and 
structured for an illness narrative, given that illness can render the future unpredictable, and that 
trauma and anxiety would both interfere with this formulation, it does highlight a particularly 
anxiety-inducing feature of the illness story, namely that ‘its present is not what the past was 
supposed to lead up to.’134 Of course, this sense of the present not aligning with the future promised 
by the past is itself a cause of anxiety, highlighting the additional anxiety that may be caused when 
anxiety’s anticipatory qualities fail. 
Prior to any overt reference to anxiety in Winter Journal, but inevitably bound up with 
feelings of anxiousness, comes the announcement from the second person narrator that the text is 
‘a catalogue of sensory data.’135 Although Lehnert argues that Winter Journal has no single telos, it is 
clear from the text’s first lines that Auster fears aging and death, and that cataloguing his body, 
albeit through a non-chronological narrative, is an attempt to reconcile these fears.  Ironically, 
cataloguing the body in this way also disassembles and anatomises it to some extent – though it also 
helps him feel more in control of a body he is losing to illness. Hustvedt, too, having described her 
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first shaking fit, confesses: ‘intellectual curiosity about one’s own illness is certainly born out of a 
desire for mastery. If I couldn’t cure myself, perhaps I could at least begin to understand myself.’136 
Thus, for both Auster and Hustvedt, semi-autobiographical writing provides a meticulous means to 
document, consider, and revisit experiences, with a view to understanding their respective anxieties 
and ills. Both Auster and Hustvedt constantly work with two concentric selves – a mediated, 
fluctuating written one in-text, and the one that exists outside the text. At the same time, though, it 
must be acknowledged that this does also risk splitting or fracturing one’s story. While on one hand, 
this seems unproblematic for writers as steeped in modernism as these, it does pose additional 
challenges in the formulation of self in texts where this formulation is already frustrated and 
presented as both difficult and as a source of anxiety. 
It is worth noting that panic strikes quickly and violently in Winter Journal. This panic 
catalyses the shifting of narrative from conversational listing of symptoms and philosophical musing 
to wild, unpredictable, visceral descriptions. Previously established narrative is disrupted, as over 
the course of a paragraph, the second-person narrator moves from the peaceful statement that 
‘your heart was sound and beating normally, […] you had learned that death was not something to 
be feared anymore,’ to a bestial force which ‘ripped through your body and threw you to the 
floor.’137 Auster is left ‘howl[ing] in terror, more afraid than [he] had ever been in [his] life.’138 The 
possession of Auster’s body in this moment renders him completely speechless, as the words 
‘howled’ and ‘howling’ are repeated four times in three sentences. This calls to mind Elaine Scarry’s 
influential argument that: ‘physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, 
bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a 
human being makes before language is learned.’139 While anxiety is a psychological condition, which 
causes Auster psychological pain, it can also manifest itself physically, as is demonstrated by the 
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animalistic force that throws Auster to the ground during his panic attack. His inability to express 
how he feels during this climactic moment of panic forces him to howl like a wolf – a metaphor that 
is reiterated by the word ‘ripped,’ bringing to mind images of claws and teeth. The loss of control 
during this episode is heightened further when Auster’s body is once again transformed: ‘death was 
inside you and you didn’t want to die.’140 As Auster is inhabited by death personified, we can assume 
he is experiencing an extreme amount of physical and psychological pain, which has in turn been 
caused by his panic during this anxiety-event. Indeed, these panic attacks can be considered as 
death rehearsals, mitigated by awareness on Auster’s part that while he feels near death, he will not 
actually die.  
Critiquing Scarry’s arguments about pain, Joanna Bourke suggests that she has ‘fallen into 
the trap of treating metaphoric ways of conceiving of suffering (pain bites and stabs; it dominates 
and subdues; it is monstrous) as descriptions of an actual entity […] ‘Pain,’ rather than the person-in-
pain, is given agency.’141 In her account, Scarry argues that there are only two metaphors that can 
adequately express physical pain – ‘the first specifies an external agent of the pain, a weapon that is 
pictured as producing the pain; and the second specifies bodily damage that is pictured as 
accompanying the pain.’142 She also argues that psychological pain is easier to express, because it 
has ‘referential content, is susceptible to verbal objectification, and is […] habitually depicted in 
art.’143 Yet Auster’s anxiety defies these arguments. Not only does it depict psychic pain as 
transformative, as altering the body and creating new forms of it, it does so while breaking with the 
anecdotal, at times even gossipy retelling of family events. The very fact that Auster must, in 
retrospect, transform his body to describe how his anxiety made him feel, only reiterates the 
difficulty of expressing this anxiety, and of making it referential. He cannot bear it in his own body, 
and must imagine it in another, connected version, which battles with his own.  
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These transformations have facilitated a form of expression that was impossible during the 
panic attack itself, restoring the agency that Bourke suggests such metaphors remove. For Bourke, 
pain is a ‘type of event,’ that possesses a ‘mine-ness’ which causes the person to ‘[become] or 
[make] herself into a person-in-pain through the process of naming.’144 The person in pain must 
‘identify it as a distinctive occurrence – for it to be labelled a pain-event,’ and while Auster certainly 
identifies his panic attacks as distinctive occurrences, the nature of his anxiety-event (as pain-event) 
means he does not need to name this pain to become the empowered person-in-pain. Changing his 
narrative and his body has provided Auster with a safe space in which he can contemplate, and 
perhaps even escape, his anxiety – at least momentarily. There seems to be an awareness on 
Auster’s part that though he feels near death, he will not actually die, and thus his panic attacks and 
the bodies they summon can be thought of as a form of memento mori.  This neatly demonstrates 
the distinction between fear and anxiety, for if death acts as the ‘ultimate fear’ for most, then 
anxious events become a means of managing that fear. As a result of his panic attack, an anxiety-
event in his own narrative, Auster’s body changes. This in turn drives the narrative of the text 
forward, albeit in a more figurative direction than previously. 
While Auster describes his first panic attack as occurring as a result of the death of his 
mother, he recreates a letter in Report from the Interior that indicates that anxiety was also present 
during his youth. He claims: ‘I often feel that I am about to die. My body shook, I trembled, and…I 
cried. I couldn’t understand it. As if I had fallen into the void. It is a solipsistic life. Friendless, 
bodyless…’.145 Auster does not acknowledge this as a panic attack, and yet it bears several 
similarities to the panic attacks he experiences in Winter Journal. He feels that death is nearing, 
shakes, and cries out, as he has no other means of expressing his feeling.  The difference is that he is 
unable to transfer this anxiety outwards. Floating in a bodyless void, young Auster is left to reflect 
ever further on what he believes during this anxiety-event is his proximity to death. He has no 
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reference point for his panic, no corporeal anchor to which he can link his shaking self. One of the 
positive elements of his bodily transfigurations in Winter Journal, however troubling, is that he is 
able to view these bodies objectively once he has written them, recalling other versions of the body 
which perform similar functions to Merleau-Ponty’s phantom limb. In creating a new body in textual 
form, prompted by an anxiety-event, he can read and reread this body to learn about, and 
experiment with, his anxiety. In Report from the Interior, he is bodyless – indeed, he is locked in 
solipsism, unable to remove himself from his anxiety or relate his affects to those of others. As such, 
he remains trapped in the miserable narrative he has created for himself. Only in allowing himself to 
experiment and transform can Auster think through his anxiety fully. 
Much as anxiety can alter the tone and style of a narrative, disrupt narrative, and catalyse 
the creation of new metaphorical bodies, characters, and spaces, in which to contemplate, perform, 
and reconcile one’s illness, it can also abandon narrative altogether. In ‘Against Narrativity,’ Galen 
Strawson refutes in the strongest terms the ‘widespread agreement that human beings typically see 
or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story of some sort,’ (what he calls the psychological 
narrativity thesis).146 He also resists what he calls the ethical narrativity thesis, which posits that 
‘experiencing or conceiving one’s life as a narrative is a good thing, […] essential to a well-lived life, 
to true or full personhood.’147 Instead, he deems himself an ‘Episodic,’ ‘one [who] does not figure 
oneself, considered as self, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
(further) future.’148 The term episodic is significant in and of itself in this context, given that in a 
traditional sense, an episode is what comes between parts of the main plot – something that can be 
assimilated into a greater narrative. Yet it is also a quasi-medical term, used to describe a period of 
certain symptoms, or indeed, a fleeting moment that someone does not relate to their usual 
behaviour – ‘I had an episode.’ Thus, although an episode would usually exist apart from the main 
narrative, it would also have significance that could be related back to or assimilated into narrative. 
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For Strawson, it is damaging to assume that living through narrative is the only route to leading a 
fulfilling life, yet if episodes are always connected to another narrative, how might we move away 
from narrative altogether?  
There are a number of instances in Winter Journal where metaphor can be interpreted as a 
non-narrative form. For example, Auster’s panic attacks operate as non-narrative moments, as they 
lie suspended in space, without any true sense of time other than the long wait for a potentially 
approaching death. They do not align with the ‘story’ of the rest of the text, which is a 
contemplation of grief and mourning, and a gradual acceptance of the reality of aging and death. 
Indeed, Auster specifically says that: 
  
whenever you come to a fork in the road, your body breaks down, for your body has always known 
what your mind doesn’t know, and however it chooses to break down, whether with mononucleosis 
or gastritis or panic attacks, your body has always borne the brunt of your fears and inner battles, 
taking the blows your mind cannot or will not stand up to.149  
 
 
This evidences how moments of panic occur as anxiety-events that disrupt the body even more than 
they do the mind, while also highlighting how the body takes on anxiety’s anticipatory drive. These 
events, ‘forks in the road’ as they are, are necessarily distinct from the rest of his narrative. 
Additionally, Auster repeatedly draws attention to how literature, as his vocation, is the form that 
brings him comfort, stating that writing ‘makes [him] feel human.’150 He describes phenomenological 
thought processes, notably, the feeling that ‘the world is in my head, my body is in the world,’ in 
order to reflect on the ‘strange doubleness of being alive, the inexorable union of inner and 
outer.’151 Auster pushes back against his anxiety about his identity by writing – it allows him to unite 
the private and the public, and helps ground him in the world. Further, Auster seems to 
acknowledge to some extent that it is impossible to be wholly ‘united’ as a person – there will 
always be tensions between the internal and external, and identity will always inevitably be 
 
149 Auster, Winter Journal, p. 68. 
150 Auster, Report from the Interior, p. 207. 
151 Auster, Report from the Interior, p. 192. 
 53 
multiplicitous. During his panic attacks in Winter Journal, the world is reduced to the space he 
inhabits. Nothing exists but his panic and the prospect of death, and so these metaphorical 
moments of transformation to stone, metal, beast and to death itself sever any story or telos. There 
is no past or future, only a dramatic moment situated in a text which otherwise has certain stories to 
tell and tasks to fulfil. Perhaps, then, these panic moments exist outside of narrative, in an episodic 
space of bodily change.152  
 
                                                   Proxy Bodies and the Multiplicity of Anxiety 
 
Building on these ideas, the chapter’s final section will focus on how anxiety provokes Auster and 
Hustvedt to summon multiple new versions of their bodies within their illness narratives. In doing so, 
both writers complicate the idea that an illness narrative ‘reflects and constitutes the self,’ as by 
virtue both of illness itself, and the presence of multiple bodies and multiple selves, the wholeness 
that selfhood implies is ruptured. 153 For both Hustvedt and Auster, their selfhood is fragmented by 
their illnesses, which in turn, leads both authors to imagine multiple selves in-text. These multiple 
bodies appear to help the author-narrators think through their anxieties, while also representing 
them in a tangible way by offering them bodily form. This multiplicity of bodies is also attentive to 
the inevitable construction and reconstruction of the autobiographical self that occurs in light of 
illness. Although the body is always multiple and in flux, even when well, in illness, the multiplicity of 
the body is emphasised, such that the unwell person may imagine their previous well body as a 
whole, unfragmented entity. In summoning proxy bodies, certain aspects of illness that both Auster 
and Hustvedt find difficult to bear or represent may be exorcised to selves that are left behind in-
text. This is not in any way to suggest that illness narratives are ultimately redemptive, or that the 
literary techniques authors employ in illness narratives serve as a form of therapy, but rather to say 
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that when Auster’s and Hustvedt’s respective anxieties become too much to bear, they are able to 
think through their anxiety external to the established, lived bodies they have introduced in-text. In 
the close readings that follow, it is worth noting that I am not referring to Auster and Hustvedt as 
such, but the protagonists of their slippery memoirs, who share their names – the author-narrators 
who represent them in their texts. 
In Winter Journal, Auster’s anxiety prompts him to experiment and toy with narrative, and 
catalyses sometimes jarring tonal shifts. As I have already discussed, reading anxiety as an event 
defined by an aesthetic anxiousness helps figure the disorder anxiety can cause in a text. Indeed, 
Auster’s bodily transformations are a form of narrative short-circuiting – this is evident in the 
narrative shifts that occur when Auster descends into panic. Reflecting on family rumours, a titbit of 
gossip fuels an anxious spiral - Auster remarks on how ‘the family had codified its litany of 
complaints against [his] mother, it is the stuff of ancestral history by now, old gossip turned into 
solid facts.’154 His recounting of his cousin’s statement that his mother was ‘always looking for 
something else, too flirtatious for her own good, a woman who lived and breathed to attract the 
attentions of men,’ leads into long, sprawling sentences narrated in staccato – ‘too much has been 
churned up inside you, your thoughts are sprinting off in myriad directions,’ until ‘swallow by 
swallow the liquid splashes into your empty stomach like acid.’155 The assonance of this sentence 
drives this changing narrative forward, as the scene switches from a family feud to a claustrophobic 
buzzing in the head. Suddenly, Auster is ‘something metallic […], a rusty contraption that simulates 
human life.’156 His body ‘shuts down,’ and ‘little by little [his] limbs turn to cement…[he] is made of 
stone now.’157 Once again, he howls, and waits for death. As he is unable to cry over his mother’s 
death, he tells himself that ‘your body broke down and did the grieving for you.’158  
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It is clear that anxiety has short-circuited the narrative leading up to this panic attack, and 
has dehumanized Auster, made him feel like a metal, machine-like, perhaps even posthuman 
‘simulation’ of himself. As affect speaks through the body, and the body has here done what the 
mind cannot in the moment, the body itself is momentarily prioritised. Equally, when he becomes 
stone, Auster expresses his emptiness in the midst of panic – he cannot move, nor can he feel. All he 
can do is wait for death – indeed, his panic attacks appear to be death rehearsals, all the more 
terrible because there is no certainty as to when they will end. Unable to express in words the grief 
of the loss of his mother, his body must anxiously perform these feelings instead. Auster’s bodily 
transformations to metal and stone have allowed him to voice emotional pain that he was initially 
unable to process. Although these new bodies are born out of anxiety, they have an empowering 
quality as they give form to the potential formlessness of anxiety, allowing Auster to observe a 
version of himself that is the receptacle of his anxiety. As well as restoring some of the agency which 
Bourke says is denied in certain conceptualisations of pain, this can be thought of as a movement 
from Freud’s neurotic anxiety to realistic anxiety, as unobservable emotions are absorbed by the 
bodies Auster summons. Merleau-Ponty posits: ‘my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in 
order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be 
unobservable.’159 He adds that even a reflection in the mirror does not allow for observation of our 
own bodies, as shadows and reflections are ‘given to me as a simulacrum of my tactile body since 
[they imitate] the body’s actions instead of responding to them by a free unfolding of 
perspectives.’160 In the space between fiction and non-fiction, however, Auster’s stone and metallic 
bodies can be read and viewed figuratively in the world of the text. While they cannot be ‘seen’ per 
se, metaphor provides a means of visualising these bodies, and allows Auster to represent and 
contemplate both his anxiety and selfhood.  While it could be argued that having multiple bodies 
might be alienating, these bodies have served a positive purpose. They may be simulacra, but they 
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do far more than imitate the body’s actions: they become Auster’s bodies, at hand to bear the brunt 
of his psychological pain, so that his actual body can be free from anxiety, at least in the world of his 
semi-autobiography.  
Where Auster creates a number of bodies to represent and bear his anxiety, Hustvedt 
instead embodies her illness in one figure: the shaking woman. Having described a shaking episode, 
Hustvedt states that ‘above all, what I felt was fear.’161 Her failure to understand and name her 
condition embeds anxiety into her narrative.  She becomes exhausted from ‘relentless anxiety about 
shaking,’ and this leads to the birth of the shaking woman, ‘a grim sense that two Siris were present, 
not one.’162 This, in turn, alters the narrative of her text, as the shaking woman begins to 
overshadow Hustvedt’s thought process about her illness, altering her journey towards a diagnosis 
and intensifying her desire for it, as well as for a sense of understanding – ‘my only certainty is that I 
cannot be satisfied with looking at her through a single window. I have to see her from every 
angle.’163 Hustvedt’s anxiety here is not only about the actual shaking, but about living in a state of 
unknowing – what is the etiology of her condition, and when will she shake?  
While Auster leaves his proxy bodies floating in metaphorical space, over the course of her 
text, Hustvedt allows the shaking woman to become a part of her: ‘as she becomes familiar, she is 
moving out of the third person and into the first, no longer a detested double but an admittedly 
handicapped part of myself.’164 Phenomenologically, allowing an appendage of the self, such as a 
walking stick or a pair of glasses, or in this case, an embodiment of one’s illness, to become one with 
the body, is an important part of accepting our altered state. Merleau-Ponty argues that once we 
habitually engage with these appendages we ‘make them play a part in the original structure of [our] 
own bod[ies].’165 Hustvedt is determined to do just this, as otherwise, she is left with nothing but 
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ambiguity in the face of her shaking, nothing but an ‘unrecognisable figure or phantom or memory 
or dream that cannot be contained or held.’166 This has led some critics to deem the text’s ending a 
surrender. Gelhaus, however, views it as a ‘hopeful seed for a different kind of nameless 
understanding.’167 She adds that ‘the mastery project is given up […] Hustvedt is not happy or 
healed, but she accepts being one person.’168 Though Hustvedt has allowed her illness to become a 
part of her, I do not believe this should be read as ‘giving up’ on the project of mastery and 
understanding. Hustvedt herself states that ‘distance from potential catastrophe […] serve[s] a 
protective, adaptive purpose: alienation as armor against the real.’169 Though Hustvedt will never be 
able to return to her previous body, she has reconciled with her newly formed habitual body, and 
has also learned a great deal about this body through the text. 
While it has been necessary for her to keep the shaking woman at arm’s length for a period 
of time in order to shield her from the frightening reality of her shaking’s inexplicability, this 
alienation could never bring about acceptance of her illness. She may not be able to control her 
shaking, but in allowing the shaking woman to become her appendage, her anxiety about whether 
she will shake is at least partially removed. There is happiness and even an agency to this, as if she 
assimilates the shaking woman, she can contain her. Though this fulfills neither a quest narrative nor 
a restitution narrative, which Frank describes as a desire for ‘the body’s former predictability,’ 
Hustvedt contains the shaking woman both within herself, and in a semi-autobiographical state, 
where she has agency both as the teller of a well-researched scientific story, and an engaging piece 
of fiction.170 As Hustvedt never feels she is going to die, she is able to maintain some corporeal 
predictability – something which Auster fails to do during his panic attacks, as he repeatedly states 
he thinks he will die, and thus fails to keep the intimation of mortality at bay. Ultimately, then, 
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where Auster treats anxiety as an intrusive and acute event, Hustvedt represents it as a chronic 
condition which she can, to an extent, anticipate, and which can produce time for understanding 
herself in light of bodily change. 
By the end of Winter Journal and The Shaking Woman respectively, Auster and Hustvedt 
have represented, contemplated, and to an extent addressed their anxieties surrounding selfhood, 
wholeness of self, diagnosis, and their ability (or lack thereof) to control their illnesses and anxieties. 
This process has occurred through numerous bodies and narrative shifts necessitated by anxiety-
events. In challenging Frank’s quest narrative formulation and allowing the chaos of illness to enter 
their lives and bodies, they have nevertheless maintained their voices as tellers of their own stories. 
This is made possible by occupying the boundary line between fiction and autobiography as an 
experimental space, where multiple bodies can bear their physical and psychological pain. In turn, 
these bodies can be figuratively manipulated by Auster and Hustvedt, acting as receptacles when 
their own bodies cannot bear anxiety any longer. While neither writer manages to gain control or 
mastery over their illness, each in their own way accepts that this is impossible, employing several 
versions of themselves in order to reflect this impossibility while also maintain some authorial and 
corporeal control over their symptoms, and the struggle to express them. Paradoxically, writing 
semi-autobiographical texts that call into question the accuracy and ‘reality’ of information and 
experiences presented within them can draw the reader ever closer, as they are invited to 
collaborate in the unease and unpredictability anxiety reaps upon and within texts. Though both 
writers’ narratives are irrevocably changed by anxiety, the disruption it causes, and the bodies that 
disruption creates, are fundamental in each writer’s journey to finding or creating a semblance of a 
unified self. Throughout their work, both Auster and Hustvedt attempt to expel what cannot be 
accommodated in their selves and their bodies, but ultimately, the semblances of unity they achieve 









I do think there is a stronger relationship between a story and a poem than there is between 
a story and a novel. Economy and preciseness, meaningful detail, along with a sense of 
mystery, of something happening just under the surface of things.171 
 
 
What accounts for the particular prevalence of the short story as a form in the American literary 
tradition? From the 1820s onwards, ‘conditions of writing and publication […] encouraged the 
publication of short pieces’ in America, which led more writers than ever before to experiment with 
short fiction.172  This began to establish the short story as a worthy and respectable means of artistic 
expression. Indeed, the Irish writer Frank O’Connor goes as far as to say that American writers 
adopted and developed the form so significantly that it can be deemed a ‘national art form.’173 
During this development of the form, many American writers found the short story to be especially 
well suited to the representation of private experiences and interiority. Bearing in mind Raymond 
Carver’s statement that the short story is concerned with what is ‘just under the surface of things,’ 
the short story could also be thought of as an especially useful and interesting form for the 
representation and consideration of anxiety as a condition and experience. Might the immediacy, 
brevity, and potential claustrophobia of the short story reflect and reiterate anxiety intra- and extra-
textually? Does the form embody and perform anxiety, provoking anxious feelings in the reader? 
What are the predominant features of the short story that denote its suitability for representing 
anxiety? What is the connection between the Americanness of the short story (or the particular 
predilection for the form in the USA) and American anxieties in particular?  And what might the 
short story reveal about the complex temporalities of anxiety and trauma? This chapter will attend 
to these questions by examining three short stories – ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face’ from Drown (1996) by 
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Junot Díaz, and ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’ from Oblivion (2004) by David Foster Wallace.174, 
Analysis will fall into two distinct but interrelated categories, with the first part of the chapter 
concerned with anxiety and the form of the short story, and the second with how anxiety manifests 
itself in these stories, particularly through the image of masks and masking. Rather than seeking to 
draw direct parallels between these three stories, though many similarities are certainly present (not 
least that the two Díaz stories consider the same character, a young boy named Ysrael, who is living 
with facial difference), this chapter will use the stories in question to illustrate how the short story 
form can represent and provoke anxiety, and to think through the prevalent motif of the mask and 
masking, which works simultaneously on literal, metaphorical, and metonymical levels in short 
stories featuring anxiety. 
 Before moving to this analysis, however, it is worth considering the history and development 
of the short story, and its centrality within the American literary tradition, as well as within the 
history of writing about anxiety. While the short story is inherently linked to cultures of oral 
storytelling, Kasia Boddy notes that the term short story first appeared in print in 1885, and that 
because at this time ‘American identity was posited as an act of continuous restless invention, the 
American writer must continually start again.’175 As such, Boddy argues that ‘the short story was the 
perfect always-new form.’176 The capacity of the short story to bear and represent this reinvention is 
noteworthy. As a form, by virtue of its brevity and typical open-endedness, it seems especially able 
to house identities in flux, be that as part of the conditions of late modernity, in which questions of 
identity are prevalent, or as part of the process of growing up, given that the short stories analysed 
within this chapter feature children and young people undergoing turbulent life changes. Writing in 
1901, Brander Matthews also indicates that differing publishing practices and trends helped account 
for the early popularity of the American short story, as ‘the short-story is of very great importance to 
the American magazine,’ while ‘in the British magazine the serial Novel is the one thing of 
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consequence.’177 Indeed, Matthews goes as far as to say that ‘the present excellence of the 
American novel is due in great measure to the short-story,’ because the most noteworthy American 
novelists of the time began as writers of short stories.178 The growing popularity of magazines and 
periodicals in the US also allowed for an ‘allegiance to region and locality’ that was well-suited to 
short form, creating space for conversations and the sharing of experiences across states that helped 
‘[inform] one part of the nation about another.’179 In particular, the growth of magazine culture gave 
space and voice to previously under-represented and minority ethnic groups, with ‘the first Yiddish 
periodical, The Post, […] founded in 1870,’ and over 150 Afro-American magazines in circulation by 
1890.180  
During the rise to prominence of the short story in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the form came to be characterised by a preponderance of Gothic texts, which in turn were 
fundamentally concerned with questions of fear and anxiety. Authors such as Edgar Allan Poe, 
Washington Irving, Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Henry James all contributed to the shaping of the 
short story as a site of anxiety, characterised not only by body horror, but also by psychic unease. 
However, this unease does not come merely from the brevity of the form, for as Matthews argues,  
 
a true short-story is something other and something more than a mere story that is short […] 
a short story has unity as a Novel cannot have it […] [and] deals with a single character, a single 
event, a single emotion, or the series of emotions called forth by a single situation.181 
 
This unity and singularity of scene contributes to the claustrophobic feeling of the form, which also 
occupies a unique temporal in-between space, suspended without past or future, and speaking to 
the distortions of temporality that occur in anxious experiences. The anticlimax, too, comes to be 
emblematic of the short story, with writers including Raymond Carver, J. D. Salinger, Flannery O’ 
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Connor, Ernest Hemingway and John Cheever presenting vignettes in which the bathetic, collapsed 
ending is a signature. In both Carver and Cheever’s work, too, action often takes place within 
physically, socially, and emotionally cramped domestic spaces - another common feature of the 
American short story in particular. The sense of constriction these spaces induce in turn reflects the 
sensation of being trapped within one’s own body – one of many possible symptoms of a panic 
attack. The denial of any certain future in many short stories toys with our narrative expectations, as 
characters often seem on the brink of revelation, only for this to be swept away.182  Such endings 
contribute to the suitability of the short story for the representation of anxiety, and for embodying 
anxious feelings, as they echo the discomfort we feel about uncertainty, while also mimicking 
Freud’s assertion that anxiety itself is ‘a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, 
even though it may be an unknown one.’183 
 Throughout this chapter, I will highlight examples of anxious and/or anxiety-inducing 
experiences in Díaz and Wallace’s short stories. Causes of this anxiety range from youthful insecurity 
about fitting in, to fragile masculinity, to processes of recovery and how this recovery could be 
facilitated, through to witnessing, experiencing, and coping with bodily trauma. With this in mind, it 
is important to consider the distinction between anxiety and trauma within the short story. Many of 
the aforementioned anxieties relate specifically to physical and psychological trauma, as well as 
traumatic return, and of course, experiences can be simultaneously anxious and traumatic. Yet 
despite their similarities and interrelations, anxiety and trauma have separate temporalities and are 
related to, and provoked by, differing states of preparedness. Considering Freud’s work on trauma 
and fright, Caruth argues that trauma is caused by ‘a shock that appears to work very much like a 
bodily threat but is in fact a break in the mind’s experience of time, […] [a] lack of preparedness to 
take in a stimulus that comes too quickly.’184 Thus, whereas anxiety might be characterized as 
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anticipating danger and preparing for it in future (sometimes, perhaps, because of past experience), 
trauma is a state of complete unreadiness – a gap in time that is created by a realisation of one’s 
unreadiness in the face of threat. Although anxiety and trauma both occupy a paradoxical position of 
simultaneous suddenness and chronicity, anxiety is concerned with unknown danger, while trauma 
is concerned with danger that has already occurred, and its aftermath. With that being said, trauma 
can also be marked by anxiety concerned with unknown danger, as when trauma is repressed or 
ostensibly unknown.185 The uncertainty of anxiety creates a particular kind of temporal suspension, 
which the short story, by virtue of its formal predisposition towards a lack of resolution, is especially 
well-suited to bear.  
Building on Freud’s assertion that anxiety is born out of the anticipation of unknown 
dangers, the absence of knowledge becomes an affective catalyst, fuelling anxious drives that could 
prove instructive emotionally in the sense that this anxiety may reveal to the sufferer their triggers 
and aspects of the nature of their anxiety. As I have already argued, uncertainty can be thought of as 
a driver of the short story, given that the form frequently offers little information about the future 
and what will come next – conditions that can prove highly anxiety-inducing. The contemporary 
short story works with what Eric Cazdyn refers to as the ‘new chronic […] a logic that assumes that 
everything will remain the same as the present turns into the future,’ a reality that ‘is provoked by 
(and provokes) very real fears and vulnerabilities – an existential mode that privileges management 
over change and holds fast to rigid continuities.’186 If, as Cazdyn argues, we now live in an age that is 
particularly anxious about maintaining the status quo, while simultaneously being fully aware that 
‘the future cannot be put off, crisis and disaster cannot be totally managed, [and] life can never be 
safe,’ the short story may be thought of as a performance of the logic of the new chronic, as it 
relinquishes control of the future, rupturing narrative stasis and continuity by virtue of its typical 
inconclusiveness. Undecidability lies at the core of the short story, with scenes and questions 
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presented therein likely to remain unresolved and without conclusion – this is one of the many 
qualities of the short story that may provoke anxiety in the reader. As a form, short fiction can be 
thought of as perpetual, presenting a freestanding snippet of time. In some senses the realization 
that everything stays the same may change the nature of this ‘same,’ and again, the short story 
stands as an apt form for such dilemmas, given that in the case of collapsed endings, it actively 
resists sameness by denying access to the future and drawing our attention to its status as a 
snapshot – an emblem of the incomplete. In each of the stories this chapter studies, endings work 
against continuity by sounding notes of uncertainty, leaving characters suspended in fictional ether, 
without future. Much of the anxiety in the short stories analysed in this chapter is anticipatory 
rather than actual – in the main, we encounter characters’ behavioural and psychological iterations 
of anxiety rather than its physical symptoms. Anxiously anticipating the reactions of others, (a 
behaviour that reaches a particular peak in adolescence, and in the short studies analysed here in 
particular), characters and readers alike are denied access to the future, as the short story 
acknowledges the impossibility of answering the question of what comes next. Of course, the open-
endedness of this question, and its pronounced scale in youth, is deeply anxiety-inducing, as it 
denies any certainty or stability. 
 
Imminence, Brevity, Temporality: Anxiety and the Short Form 
 
During his consideration of microfiction (the very short story), Marc Botha notes that the 
1970s and 1980s brought with them a ‘resurgent interest in short narrative forms’ both within and 
outside America, which was, in turn, tangled up with a ‘sustained challenge to the progressive logic 
of the formation of the autonomous subject.’187 Although evidence for whether new media has 
lowered the human attention span has been much disputed in the academic community, Botha’s 
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question of whether ‘even the short story cannot convey the speed and immediacy of contemporary 
life’ highlights the shift, particularly from the 2000s onwards, towards especially brief short 
fiction.188 The brevity of microfiction, then, is arguably reflective of the feeling of temporal 
acceleration caused by developments in technology, the internet, and social media platforms, all of 
which encourage immediacy in reporting information, and which have allegedly contributed to our 
diminishing ability to concentrate, as well as to a communal feeling of anxiety. Speaking of panic, 
which can be thought of both as an affect in and of itself, and an iteration of anxiety that is 
especially relevant to the imminence and claustrophobia of the short story, Franco Berardi notes: 
 
today, panic has become a form of psychopathology: we can speak of panic when we see a 
conscious organism (individual or social) overwhelmed by the speed of processes in which it is 
involved, and where it has insufficient time to handle the information generated by those 
processes.189 
 
These concerns are especially evident in Wallace’s work, with its repeated consideration of the 
impact of technology on human culture and behaviour, as well as its formal experimentation. Both 
his short and longer fiction employ footnotes, varying sentence length, multiple narrative 
perspectives and the inclusion of potentially anxiety-inducing media and forms such as emails, lists, 
interviews and formal documents in-text which can complicate and potentially frustrate the flow of 
reading, and thus the reader’s ability to concentrate. In turn, this experimentation generally requires 
greater concentration to follow, though of course, our increasing reliance on technology and a 
profusion of screens, and the difficulties these factors pose in terms of focusing our attention on one 
task, may actually result in the space of the book serving as a place of solace and slowing down. This 
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is further complicated by the varying temporalities of anxiety and panic, which are often 
represented through formal changes in-text – changes that are all the more evident within the 
compacted space of the short story. While Berardi considers panic in the particular context of a 
globalized, digitized world, whereby the ‘acceleration of the infosphere’ puts the ‘human terminal of 
the system (the embodied mind)’ under increasing pressure, microfiction’s rise as a form responding 
to the speed of contemporary life cannot be explained by technology alone.190 This acceleration is 
also inextricably linked to the precarity of contemporary work, with the proliferation of short-term, 
low-hour contracts and progress reports increasing pressure on workforces; this precarity coexists 
with wider geopolitical or even planetary uncertainty, marked by global political unrest, the threat of 
warfare and pandemic, and the growing environmental threat of natural disaster brought about by 
climate change. These conditions call for a form that can bear their imminence: in this respect, 
microfiction responds to, and aptly represents, the anxiety of our time, particularly in its 
manifestation as panic. Further, this panic need not be directly related to the aforementioned 
conditions – microfiction is an apt form for the representation of panic, as it is an affect that tends to 
unfold with visceral urgency that is especially well-suited to a literary space that shares this temporal 
conciseness.   
In the case of ‘Incarnations of Burned Children,’ which spans three pages and nine 
sentences, it is clear that the breathless, urgent pace of the story’s mostly long, sprawling sentences 
is reflective both of the horror of the scene as it unfolds in front of the parents’ eyes, and the anxiety 
we as readers experience as bystanders to the trauma. Although the story does feature some loose 
indications of time period, in the form of the ‘radio’s lady,’ the ‘hot truck,’ and ‘the clinic’s ER,’ it is, 
overall, presented as a timeless scenario. It is also an instance of stopped time – a moment that is 
extended, and also punctuated by implications of future anger on the parents’ part – as when the 
narration implies the mother starts by ‘dabbing pointlessly’ at the child.191 This is underscored by the 
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story’s title, all pluralised, implying that the scene of the story has been repeated endlessly, with the 
spirits of affected children ever-present as ‘vapor aloft.’192 Thus, its pacing bears out Botha’s view 
that microfiction is the most appropriate form for scenes of immediacy and acceleration. The 
narration of the scene is such that the reader experiences the burning of the child precisely in line 
with the father, who, having heard the boy scream, witnesses everything in one long sentence: ‘the 
overturned pot on the floortile before the stove and the burner’s blue jet and the floor’s pool of 
water still steaming as its many arms extended […].’193 While the narrative focalisation of the piece 
rests with an unknown third person narrator, the reader is led to align with the father, absorbing the 
scene through his point of view, too. The brevity of the piece is heightened further by its locational 
focus within the home’s kitchen, creating a twofold claustrophobia as scene and form both unfold in 
small spaces, producing anxiety in the reader, and representing the weight of the trauma the 
parents and child experience.  
Equally, the story is rooted in precarious conditions, not only because of the unpredictability 
of the accident itself (which, interpreted alone, would not invoke a precarious context), but also 
because the family are hosting a tenant in their home. This implies a need for additional income that 
speaks of rootlessness and instability, as well as demonstrating a less traditional family structure 
that has to an extent breached the social hygiene of the family home. In an environment of such 
precarity, Ivor Southwood argues that ‘the individual must exist in a state of constant readiness,’ 
anticipating which mundane and less mundane anxieties may be realised.194 With this in mind, the 
narration of the piece implies the family is being punished for its unreadiness, and for its inability to 
cope with panic and trauma, impossible though this might be to do under pressure. Even under the 
logic of the new chronic, which is characterised by, among many things, crisis culture and 
management, ‘we can prepare for crisis, we can stage it, reenact it, even practice it, but when the 
airplane is going down we can never be sure if we will help others out the door or be pinned to our 
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seats in uncontrollable fear.’195 In the mother’s case, she is so hysterical ‘she was almost frozen,’ and 
turns immediately to ‘invoking God,’ while the father rushes to address the situation which results in 
misinterpretation.196  
The story’s seventh sentence suddenly shifts the tone of the piece from a literal, visceral 
account to a figurative, speculative, and experimental one, as the parents realise ‘where the real 
water’d fallen and pooled and been burning their baby boy all this time while they screamed for 
them to help him and they hadn’t.’197 Thus, the father’s reflexive attempts to cool the child’s head, 
shoulders, and chest under the tap have only meant that the child, yet unable to express its pain in 
words, has had to sound ‘new high cries’ to indicate that his parents have not yet managed to 
help.198 Here, the invoked state of ‘not yet’ speaks to key facets of the story’s anxious temporalities - 
to a sense of impending danger and uncertain futures, and also to the elongation of traumatic 
experience, made all the more difficult to process because there is still slim hope that the parents 
may yet be able to help their child. In an email to Ms. Testa, a woman who made enquiries with 
Wallace’s literary agent Bonnie Nadell about translating ‘Incarnations,’ Wallace himself argues that 
‘the father will feel guilty that he had not checked the diaper sooner, and he will search for 
rationalizations: one is that, though the child was still crying, he [the father] believed the crying was 
from fear, not from pain.’199 Here, then, the father’s anticipatory logic, marred by panic, fails him, 
because the trauma of the scene is too great - the realization of the true threat and the true nature 
of his son’s cries is delayed. In this meeting of panic and trauma, the father can only act on 
embodied reflex, rather than responding reactively to the actuality of the scene in its entirety.  
Moving from the blunt eighth sentence, ‘If you’ve never wept and want to, have a child,’ the 
story swiftly moves to a final sentence tinged with guilt, mourning, and pathos, losing its narrative 
thread and imitating the childlike babble of the father’s thoughts: ‘Break your heart inside and 
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something will a child is the twangy song the Daddy hears again as if the radio’s lady was almost 
there with him looking down at what they’ve done,’.200 Rather than offering any clarity, then, the 
story ends with the stark juxtaposition of the father’s shame at thinking of wanting a cigarette as 
they remove and replace the steaming diaper that has scalded the child, and the inconclusive, open-
ended, even spiritual description of the child ‘learn[ing] to leave himself and watch the whole rest 
unfold from a point overhead.’201  This desire serves as an especially cruel reminder of his failure to 
protect his child, given that he was burned, and the lighting and smoking of a cigarette must involve 
burning. The father’s guilt is amplified by his feeling that the radio presenter is also watching him, 
unwanted yet present, like the twangy song which returns to a person’s head unbidden. This song, in 
turn, metaphorically represents the child, reminding us that he will always come back to the parents’ 
thoughts and memories as a traumatic return at unwanted and at jarring moments. Yet the twangy 
song is also an anxious transference, as the father’s mind replaces the experience of the child being 
burnt with music, fearing judgement for his and his partner’s response to their son’s accident. While 
the final sentence is narrated almost like a stream of consciousness, with the child’s final fate left 
unclear (we are unsure as to whether he is dead, or permanently disabled or disfigured), we are told 
that ‘whatever was lost never thenceforth mattered,’ and that ‘its self’s soul [was] so much vapor 
aloft, falling as rain and then rising,’.202 The idea of what is lost not mattering could imply that the 
child survived but was too young to realise, at least at this pre-verbal stage, the long-term 
significance of any loss of function caused by the accident. However, because as a burns victim he 
would likely need multiple painful surgeries, this reality would, of course, soon become apparent to 
him.  
Given that his soul leaves the body and then enters into the water cycle, it seems more likely 
that he has died, yet this, too, is rendered ambiguous by the future that is temporally implied by the 
phrase ‘never thenceforth mattered,’ which indicates some kind of continuation, as well as an oddly 
 




definitive negation of past trauma. This ambiguity operates in stark contrast to the previously 
recurring image of the tenant’s new door hanging on its hinge, which reaches resolution as ‘the 
hinge gave but by then it was too late.’203 However, the fast-paced unfolding of the burning scene 
means that narrative focus rests not on the story’s multivalent ending, but on the immediate 
aftermath of the child’s accident. While the reader may become anxiously involved in the child’s 
fate, in line with the mother and father, any hope for resolution is quickly undermined. Archival 
material reveals that Wallace made a conscious decision to change the ending of the story so that it 
was far more inconclusive – in earlier notes stored on a floppy disk, the story is named ‘Childhood 
Genital Trauma,’ and ends with ‘half [the child’s] penis [coming] off with the diaper.’204 In deciding 
against this more visceral and conclusive ending, Wallace allows his short story to perform the 
temporal suspension the form can facilitate.  Whereas this earlier draft has an object (the penis), 
linking it more closely to fear, the actual story is considerably more ambiguous, far-reaching, and 
inconclusive, provoking significant anxiety around temporality and all that is unresolved. 
Indeed, those who desire clear resolution are almost mocked by the closing image of the sun 
going ‘up and down like a yoyo,’ which serves as a naïve image associated with childhood, 
embodying the oscillations in emotional states that the story has captured, and mimicking fast-
paced breathing or even palpitations, as well as the passage of time in adolescence. This bathos pulls 
attention away from the anguish of the father, while also enhancing the claustrophobia of the piece, 
given that no real answers are offered to the reader. The movement of the yoyo is also reminiscent 
of a game which Freud observed a child playing which involved throwing an object (usually a toy) 
away from themselves and then pulling it back towards themselves with string. Freud labelled this 
game Fort-Da (Gone-Here), and conceptualizes it as a cathartic repetition of the trauma of the 
child’s mother leaving him at any given point – ‘at the outset he was in a passive situation – he was 
overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he 
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took on an active part. These efforts might be put down to an instinct for mastery.’205 Freud also 
observes that this game could be a means for the child to ‘revenge himself on the mother for going 
away from him.’206 The sun’s movements at the story’s close might also then be thought of as a kind 
of Fort-Da game for the burned child, an attempt to reflect the parents’ failure to protect him, and a 
reiteration of his ability to transcend the scene and present trauma – thus reclaiming an otherwise 
melancholy image. Further, Fort-Da is a first loss, which relates to the father’s loss in that he is back 
in the fort-da formative first trauma, trapped or doomed to repeat developmental stages. 
Like Wallace’s ‘Incarnations,’ Díaz’s ‘Ysrael,’ which is formed of six short episodes that span 
fifteen pages, deals with a young subject. Indeed, each of the stories this chapter considers have 
children at their centre, and represent a particular set of anxieties surrounding the future, 
particularly given that, in Lee Edelman’s terms, a child can be thought of as an investment in the 
future: ‘the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value.’207 This focus on children and young people is 
significant, as this means the focus is also on questions of futurity, and the anxiety an unknown 
future may cause. This anxiety may well be heightened by the innocence of childhood, and our 
particular protectiveness over children, especially when at risk of physical and emotional harm. 
Considering the structure and makeup of Drown, Boddy notes that: 
 
Díaz described the collection as a ‘tapestry,’ and the stories he has published since Drown 
have, in featuring some of its characters, added further to its texture. The absence of a 
‘coherent narrative’ is crucial to a book that is all about living in gaps and fissures, between 
childhood and adulthood, between countries and between languages.208 
 
With this in mind, it is clear that Díaz intended for the scenes in Drown to be snapshots that resist 
the offering of a linear, neat narrative, as this is not adequate for the representation of young, 
diasporic experience, which is widely varied and complex, and which, as I will argue later, has 
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idiosyncratic temporalities. Further, anxiety’s existence within particular temporalities (that are 
especially relevant to young people) speaks back to Edelman’s notion of the child as representing 
the value of the future, given that the young people in the stories analysed here face unsettling, 
uncertain futures, or, indeed, risk having no future at all.  
Each episode of ‘Ysrael’ builds on Yunior and his older brother Rafa’s knowledge of a facially 
disfigured child called Ysrael, who lives in the countryside where the brothers spend their summers 
with relatives. Over the course of the story’s episodes, we are made aware of Rafa’s increasing 
fascination with Ysrael, as he asks ‘Could you see under the mask?’ and wonders ‘how much of 
Ysrael’s face is gone,’.209 Although Yunior is initially excited by Rafa’s plan to find and observe Ysrael, 
their expedition is soon tinged with trepidation and anxiety, as the brothers begin to bicker, and 
Yunior recalls his aunt’s warning that if they looked at Ysrael’s face, ‘[they] would be sad for the rest 
of [their] lives.’210 By the end of the third episode, Yunior has been portrayed as a sympathetic 
character, who is bullied by Rafa, called a ‘pussy’ and told to ‘get tougher.’211 However, the fourth 
episode takes us back to the previous summer, where Yunior ‘pegged Ysrael with a rock,’ knowing 
that he has ‘clocked a shoulder blade.’212 Given that the chronology of the story is fragmented, the 
affective drive of the piece is also complicated. While Ysrael is clearly the affective anchor, and the 
character for whom the reader is likely to feel the most pity, up until the fourth episode, Yunior is 
also a sympathetic character. However, any anxiety concerning Ysrael’s fate soon becomes attached 
to both Yunior and Rafa, both of whom become a threat to him.  
It is only in episode five that the brothers actually encounter Ysrael together, and Yunior 
soon falls into a friendly back-and-forth with him, asking about his kite and his interest in wrestling. 
This brief camaraderie is quickly and violently ended, however, as Rafa ‘brought his arm around and 
smashed the bottle on the top of [Ysrael’s] head.’213 Rather than intervene to help the boy that he 
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has begun to befriend, and yet, has also abused in the past, Yunior stands by, exclaiming ‘holy 
fucking shit’ before helping Rafa to roll Ysrael over.214 This episode comes to a sombre end as Rafa 
crouches down to Ysrael’s beaten body, and ‘using only two of his fingers, turned [his] head from 
side to side.’215 Committing a final voyeuristic act, Rafa thus completes his quest to see what is 
beneath Ysrael’s mask, though, in turning his head from side to side to look further, there is a 
suggestion of shame, as if Ysrael, even in his pain and humiliation, is shaking his head at the 
brothers, silently condemning their violence. The structure of the brief final episode of the story 
further emphasizes this shame, as it transpires that Rafa and Yunior have taken the wrong bus, and 
are headed in the wrong direction, back towards Ysrael’s village. In its cruelty, Rafa’s final interaction 
with Ysrael calls to mind Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of the face-to-face encounter, which he views 
as the basis of the ‘ethical relation and of language.’216 Indeed, Levinas views this interaction as so 
fundamental, that ‘no fear, no trembling could alter the straightforwardness of this relationship.’217 
In engaging with someone face-to-face, Levinas argues that one enters into an ethical relation with 
oneself, and that, through the responsibility towards the Other that this encounter necessitates for 
the self, ‘the Other […] reveal[s] himself in his face.’218 However, what does have the potential to 
alter and challenge the face-to-face interaction is a mask. In denying the revealing of the Other (in 
this case, Ysrael) in a full-face encounter, it is impossible for Yunior and Rafa to have an ethical 
relationship with Ysrael. The ‘nakedness’ of the face, as Levinas puts it, reveals its poverty, and 
presents the Other as vulnerable – ‘the poor one, the stranger, […] an equal.’219 Although Ysrael’s 
mask in no way excuses the way he is treated by Yunior, and Rafa in particular, it does alter the 
relations they share, as they are not encountering Ysrael as an equal. Rather, they are projecting fear 
and monstrosity onto Ysrael’s mask, and thus negating the purity of the face-to-face in Levinas’ 
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terms. This does not divest the boys of the essential ethical responsibility that the self has for the 
Other, but their projections make it very difficult for them to encounter the poverty of Ysrael’s face. 
Nonetheless, Yunior’s naivety and guilt is highlighted as he contemplates Ysrael’s fate, particularly in 
relation to his forthcoming surgery – ‘Ysrael will be OK […] they’re going to fix him.’220 ‘Ysrael’ ends 
almost like a fable, with Rafa’s statement that ‘they aren’t going to do shit to [Ysrael]’ followed by a 
glance from an old woman with a ‘milky’ eye.221  In this moment, the woman embodies the narrative 
gaze, which symbolically notes the boys’ boarding of the wrong bus, which is travelling in the wrong 
direction. The white of the woman’s eye reflects Yunior’s waning innocence, while its blankness also 
serves as a bathetic reminder of the erasure of abnormal bodies, echoing the way Ysrael has been 
forced to mask his disfigurement.  
Formally, the story ends cyclically, with a repetition of Rafa’s line ‘get ready to run,’ 
reminding the reader of the temporary escape each brother can make from their respective 
anxieties about their treatment of, and interactions with Ysrael, and that Ysrael can make from his 
torment at the hands of other children. Rafa’s compulsion to see Ysrael’s face can itself be thought 
of as an anxious drive, bound up with concerns about how he himself is perceived, and about 
fulfilling the role of a hypermasculine Latino, driven by physical strength and thus appearance, as 
well as sexual virility.222 Even without his mask, the extent of Ysrael’s facial difference could result in 
a negation of the face-to-face – indeed, both with and without mask, Rafa cannot seem to 
incorporate Ysrael via the facial encounter, resulting in a severe othering with ultimately violent 
consequences. In this sense, the gaze cannot subordinate Ysrael. It is clear that Yunior attempts to 
allay his anxiety about his own teasing of Ysrael by speaking to him, and by re-enforcing the boy’s 
hope that his face will be ‘fixed’ by surgery. Unlikely though it may seem, this hope of redemption 
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for Ysrael also drives the story, with the reader likely invested in this redemption, though also 
painfully aware of its unlikeliness.  
 Díaz’s ‘No Face’ is directly linked to ‘Ysrael’, and offers us the boy’s perspective on his 
disfigurement in third person narration over the course of six pages. Oddly hopeful given his ill-
treatment, Ysrael imagines himself as having superpowers, with capital letters enthusiastically 
aligning with his child-like belief that he can speak words to engage skills: ‘FLIGHT,’ ‘INVISIBILITY,’ 
and ‘STRENGTH.’223 In this sense, the story grants immense power to language, with Ysrael’s words 
directly correlating to physical agility, and introducing a magical-realist element to his narrative. The 
unknown narrator of this story supports and encourages Ysrael’s conception of himself, saying that 
‘he’s unbeatable’ and that ‘no one can touch him.’224 Indeed, there is something excitable about the 
way in which Ysrael is described, which counteracts the pity and sadness with which he is described 
through Yunior’s eyes in ‘Ysrael’ (demonstrating how language has also objectified him). The 
excitability of narration in ‘No Face’ can be thought of as a means of speaking back to Ysrael’s 
anxiety about his future, particularly as he is still haunted by the image of the pig which disfigured 
him, and the fear that ‘nothing will change’ after his now-scheduled surgery.225 His adoption of a 
superhero persona is clearly a coping mechanism against this anxiety that nothing will change, or 
that his surgery will be unsuccessful, as other attempts have been, as well as a means of combating 
his fear of the pig, which he can only counteract by ‘tell[ing] himself to be a man.’226 Ysrael’s peers 
repeatedly remind him of his accident, ‘as though afraid that he might forget,’ and this results in him 
dreaming of the pig, as ‘blunt teeth rip a strip from under his eye and the muscle revealed is 
delicious, like lechosa.’227 On occasion, he is able to save some of his face in these dreams, mitigating 
this traumatic return, but sometimes, ‘he cannot turn his head or [the pig’s] mouth is like a pothole 
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and nothing can escape it.’228 This anxiety dream stresses Ysrael’s concern that the pig will always be 
with him, and that the injuries it caused him will never heal – indeed, the pothole that is the pig’s 
mouth is metaphorically all-consuming, reminding us of the voyeuristic ravenousness of Ysrael’s 
community, which, like a pig consuming a sweet lechosa (papyrus) fruit, violently feasts on his 
difference.  
Of the three stories this chapter considers, ‘No Face’ is certainly the one with the most 
redemptive ending, at least on first reading. Whereas ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’ and ‘Ysrael’ 
end inconclusively, hanging in suspense with no clear sense of what is to come, ‘No Face’ concludes 
with the act of running, which is regularly repeated throughout Drown: ‘He runs, down towards 
town, never slipping or stumbling. Nobody’s faster.’229 Having begun the story with members of his 
community calling ‘No Face’ after him, this appears as a quite remarkable turnaround – Ysrael is 
presented as forceful and determined. Yet his skill at running has developed from the repeated 
release of adrenaline as he has fled those who wish to harm and mock him. Equally, we are aware 
that the apparent optimism of this ending is a façade, masking the anxiety both Ysrael and the 
reader have about his future under a veneer of imagined superpower. Returning to Ysrael’s 
invocation of the power of ‘FLIGHT,’ fight-or-flight responses are called to mind, with Ysrael 
addressing his fears by transcending them in his imagination – entering what can be thought of as a 
fugue state. In psychiatry, a fugue state can also be ‘a flight from one’s own identity, often involving 
travel to some unconsciously desired locality.’230 In Ysrael’s case, he is metaphorically ‘rising above’ 
the cruelty of his peers, his isolation from his community, and the shame his family feel about his 
facial difference, leaving behind these facets of his life and identity in favour of his superheroic 
persona. As such, Ysrael could even be thought of as exhibiting some symptoms of a dissociative 
disorder as a result of the trauma he has suffered. Adopting a new, superheroic persona which 
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allows Ysrael to occupy spaces he could not otherwise reach would in this case be a defense 
mechanism against his accident and the cruelty that has followed it.  
Thus, to align with the potential optimism of the piece is to be complicit in the lie that the 
narration of the story weaves – that is, that Ysrael will achieve any significant change as a result of 
his surgery. Read in isolation, the story might give this impression, as the Doctor tells Lou, who 
watches over Ysrael, that ‘everything looks good’ and that ‘we’ll get him there eventually.’231 Ysrael 
himself reacts to the spatial and medical ambiguity of the word ‘there’, noting that he ‘doesn’t know 
what he should think’ about this analysis, which in turn, opens up a narrative about the assumed 
necessity of recovery, and whether it is always positive to recover.232 The word ‘there’ implies a 
space that constitutes an endpoint, a space in which Ysrael will be well, or better. However, in  
Ysrael’s case, it is difficult to know what recovery would constitute, particularly given that in the 
short story ‘Ysrael’, Yunior reports that ‘his left ear was a nub and you could see the thick veined 
slab of his tongue through a hole in his cheek. He had no lips […] his eyes had gone white and the 
cords were out on his neck.’233 If we are to read this description literally, tinged though it may be by 
a youthful propensity to exaggerate the grotesque, the extent of Ysrael’s disfigurement is 
nonetheless severe, such that the prospect of a significant recovery, or indeed any kind of ‘change’, 
as he himself puts it, seems unlikely. Further, the language that Ysrael’s doctor and Padre Lou use to 
describe Ysrael’s potential recovery is ambiguous (Lou asks if the doctor has a ‘ballpark figure’ for 
how long it will take), and not necessarily rooted in Ysrael’s preferences, but rather in the imposition 
of certain trajectories of recovery that the adults in his life want for him.234 As readers, we are aware 
of the complexity of Ysrael’s recovery, given that he will be permanently scarred regardless of how 
much treatment he receives, rendering the clear ‘endpoint’ of his surgery ambiguous, as well as 
ethically charged – who decides when his recovery is complete? Further, none of Ysrael’s peers 
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mention the psychological impact his accident has had on him, despite the narration demonstrating 
that Ysrael is experiencing traumatic return through nightmares about the pig. It is his physical 
recovery that is being discussed by the doctor and Padre Lou, despite it being evident that recovery 
for Ysrael would constitute both the physical and psychological. The tapestry-like structure of Drown 
as a whole, as noted by Boddy, also speaks to the difficulties and complexities both of recovery itself 
and its narration, given that even full recovery will not truly restore a person to what they were 
before their illness or injury. 
This kind of interconnectivity is apparent throughout Díaz’s work. The majority of his 
collection This is How You Lose Her (2012) and his novel The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao 
(2007) feature Yunior de Las Casas as narrator (as does Drown), and many of these stories are linked 
up by recurring characters and locations. As such, Díaz’s body of work forms a constellation which 
offers snippets of characters’ lives – snapshots that relate to one another. These snapshots do not 
necessarily unfold chronologically, which can be thought of as an acknowledgement of the 
challenges posed by attempting to narrate experiences of anxiety, trauma, and diaspora in a linear 
way. Indeed, the structure of Díaz’s work implies this is, in fact, impossible, reflecting Anne 
Whitehead’s argument that the medical humanities as a field must move away from its prioritization 
of ‘conventional narrative modes,’ which cannot bear the more ‘chaotic and contingent aspects’ of 
illness.235 If we take Díaz’s work as a cycle of sorts, questions of recovery and teleology posed in his 
work are complicated further. The ambiguity of what recovery means for Ysrael – what it is, and how 
long it will take, is in and of itself a frustration of any easy sense of purpose or telos, which is 
reflected formally in the fragmented yet interrelated way in which Díaz presents information about 
different characters. Ysrael’s recovery narrative, then, is rendered chronic, as there is no clear or 
agreed point at which it ends. Sianne Ngai notes that anxiety is ‘intimately aligned with the concept 
of futurity, and the temporal dynamics of deferral and anticipation in general,’ and this is all the 
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more relevant in adolescence, given there is far more future to unfold.236 Equally, that future is 
increasingly uncertain in a globalized yet environmentally and sociopolitically precarious world.  
 In ‘Incarnations,’ ‘No Face,’ and ‘Ysrael,’ pacing, sentence length, the length of the piece in 
its entirety, chronology (and the rate and order in which information is revealed to the reader), 
narrative perspective and focalisation, tone, the layout of text on a page, and the use of bathos all 
contribute to the feelings of anxiety the writing evokes and represents through its form, both for 
characters and in the reader. In the case of building narrative tension, and bathetic endings, it can be 
argued that these formal qualities are particularly common in the short story, denoting its especial 
suitability for the representation of anxiety, given its relationship to unknown futures, and the 
collapse of futures in the short stories analysed. Just as Scofield argues that the short story always 
has an emphasis on ‘narrative and event […] the most intense and life-changing experiences,’ Kasia 
Boddy posits that the ‘formal essence of the short story is the staging of turning points.’237 There is 
an intimacy and intensity to the short story which provides space only for a snapshot of anxious 
experience, yet this snapshot can carry with it immense affective potential, given that the form is 
frequently used to give insights into private and internal drives, sensations and emotions. In this 
sense, the short story prioritises momentary sensations, thoughts, and feelings, rather than the 
ongoingness of a particular condition. However, this snapshot structure of the short story does, 
nonetheless, also carry a chronic quality because of its temporal suspension. In this sense, the short 
story occupies an oxymoronic space of stasis and uncertainty, where the sudden and the slow 
collide. A short story may take less time to read, and action may unfold more quickly because of its 
brevity, yet formally, its open-endedness, paired with the representation of anxiety therein, allows 
for both chronic and acute temporalities.  
As the moments of panic captured in the child’s accident in ‘Incarnations,’ Ysrael’s assault in 
‘Ysrael,’ and the dreams and recollections of the pig in ‘No Face’ demonstrate, the short story is an 
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especially useful form in which to explore sudden moments of anxiety, which appear as moments of 
narrative disconnect that are not connected to a longer telos, but rather, are suspended 
independently and indefinitely. The closeness a reader may feel to the action and characters of a 
short story also leads to a more sudden emotional investment in the text, particularly given they will 
have an awareness that this closeness will be fleeting. This could lead to an increasing chance of 
anxiety on the reader’s part, should they become particularly attached to, or concerned about, a 
character’s welfare, or indeed if they become immersed in the tension built into the form, which 
rarely offers resolution. The suddenness with which panic responses as a manifestation of anxiety 
appear in short stories speaks to the discontinuities within the new chronic. As Augé observes, there 
is a ‘feeling among the public at large – [that is] no doubt technically inaccurate, but sociologically 
revealing – that in art as in architecture, everything stays the same,’ – and the false promise of this 
sameness is highlighted by the short story’s formal denial of the future.238 If the driving narrative 
force in short stories is episodes, events, or turning points, it can also be thought of as mimicking 
chronic anxiety, with anxiety consistently under the surface but also appearing in sudden, brief 
moments, as in the case of a panic attack.  
 
Anxious Masks, Masking Anxiety 
 
Having considered the formal iterations of anxiety both within the short story and on the part of the 
reader encountering a short story, I will now move to the consideration of a prevalent and recurring 
image and metaphor for anxiety and anxious experiences within the short story – the mask and 
masking. Both ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face’ contain a literal mask – the one that covers Ysrael’s face, while 
along with ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’, each story also features figurative masks and instances 
of masking in order to address, conceal and represent anxious feelings. The word ‘mask’ has several 
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meanings, ranging from the obvious ‘covering for the face, and related senses’ to ‘a facial expression 
assumed deliberately to conceal an emotion or give a false impression.’239 In its verb form, it can also 
mean ‘to diminish or prevent the perception of (another stimulus, esp. one affecting the same 
sense).’240 Its etymology is linked to the French masque and Italian maschera, which in turn, has 
been linked to the post-classical Latin masca – ‘an evil spirit, spectre.’241 As such, the process of 
masking is one that has long been linked to darkness and deception, as well as the covering up of 
emotions, or even an attempt to repress one’s feelings. Yet in drama and theatrical performance, 
and particularly in Expressionist theatre, the mask can be used to intensify the representation of an 
emotion. In the context of artistic representations of anxiety, there is perhaps no more emblematic 
image than Edward Munch’s ‘The Scream’, with the figure’s facial expression of exaggerated turmoil 
presented as mask-like. This is particularly emphasized by the placement of the figure’s hands, which 
are placed to the side of the face, almost as if holding a mask to it. With this in mind, it is pertinent 
to consider what kinds of masks, literal and figurative, are being presented in the short stories at 
hand, and why. How might the wearing of masks or masking allay or induce anxiety? When is 
masking consensual, and when it is not, why is it occurring? What anxieties are being addressed in 
the act of masking, be it literal, metaphorical, or metonymical? Equally, each story features 
disfigured child subjects, and the perspectives both of those who have experienced and witnessed 
trauma. Boddy argues that ‘the short story, a form constituted by and as crisis, well suits 
adolescence’ – might it be, then, that the youth of the characters in questions brings with it a 
particular desire on their parts to mask abnormality and difference, out of protectiveness, a desire to 
fit in, or more selfish motives?242 Why does Díaz choose to focus so closely on masks and young 
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people?243 As I have already argued, the short story has particular affinity with panic-responses, and, 
with Boddy’s assertion in mind, can also relate to the implicit temporality of adolescence, which, 
while we are young, may feel particularly slow, but which, on reflection, seems to occur very quickly 
– might this compacted temporality of adolescence also suggest an especial affinity with the form of 
the short story? In her work on adolescence and time, Pam Thurschwell notes that there is a 
particular trend in contemporary young adult (YA) fiction to undermine the traditional 
bildungsroman plotline when representing young people in favour of ‘registering the actual 
condition of young western adults living under precarity and neoliberal capital.’244 As a result, 
romance plots are superseded by stories whereby ‘adolescents confront the terrors of extinction 
rather than those of developmental time.’245 Given that the short story, by virtue of its length, is best 
suited for portraying snapshots that are often inconclusive, it lends itself to this compacted 
adolescent temporality, which is also driven towards uncertain, often dark futures.  
Beginning with Ysrael’s actual mask, in both ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face,’ characters exhibit a 
morbid fascination with what is underneath it. The narration of both stories seems to encourage this 
fascination, providing regular detail on Ysrael’s facial expression beneath his mask, as well as titbits 
of hearsay and gossip about his appearance. In turn, this fascination is inevitably bound up with an 
anxiety about disfigurement and abnormality – a relief on the voyeur’s part at their own wellness. 
Ysrael’s mask is also presented as a means of quelling his father’s anxiety about his son’s 
abnormality – ‘the father was very sensitive about anyone taunting his oldest son, which explained 
the mask.’246 While in ‘Ysrael’ the mask is presented as something the father has suggested to 
protect his child, in ‘No Face,’ it is implied that Ysrael wears the mask mainly for his father’s sake, to 
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prevent shame and embarrassment. This shame appears to be as much about the father’s inability 
to protect his son as his son’s actual disabilities, which in turn speaks to the anxieties and discomfort 
able-bodied people may feel when encountering a person with a disability. When the father is 
returning, Ysrael’s mother fetches his mask and tells him to ‘go […] before your father comes out.’247 
Thus, the family’s anxiety about Ysrael turns on itself – they are anxious both about protecting the 
child from the people of Ocoa, and, in Ysrael and his mother’s case, about ensuring that the father is 
not exposed to his son’s true face. The fragility and indeed inadequacy of the mask to truly achieve 
these aims (and thus reduce the family’s anxiety) is made unpleasantly evident as Ysrael places it 
back on his face, only to ‘feel the fleas stirring in the cloth.’248 His proximity to these animals, as well 
as the fact that his facial difference was caused by a pig, reiterate the way he is repeatedly treated 
as non-human by his peers, while also viscerally representing his peers’ fascination with his face by 
associating this unsettling voyeurism with bloodsucking insects.  
Returning to Levinas’ assertions about the face-to-face, even the title ‘No Face’ literalises 
the negation of Ysrael’s face, serving as a performative act of denial that has the potential to be 
completely dehumanising. In conversation with Philippe Nemo, Levinas does briefly consider the act 
of masking, noting that ‘there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to 
mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance.’249 Here, Levinas is 
contemplating behavioural acts of self-masking, taking on a particular character or acting in a certain 
way to hide one’s vulnerabilities – yet, in Totality and Infinity, he proposes that it is only when the 
self acknowledges the poverty of the Other, unhidden and naked, that we move towards productive 
discourse and ethical encounters. The so-called ‘poverty’ of the face lays us bare to the person 
encountering us – it acts as a reminder of our difference and our vulnerability, while also instilling a 
sense of responsibility in the self for the other. The significance of a physical mask, then, is all the 
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more complex – Ysrael’s family are sensitive about him being seen without his mask, and yet, both 
wearing the mask and exposing the nakedness of his actual face result in him being subject to 
taunting and violence. Face-to-face encounters with and without his mask on lack the ethical 
relationship to self and Other that Levinas cites as central to such encounters, indicating that the 
selves that come into contact with him do not view his actual face as a face, either. Those who meet 
Ysrael do not feel the sense of responsibility for him that Levinas suggests the poverty of the face 
should provoke in the self, and without this sense of responsibility, there is no possibility of an 
ethical encounter (which for Levinas, is grounded in human communication and the 
acknowledgement of the aforementioned responsibility). The ethical encounter is one that has the 
potential to teach morality, but only if the self who encounters the other is prepared to accept 
responsibility for them, and thus relinquish, to an extent, their freedom to act on impulses. The 
denial of Ysrael’s face represents an anxiety that is central to both ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face’ about 
disability – an anxiety that is so severe that members of Ysrael’s community are prepared to deny his 
humanity to avoid coming into meaningful contact with his facial difference. 
The names of characters are particularly linked to the masking of physical and psychological 
pain in ‘Ysrael’ and ‘No Face,’ as the name Ysrael is a Spanish variation of the name Israel, which is 
biblically linked to Jacob, who was re-named Israel after wrestling with an angel (or God, in some 
interpretations). During this fight, the man ‘touched the hollow of [Jacob’s] thigh, and the hollow of 
Jacob’s thigh was out of joint,’ and once their fight has ended, the man says ‘thy name shall be called 
no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast 
prevailed.’250 The renamed Israel is permanently disabled as a result of this encounter, and the name 
is generally taken to mean ‘fighter for God’ or ‘God-contended,’ as it combines Hebrew words for 
wrestle and God. As a result, the name is also interpreted as ‘he struggled with God.’ In turn, the 
ancient Greek word ἀγών (Agon) means struggle, and is the etymon of the word agony. Thus, 
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Ysrael’s name has particular resonance, as his facial difference and the pain and anxiety it has 
caused him are implicit within it, almost like a prophecy of the struggles to come, masked within its 
etymology. Indeed, in a cruel nod to this etymology, just before Rafa smashes a bottle on Ysrael’s 
head, Yunior tries to make conversation with him, asking if he is ‘still into wrestling,’ to which the 
boy replies, ‘I’m a great wrestler. I almost went to fight in the Capital.’251 This linguistic masking 
echoes Ysrael’s reliance on language to ascribe powers to himself, while also offering a more 
positive example of a face-to-face encounter with the Other, as although the Biblical Israel is harmed 
and renamed by his encounter with God, it also redefines him, leading him to be blessed.  
Ysrael’s surgery can, in turn, be thought of as a kind of masking. His father’s insistence that 
he always wears a mask, along with the cries of ‘No Face!’ from villagers and the violence Ysrael is 
subject to, emphasise his community’s discomfort with difference.252 Indeed, as well as his cloth 
mask, it appears that his family have attempted many other kinds of masking to conceal Ysrael, 
including calling on ‘santeras.’253 Santeras are spiritual workers who practice Santería, a religion of 
Caribbean origin which centres around the worship of saints. It was Ysrael’s mother who hired the 
santeras, who ‘called on every spirit in the celestial directory for help’ to heal Ysrael.254 As Adelaida 
M. Rosario and Mario De La Rosa note, ‘Santería’s traditions function as anchors to cultural identity 
and as an informal health care system that continues to prove resistant to formal biomedical health 
care.’255 Further, ‘folk healing traditions inclusive of Santería function in much the same way as 
mental health services, serving as “informal counseling” with spirituality as an added dimension.’256 
In calling in santeras before medical doctors, Ysrael’s mother exemplifies the Ocoan community’s 
reluctance to engage with Western biomedicine. For her, Santería is a more reliable and comforting 
option, though when the santeras fail the family does concede and call in American and later 
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Canadian doctors to help Ysrael. While he is promised operations, their capacity to mask Ysrael’s 
disfigurement is called into question, as his own wounds and scars are directly juxtaposed with the 
unmaskable injuries of other children in the ward, including ‘a boy whose skull plates had not closed 
all the way and a girl who didn’t have arms,’ as well as a child who proudly states ‘you can see my 
brain […] All I have is this membrane thing and you can see right into it.’257 In particular, the boy’s 
statement that anyone can see right into his brain seems to deny any possibility of interiority, of the 
ability to mask anything. It is as though his injury, and by extension, Ysrael’s, strips individual agency 
from him – rendering any literal attempt to mask it pointless. Each of the children’s wounds are 
obvious, and unmaskable in a literal sense, though the anxiety that Ysrael’s narrative bears means 
that metaphorical  masking is at play within ‘No Face’ and ‘Ysrael’, too.  
For his own part, Ysrael opts to metaphorically mask himself, assuming the character of a 
superhero, and immersing himself in comic book culture as well as wrestling and strength training. 
This characterisation is twofold, as he trains outdoors doing pull-ups and chest exercises, while also 
reading comic books bought for him by the kindly Padre Lou. Ysrael clearly finds comfort in this 
characterisation, seeking out those similar to him, particularly those who have also been othered or 
isolated – in ‘No Face’ he chooses ‘Kaliman, who takes no shit and wears a turban. If his face was 
covered he’d be perfect.’258 It is interesting to note that despite the wide variety of comic book 
superheroes who wear masks (and Ysrael’s internal monologue indicating his preference for masked 
characters), the qualities that particularly draw him to a character are their ability to withstand ‘shit’ 
from others, and their status as outsiders. In developing his fitness, Ysrael is able to easily address 
the issue of being targeted by village bullies, as he becomes faster and stronger than them, and thus 
more easily able to escape. In turn, Ysrael addresses his anxiety that nothing will change by 
imagining himself as having superpowers – and this self-masking, or perhaps re-imagining of his own 
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mask as a superheroic accessory, allows him to feel stronger in the face of his nightmares about the 
pig.  
 Both Ysrael and the child in ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’ are closely linked to, and 
indeed, masked by, the natural landscapes and organisms around them. In Ysrael’s case, he is linked 
to nature in both violent and protective ways at different moments. When we first hear of Ysrael’s 
accident from Yunior’s perspective in ‘Ysrael,’ the pig is described as having ‘eaten his face off, 
skinned it like an orange.’259 This visceral simile for the way in which Ysrael’s skin was apparently 
peeled off emphasises his vulnerability, and the ease with which masks may be removed or 
rendered necessary. Indeed, the jarring pairing of Ysrael’s violent disfigurement with a soft, sweet 
fruit could, in and of itself, be thought of as a metaphorical mask, mitigating the horror of the act. 
Later, in ‘No Face,’ nature provides a mask for Ysrael, and reminds him of his need to mask himself, 
as he and his mother are reminded he needs to hide from his father by ‘the way the land curves 
away to hide itself.’260 With this reminder from the landscape, ‘he hides, blending into the weeds.’261 
This camouflage links back to the image of the orange, juxtaposing its fruitfulness and vulnerability 
with the barrenness of weeds and the protection they offer Ysrael. In the case of the child in 
‘Incarnations of Burned Children,’ the boy becomes one with the environment, ‘falling as rain and 
then rising.’262 Given the immense pain and suffering the child has undergone in such a short space 
of time, this ambiguous link back to the natural progress of the water cycle is a considerably more 
gentle, though also melancholic metaphor. As rain occurs commonly, this metaphor points to the 
inevitable return of this trauma to the child’s parents’ lives – it is inescapable, and all encompassing. 
Indeed, bearing in mind the story’s apocalyptic title, which, in its plurality, invokes an unknown 
number of burned children, the piece also carries an environmental anxiety, linking up natural 
processes to human trauma, and indeed environmental trauma caused by human activity. This 
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trauma can be thought of as becoming anxiety in its open-endedness, as the future of the family in 
the story, and the infinite families summoned by its title, are, by virtue of this title, presented as 
always at risk of tragedy. In the context of war, Saint-Amour refers to this feeling as a ‘collective 
psychosis’ or ‘routinised anxiety’ - an ever-present anticipation of possible catastrophe that 
challenges trauma studies’ consistent focus on the past.263  Yet this constant sense of anxiety can 
apply outside of war, too, with the precarious working conditions and environmental instability 
implied by the story creating a persistent unease about the future that is emblematic of the shared 
anxieties of our present time. The universality of the story’s title is heightened by the generically 
named ‘the Daddy’ and ‘the Mommy,’ further emphasizing that the anxieties at hand are applicable 
to everyone, and even suggesting allegory.264 These anxieties are again well-placed within the short 
story, as both the form itself and the environmental and political anxieties represented within it 
conform to Cazdyn’s conditions of the new chronic, which ‘extends the present into the future, 
burying in the process the force of the terminal.’265  
  Each of the stories this chapter considers also contains examples of narration masking the 
full extent of characters’ traumatic and anxious experiences. In Ysrael’s case, although the reader is 
aware his chance of recovery in any meaningful sense, at least in terms of his physical injuries, is 
very low, we are nonetheless encouraged into a positive outlook for his future – a narrative act that 
can be considered as a form of masking. When asked whether he ever takes his mask off, Ysrael 
responds: ‘Not until I get better. I’m going to have an operation soon.’266 To this, Rafa says: ‘They’re 
lying to you. They probably just felt sorry.’267 However, in the later story ‘No Face,’ Ysrael meets with 
his Doctor, performs various exercises, knocks a boy who is bullying him away, and runs with 
noteworthy speed, eventually returning home to tell his younger brother Pesao that he has ‘been 
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fighting evil.’268 These acts undermine Rafa’s cynicism to some extent, and also plant a seed of hope 
that Ysrael’s face could be repaired. Although Ysrael admits he’s “’scared of the operations […] and 
wishes he could lie under a table where no one can see’ (an act of self-masking), the story closes 
optimistically, with Pesao being washed by his mother, and Ysrael running confidently and quickly 
towards town.269 This ending can be thought of as a form of narrative masking that attempts to 
appease the reader’s anxiety about Ysrael’s future, in the sense that it pulls attention away from 
Ysrael’s anxieties about his surgery, and about the future (that ‘nothing will change’), and instead 
sounds an unrealistically positive note, suggesting that Ysrael may overcome his bullies and the 
stigma he faces in his community, as is implied by the line ‘nobody’s faster.’270 In fact, we know that 
the narration of this story is focalized through Ysrael, and that his imagination is altering how scenes 
unfold, as when ‘he says STRENGTH and the fat boy flies off him.’271 In this sense, Ysrael’s 
adolescence is also masking the full extent of the difficulties he is facing, from his isolation in his 
community and even within his own family, to the physical violence he regularly suffers at the hands 
of local boys. While ‘No Face’ ends inconclusively, and the reader may well be aware that hope for 
Ysrael is misplaced, we are still guided towards leaving the anxieties he has expressed behind, and 
instead moving forwards positively in line with the momentum of his running. Indeed, the 
superheroic fugue state that he adopts through language (that is, the invocation of superpowers 
through caps-lock words) can also be thought of as a proxy form of wellness – an adoption of a 
hyper-well, hyper-physical persona that speaks back to anxieties about Latino masculinity which are 
reflected in his family’s desperate desire to heal or hide him. Although we have no sense of where 
Ysrael is running to, his trajectory is linear, encouraging a sense of positivity through forward 
motion. This stands in stark contrast to the image of the yoyo at the close of Wallace’s 
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‘Incarnations’, which moves up and down, unable to occupy the same space for any significant 
length of time, and metaphorically representing the uncertain future ahead.  
 Similarly, although the unnamed child in ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’ is not masked 
directly, his pain is initially presented as other, dissociated from the child’s body, such that two 
characters emerge, with the child’s face ‘seeming somehow separate from the sounds that 
issued.’272 Further, rather than linking the child’s cries to the child himself, they are described as ‘the 
screams,’ presented without object as if to mask the immense pain the child is experiencing. In these 
unfolding moments of immense panic, the father’s mind seems to empty itself – ‘his man’s mind 
empty of everything but purpose.’273 This can be thought of as a mental mask, employed to mitigate 
the horror of what he is witnessing, and perhaps, too, as a result of the fight-or-flight, reflexive 
nature of his response to his son’s burning.  Just as the child’s screams are disconnected from the 
boy, the father’s mind begins to block them out, as he ‘ceased to hear the high screams because to 
hear them would freeze him and make impossible what had to be done to help his own child.’274 
Despite the father’s personal masking of the sound, the screams continue, and are briefly 
reconnected to the child, coming ‘regular as breath.’275 Yet instantaneously, the screams are 
described as being separate from the child again, lasting ‘so long they’d become already a thing in 
the kitchen, something else to quickly move around.’276 The objectification of these screams again 
masks the pain of the child, instead conferring it into a ‘thing’ that the father must avoid to help his 
son – indeed, through the father’s gaze, ‘the toddler still made little fists and screamed except 
maybe now merely on reflex from fear,’ – lines that seem to deny the pain the child is in.277 To 
further this denial, the father comes face to face with his son only to hear ‘a high pure shining sound 
that could stop his heart.’278 Although this sound is clearly panic inducing, the fact it is not identified 
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as a scream again indicates the father is masking the trauma he is witnessing from himself, unable to 
process the full reality of the scene. Oxymoronically, at this juncture the child’s pain is unmasked, 
and made startlingly evident to the father, as the boy comes to embody the flame that has scalded 
him, ‘his bitty lips and gums now tinged with the light of a low flame the Daddy thought, screaming 
as if almost still under the tilted pot in pain.’279 It is only at this point of unmasking in the father’s 
thought process that he realises that in fact, he and his partner have been attending to the wrong 
wound, and that it is beneath the child’s diaper that most of the boiling water has gathered, fusing 
the fabric to his skin. Indeed, the child’s cries themselves serve a masking function, pointing to his 
inability to express his pain in language, particularly given his young age. This reflects the etymology 
of the word infant, which derives from the Latin infāns and French enfant, both of which translate as 
without speaking, or without language. The masking of the child’s pain thus occurs not out of any 
choice on his part, but rather because the only means he has of indicating his pain (through crying 
out) has proved inadequate, as it has not resulted in his parents being able to pinpoint the main 
bodily location of his pain.   
 The story concludes with two contrasting examples of masking, fluctuating from the trivial to 
the transcendental. Recalling regretfully the scene of his son’s burning, the father feels immense 
guilt at ‘how badly he wanted a cigarette’ as he wrapped the child in gauze and handtowels.280 In 
thinking of smoking rather than his son in these desperate final attempts at rescue, the father masks 
the reality that ‘it was too late, […] it wouldn’t stop, and they couldn’t make it.’281 The inefficiency of 
the parents’ anxiety-ridden responses to their son’s accident lead their son’s assumed death, or at 
least life-changing injuries, which in turn, brings the story to its final narrative mask, as ‘the child’s 
body expanded and walked about and lived its life untenanted.’282 As what appears to be the child’s 
soul ascends as ‘so much vapor aloft,’ his pain is drawn away from his body, which is left to wander 
 
279 Wallace, Oblivion, p. 115. 
280 Wallace, Oblivion, p. 116. 
281 Ibid.  
282 Ibid. 
 92 
eternally.283 The story’s narration thus ends on a jarring note, simultaneously horrific and peaceful, 
with the trauma of the scene apparently evaporating away, yet clearly ever-present for the child’s 
parents.  However, it must also be acknowledged that this ending is highly ambiguous – the reader is 
not offered any real certainty as to the child’s fate, and the word ‘untenanted’ seems to point not to 
overt bodily trauma such as wounds and scars, but rather to a more existential trauma.  The 
apparent emptiness of the child’s physical body, its lack of a tenant, indicates a separation of body 
and self, such that the child is no longer coinciding with himself. In dividing the child’s physical and 
psychological presences, Wallace speaks to the challenges of presenting a unified self, especially 
following physical trauma. This, too, speaks to the act of masking oneself, of presenting many 
versions of oneself that are suited to certain scenarios, and that can mask certain pains and 
anxieties.  
 Through formal techniques such as varying sentence length, the brevity of the stories 
themselves, narrative pacing, a variety of narrative perspectives, and the employment of collapsed 
or bathetic endings, the short stories this chapter has considered demonstrate the variety of ways in 
which the form is especially well-suited for the representation of anxiety, and is inherently anxious, 
in line with the form’s historic intertwinement with questions of anxiety and fear in the American 
tradition. These questions are revisited and reformulated in our contemporary anxious age in the 
stories at hand, cementing the short story as an anxious form. The general feeling of claustrophobia 
the techniques I have mentioned perform, tied with the sense of a denied or uncertain future that 
collapsed endings provoke, further emphasise the short story’s capacity both to be anxiety-inducing, 
and to mimic contemporary anxieties and symptoms of anxiety. Indeed, the open-endedness of 
‘Ysrael,’ ‘No Face,’ and ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’ speaks directly to the “slow cancellation of 
the future” that Mark Fisher analyses.284 He argues that  
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The 21st century is oppressed by a crushing sense of finitude and exhaustion. It doesn’t feel 
like the future […] there’s an increasing sense that culture has lost the ability to grasp and 
articulate the present. Or it could be that, in one very important sense, there is no present to 
grasp and articulate any more.285 
 
With this in mind, the lack of certainty that each of the stories offers about the future for its 
characters echoes the difficulty artistic culture faces in articulating the present (while also begging 
the question as to whether such articulation has ever truly been possible). Anxiety’s relationship 
with the short story is consolidated not only by its formal predisposition towards denied futures, but 
also by recurring themes, imagery, character types, and metaphors – particularly, in the case of the 
stories analysed within this chapter, the mask and the child. For Díaz, the mask operates both at a 
highly literal level and a metaphorical one, with Ysrael’s mask negating the possibility of ethical 
interactions with Rafa and Yunior, while also masking all the anxieties his facial difference provokes 
in its failure to adhere to a hypermasculine Latino identity. In Wallace’s work, masking works at a far 
more linguistic level, with long, panicked sentences, the child’s cries, and the metaphorical 
suggestion that the child ascends as vapor all masking, or at least delaying, the full interpretation of 
the trauma that has occurred, given the anxiety both the unfolding of the accident and its 
consequences provoke. In focusing on young subjects, both Díaz’s and Wallace’s work encompasses 
the many anxieties adolescence entails – about fitting in, about the ability to express oneself, and 
one’s pain, and about the ultimate shortness of this period, which again, is aptly represented in the 
short story form.  
While much of the analysis within this chapter has thought through traumatic events that 
also cause anxiety, the particular relevancy of the short story to and for anxiety is how its brevity 
relates to, and heightens, its anticipatory, panic-driven qualities. The shortness of ‘Incarnations of 
Burned Children,’ for example, exaggerates the anxious tension the unfolding of the traumatic 
burning scene causes, and reflects and reiterates the panic of said scene.  Equally, the excitable, 
childlike, fast-paced nature of the narration of ‘No Face’ reflects Ysrael’s desperate anxiety about 
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acceptance in his community and the prospect of recovery, which is promised yet highly ambiguous, 
not least because he ends the story as he begins – on the run, a typical anxious image. With all of 
this in mind, as well as being an archetypally anxious form, the short story has much to tell us about 
anxiety, speaking to its ability to induce claustrophobia, to highlight precarity and to feed upon it, to 
induce temporal acceleration and deceleration, and to invoke and emphasise uncertainty about the 
future. In the cases of the young people in the short stories this chapter has considered, the form 
has also articulated anxieties that have particular potency in youth – of being stuck in time, of being 
faced with an uncertain future, or even of having no future at all. Through the short story form, 
then, we also bear witness to how anxiety operates textually: it settles in tropes (as with masks and 
masking), it gives voice to all manner of internal sensations and drives, and it interferes with the 
structures of texts so that the temporalities of given anxieties are reflected therein. In turn, these 
features accentuate the unsettling question of what lies ahead, with anxiety feeding upon this 















‘The Proper Path of Dominican Male-Itude’: Anxiety and Hypermasculinity in Junot Díaz 
 
 
In May 2018, during a Q&A session at Sydney Writers’ Festival, Junot Díaz was confronted by author 
Zinzi Clemmons, who asked whether his recently published New Yorker article, ‘The Silence: The 
Legacy of Childhood Trauma,’ had been written to pre-empt allegations of sexual misconduct against 
him.286 She said he had harmed her in the past, and later described her experience in more detail on 
Twitter, saying he had ‘forcibly kiss[ed]’ her.287 This led several other women to come forward with 
accounts of mistreatment by Díaz, including Carmen Maria Machado, who said that he had lost his 
temper after she questioned his male protagonists’ problematic relationships with women in 2012 
during the This Is How You Lose Her (2012) book tour.288 This allegation is particularly pertinent in 
the context of the #MeToo movement, which has challenged and shaken prominent male figures in 
the literary scene and beyond for their misogynistic behaviour. Díaz’s writing is rife with such 
hypermasculine displays, ranging in scope from repeated infidelities, to physical and sexual abuse, to 
the control and coercion of women. While many of Díaz’s characters are self-conscious about the 
ways in which this behaviour feeds into stereotypes about Latino, and specifically Dominican 
masculinity, their actions also frequently and problematically reiterate these stereotypes, with 
recurring narrator Yunior des Las Casas going as far as to state that he ‘inherited’ his status as a 
‘[sucio] of the worst kind’ from his violent father and brother.289 In this refusal of responsibility for 
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his poor treatment of women, which he puts down to genetics, Yunior comes to epitomise a number 
of important questions rising from the current debate about toxic masculinity. What does it mean to 
be masculine now, particularly for Dominican men in America? Are all men implicated in the 
#MeToo movement? Is there anything positive about masculinity, and can men be redeemed after 
enacting toxically masculine behaviour? How and why is hypermasculinity performed by Díaz’s 
characters? What is the relationship between masculinity and anxiety? And what does it mean to be 
a ‘good’ man? These questions remain live, and the issues they raise require close and sustained 
scrutiny. With attention to these questions, as well as the extra-textual anxiety arising from reading 
and working on fiction by a writer tangled in allegations of sexual misconduct, this chapter will focus 
on Díaz’s hypermasculine characters and their anxieties in order to think through what anxiety about 
masculinity (specifically Dominican masculinity) can reveal about anxiety more generally. 
Rather than specifically interpreting allegations against Díaz (which are, nonetheless, 
inextricably linked to patterns of aggressive male behaviour that are increasingly being exposed for 
their misogyny and for the harm they cause women, and which are prevalent in Díaz’s writing), the 
analysis in this chapter will focus on his writing, its reception, and broader sociopolitical contexts. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy of these contexts, aside from the #MeToo movement, is the turn in 
critical masculinity studies towards interpreting masculinity itself as crisis, which, as I will argue, 
inextricably connects masculinity to anxiety. As Bruce Traister puts it: ‘the history of American men 
as men now not only proceeds as a historiography of masculine crisis but collectively writes itself as 
an actual history of American masculinity as crisis.’290 In Michael Kimmel’s view, this crisis became 
particularly apparent from the 1970s onwards, during which time ‘feminism, black liberation, and 
gay liberation provided a frontal assault on the traditional way that men had defined their 
manhood.’291 Framing masculinity as crisis draws attention to the centrality of anxious drives in 
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forming the masculine subject and masculine experience, while also highlighting the instability of 
what R.W. Connell calls hegemonic masculinity: ‘the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of the patriarchy, which 
guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of 
women.’292 
At this juncture it is worth establishing some of the particularities of American and 
Dominican masculinity to provide context for the analysis that follows, which centres on Dominican-
American immigrants. In both American and Dominican constructions of masculinity in the literary 
and theoretical texts within this chapter, there are outdated expectations that a man will be the 
main provider for his family, and that he will be physically strong yet emotionally unavailable, taking 
pains to conceal feelings or hints of femininity. Successful heterosexual relationships are also central 
to both conceptualisations of masculinity, though as Maja Horn notes in her study of gender politics 
in Dominican literature, gender roles in the US are predicated on the assumption that ‘monogamous 
relations and marriage are […] ideal arrangements,’ whereas Díaz’s Yunior is presented as an ‘ideal 
model of Dominican masculinity’ because he is ‘incessantly cheating and chasing other women.’293 
This is not in any way to say that American masculinity does not also involve infidelity, but in 
American masculinity, this may be hidden or revealed only to those who would find it impressive, 
while for Dominican men, infidelity is a badge of honour, and a more open and expected part of 
masculine construction. However, this formulation embeds an ‘us and them’ rhetoric that 
problematically deems Dominican masculinity as more harmful:  
 
mainstream American readers are easily compelled to receive this “New World” doom as being at a 
far remove from North American reality, an exotic and opaque “Other” world vastly different from 
their own, rather than one with long-standing close relations with the United States and that was 
shaped by U.S. imperial, economic, and cultural politics.294 
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Although Díaz himself describes how he grew up in ‘a very segregated masculine world’ in which 
men were ‘struggling with a mask that they have to be tough and constantly aggressive,’ Horn notes 
that he ‘does not consider U.S. masculinity any less problematic or noxious than the Dominican 
forms of masculinity that he addresses in his writings.’295 However, in response to the additional 
pressure of conforming to both American and Dominican versions of masculinity, Horn argues that 
‘the Dominican diaspora has contributed to amplifying existing gender repertoires in the Dominican 
Republic.’296 As well as responding to the emasculation prompted by colonisation, which I will 
discuss later in the chapter, Díaz’s characters, as immigrants in the US, are thus pushed to even 
more noteworthy hypermasculine performances enacted to assert power and dominance. This 
poses a challenge in assimilating, as well as the danger of being conceived of as a violent other, yet is 
also necessary to it, as Díaz’s characters must work much harder than white American peers to 
prove their worth and their masculinity. When using examples of American masculinity in this 
chapter, then, I assume that these conceptualisations generally apply to Dominican masculinity, too, 
but to a greater and more complicated, racialised extent. This is not to say that these masculinities 
are directly interchangeable, because of course, they are not, but as Dominican-Americans, Díaz’s 
characters are in the challenging position of having to fulfil two sets of expectations of masculinity.  
Concepts such as Connell’s have now been challenged repeatedly, and while the hegemonic 
power and presence of masculinity undeniably remains, in light of mounting pressure that has 
culminated in the #MeToo movement, aspects of this particular, dominant kind of masculinity have 
been reinterpreted as and through narratives of toxicity. For Terry Kupers, ‘toxic masculinity is the 
constellation of socially regressive male traits that serve to foster domination, the devaluation of 
women, homophobia, and wanton violence.’297 Mel Chen notes that toxicity has permeated 
 
295 Nicholas Wroe, ‘Junot Díaz: A Life in Books,’ The Guardian, (31 August 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/31/life-in-books-junot-diaz> [accessed 1 June 2020]; Horn,  
p. 131. 
296 Horn, p. 124. 
297 Terry J. Kupers, ‘Toxic Masculinity as Barrier to Mental Health Treatment in Prison’ Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 61 (2005), 713-724 (p. 714). 
 99 
‘environmental, social, and political discourses […] leaking out of nominal and literal bounds while 
retaining their affective ties to vulnerability and repulsion,’ yet also remaining driven by ‘domestic 
panic’ about toxins, a fear which ‘[recycles] languages of terror.’298 Both Kupers’ and Chen’s 
formulations link up toxicity and anxiety, positing that toxicity is inherently anxious as it emphasizes 
our vulnerabilities, thus prompting exaggerated displays of strength and violence. The Good Men 
Project, established as a platform to think through what it means to be a ‘good man’ in the twenty-
first century, also reflects on the damage toxic masculinity does to men: ‘it derives from a rejection 
of the perceived opposite, femininity, that is so pervasive as to become unhealthy for both men and 
those around them.’299 These definitions speak to a twofold crisis of masculinity, with the dominant 
position of men in society coming under siege for its toxicity, and the anxiety this may cause, as well 
as the pressure on men to perform a certain version of masculinity to be successful and not be 
perceived as weak. In turn, the desire or need to engage in such harmful gender performances is 
born from anxiety, while the performance itself may also cause anxiety if the subject is conscious of 
its toxicity.  
As Judith Butler argues in Gender Trouble, ‘as a strategy of survival within compulsory 
systems, gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences.’300 Yet, in the main, the 
always-performative nature of gender is hidden, particularly given that there is no conceivable 
‘original’ masculinity upon which masculine performance is based: 
 
Gender is […] a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective 
agreement to perform, produce, and sustain polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured 
by the credibility of those productions – and the punishments that attend not agreeing to 
believe in them; the construction “compels” our belief in its necessity and its naturalness.301 
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However, in the case of many of Díaz’s male protagonists, this performance is not hidden, because it 
is hypermasculine. It is visibly performed, inherited and copied from male peers - albeit without any 
real source, as its performed nature means it has always been a fiction. So exaggerated are the 
masculinities at play in his work, so violent and misogynistic, that their status as performance is 
explicit, such that they cannot appear natural. Indeed, Yunior’s brother Rafa alludes to his behavior 
being for show, when he purposely interrupts his mother’s prayer group to highlight the fact he has 
succeeded in bringing a woman home despite the fact he has cancer, later explaining: ‘can’t let them 
think I’m slipping.’302 For Yunior and many of Díaz’s other male characters, anxiety about being 
perceived as masculine means performances such as this are thought of as a necessity – a defense 
mechanism against accusations of femininity or homosexuality. They must be seen to act, to 
perform masculinity, as they cannot be taken to be ‘real’ men without doing so. Sianne Ngai 
discusses how anxiety ‘has a history of being gendered in Western culture,’ with Freud’s castration 
complex ‘barring female subjects from anxiety’ while it ‘plays a privileged role in the process of 
gendered ego formation for male subjects.’303 Indeed, ‘the privileging of anxiety as a key for 
interpreting the human condition is accompanied by its being secured as the distinctive – if not 
exclusive – emotional province of male intellectuals.’304 However, all of this problematizes masculine 
performance, as it reveals vulnerabilities and anxieties, with masculinity defined as much by what 
threatens it, about what it is not, as by what it may be.  As I have already mentioned, these 
hypermasculine performances are complicated further by Díaz’s characters’ status as Dominican-
American immigrants, meaning that they occupy a challenging position of duality. In his 
autotheoretical text, Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Frantz Fanon describes the duality experienced 
by a black person thus:  
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The black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the white man. A 
Negro behaves differently with a white man and another Negro. That this self-division is a 
direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question.305 
 
 
Although the use of the word Negro means this example is not culturally specific to Dominican men, 
it does highlight the necessity of performative behaviour for people of colour living in white 
communities. The performance of hypermasculinity by Díaz’s male characters is multi-dimensional, 
anxiously grappling with a racialised dual existence that is both actual through migration to the US 
(which occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924), and existential in the broader sense of 
splitting oneself to survive amidst black and white people.306  
In turn, this exemplifies one of four scenarios in which Julia Kristeva believes hysterical time 
is manifested – the double personality, whereby a person is ‘two people at the same time,’ 
experiencing ‘simultaneous dissociation.’307 Kristeva uses this example to describe a woman named 
Oriane, who lost her brother in an accident, and presented anxious symptoms including 
breathlessness and ‘silent gasping’ thereafter.308 She also had a ‘selective memory disorder’ which 
led to her struggling to remember her brother’s death, breaking her out of the ‘linearity of conscious 
time’ as a kind of defense mechanism.309 While for Oriane, it is a specific emotional trauma that 
prompts her existence as two people at the same time (that is, existence within hysterical time), for 
Díaz’s characters, it is the broader pressure of fulfilling the masculine expectations associated with 
American and Dominican masculinity, while also grappling with the legacy of a brutal dictator and 
life as an immigrant to a country that has oppressed the Dominican Republic. With all of this in mind, 
Yunior des Las Casas (Drown (1996), This Is How You Lose Her, The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao 
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(2009)) and Oscar de León (The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao) both participate in 
hypermasculine performances which reflect a wide range of anxieties about gender, identities, and 
whether or to what extent they should fulfill stereotypes of Dominican masculinity. 
 In the opening story of This Is How You Lose Her, entitled ‘The Sun, the Moon, the Stars,’ 
Yunior reflects on his relationship with a woman called Magda, contemplating her discovery of his 
infidelities while also attempting to defend his moral character. Yunior refutes claims made by his 
ex-girlfriend Magda’s friends that he cheated ‘because [he] was Dominican, because all […] 
Dominican men are dogs and can’t be trusted,’ arguing that ‘from [his] perspective it wasn’t 
genetics; there were reasons. Causalities.’310 Here, he tries to justify his behavior, framing it as a 
cumulation of circumstances unassociated with his heritage. Yet in a later story, ‘Miss Lora,’ he 
admits to himself: ‘you had hoped the [sucio] gene had missed you, skipped a generation, but clearly 
you were kidding yourself. The blood always shows.’311  In describing a ‘sucio gene,’ Yunior suggests 
that his sexual promiscuity is a fundamental part of his and his male relatives’ essence, in Aristotlean 
terms – their virility, their violence, and their poor treatment of women are framed as inevitabilities 
here.312 However, Yunior battles constantly with his identity in this regard, sometimes accepting his 
behaviour as an inevitability of his Dominican background and upbringing, as above, and at other 
times denying his background altogether. Reflecting on a meeting with a woman from Trinidad who 
uses a ‘phony-as-hell English accent,’ he notes that such performances demonstrated ‘the way we all 
were back then. None of us wanted to be niggers. Not for nothing.’313 DuBois reflects on this kind of 
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a world which yields [a black person] no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself 
through the revelation of the other world […] one ever feels his two-ness, - an American, a 
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark 
body.314  
 
As with Fanon’s writing, it is important not to assume the blackness reflected on here is relevant to, 
or representative of, all black people, though while Negro is often used derogatively to describe 
African-American people, Yunior uses this word to describe himself: ‘For some Negroes [being 
rejected] wouldn’t mean shit. But you ain’t that kind of Negro.’315 This demonstrates how Latino 
masculinities are mapped onto other racialized identities in North America, with such identities 
inappropriately conflated to such an extent that Yunior absorbs such homogenizing discourses, while 
also wishing to escape them and his specific identity as a Dominican.  
His struggle with whether or not he possesses the ‘sucio gene’ speaks to a complex and 
paradoxical anxiety arising in Díaz’s writing: a seemingly self-perpetuating anxiety about masculinity 
and what it is to be a Dominican man that prompts his double-consciousness. Despite eventually 
finding ‘a wife [he] adores and who adores [him], a negrita from Salcedo’ whom he says he ‘does not 
deserve,’ and with whom he discusses having children, Yunior’s concluding statement in The Brief 
Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao that he is ‘a new man, you see, a new man, a new man,’ is partially 
undermined as he says ‘I don’t run after girls any more. Not much, anyway.’316 Even having 
seemingly stepped away from hypermasculine performance, desperately repeating that he is a good 
man, Yunior still feels anxiously compelled to state he still chases women. This anxiety can be 
thought of as self-perpetuating in that Díaz’s writing tends not to resolve the anxieties his characters 
experience; rather, anxiety is compounded, becoming not only anxiety about masculinity, but 
anxiety about anxiety itself.  Such anxieties are equally prevalent throughout Oscar Wao, which also 
features Yunior as a narrator, but focuses on the titular Oscar, who is described as ‘very un-
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Dominican’ based on his inability to sleep with women.317 This shift in narrative focus can be thought 
of as a means of deflecting from Yunior’s anxious masculinity: Oscar shares this anxiety to an extent, 
but is altogether more complicated as a character given that he seems to simultaneously desire and 
reject the kind of Dominican masculinity Yunior practices. That being said, Oscar’s struggles with 
anxiety and depression are directly linked to his failure to fulfil stereotypes about Dominican men 
having ‘Atomic Level G;’ while observing his ‘cursing swaggering cousins, […]  he had started to 
suspect that in their Latin hypermaleness there might be an answer.’318 Yet despite his best efforts, 
and his affirmations of ‘soy dominicano. Dominicano soy,’ his peers refuse to believe he is 
Dominican.319  
Both This Is How You Lose Her and Oscar Wao are texts haunted by spectres of absent, abusive 
fathers, as well as the hyperbolically masculine and totalitarian Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. 
The absent father can be thought of as an anxious emblem, embodying, too the son’s failures to 
successfully perform Dominican masculinity. After an unexpected appearance from his father, Yunior 
remarks that ‘a father is a hard thing to compass,’ pointing to the difficulty in placing him both 
geographically and emotionally.320 The linguistic link that is established between a sense of 
rootlessness and fatherhood cements the relationship between paternal absence and a broader lack 
of connection to a Dominican identity, particularly as this absence continued even when Yunior’s 
family were reunited in America.  While these spectral figures are portrayed as deeply flawed and 
unpleasant, ‘free with [their] smacks,’ and abusive towards almost everyone they encounter, Yunior 
also grapples with the possibility (or perhaps even inevitability) of becoming them, at times openly 
mirroring their behaviour.321 This speaks to the double-bind of anxiety surrounding masculinity in 
Díaz’s work – the anxiety characters feel about fulfilling or performing the stereotype of a 
hypermasculine Dominican man, but also the anxiety provoked by successfully (or unsuccessfully) 
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doing so. This anxiety is demonstrated physically through trembling, sweating, and accelerated 
thought processes, to name but a few symptoms, but is also borne out at a formal level as much of 
Díaz’s writing is connected across different texts by a selection of narrators, and in the case of Oscar 
Wao, is split and interrupted by footnotes that fluctuate in tone between the consersational, the 
jovial, and the academic.  
More often than not, Díaz’s male characters are aware of the problematic nature of 
stereotypical Latino masculinity, and the inherently contradictory desire they feel to perform it – 
driven, as I have noted, by an anxiety about fitting in, and being perceived as a ‘real man.’ Yet this 
awareness and anxiety does not necessarily guard against misogyny, despite the explicit 
performativity of their hypermasculinity, Díaz’s characters end up reiterating stereotypes of 
Dominican men. Horn reflects on the way in which Western readers and critics have responded to 
Díaz’s work, noting that their enthusiastic reception is partially built on how ‘Dominican masculinity 
is used to bolster implicitly a presumably less problematic American masculinity.’322 Male readers 
may contemplate their own performances of masculinity, problematically defining them as less 
damaging than the Dominican masculinity presented in the text. In turn, this assumption that 
Dominican masculinity is more problematic and damaging grants no attention to the complex and 
multifaceted nature of racialised gender performance, nor how a person may over-compensate for 
their position as other. While Yunior stands apart from the tacit collective agreement to perform 
gender in the manner that Butler posits, drawing attention to his anxious reluctance to fulfill 
stereotypes about Dominican men, Oscar is desperate to ‘prove’ his Dominican identity to Latino 
men who are part of the collective agreement. One of many reasons that both Oscar and Yunior end 
up assimilating hypermasculine stereotypes through performances of them is as a result of the 
reception and perception of Dominican men as inferior to, or ‘worse’ than American men – indeed, 
even Yunior’s own father reinforces this stereotypes, cursing Yunior for urinating on the street as he 
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had always done in Santo Domingo: ‘Decent people live around here and that’s how we’re going to 
live. You’re Americans now.’323 
Anxiety surrounding masculinity and its performance in Díaz’s work can be divided into a 
number of sub-categories with physical and psychological iterations, each of which this chapter will 
consider in turn. This anxiety manifests itself through language and through the form of Díaz’s 
writing, which makes numerous chronological jumps, testament to the challenges inherent in 
recounting and representing anxious narratives: Oscar Wao spans many generations and jumps 
between time periods, and the short stories in This Is How You Lose Her are also out-of-order, while 
also providing considerable additional detail about Yunior’s life that is not revealed by his narration 
in Oscar Wao. These categories include anxiety about fathers (or the absence of fathers); anxiety 
about ‘proving’ heterosexuality and refuting claims of homosexuality (despite the phallocentrism of 
Latino masculinity as portrayed in Díaz’s work, which centres on sexual virility); anxiety about 
displaying strength, particularly physical strength; and anxiety about appearing too emotional or 
expressive (which can also be thought of as a fear of the feminine and a racialized trope). This final 
anxiety also extends to the discussion of mental health, with Oscar’s family, for example, feeling a 
great deal of shame and misunderstanding over his attempted suicide and his emotional state in 
Oscar Wao. Prior to his attempt, which follows an unrequited romantic interest in a fellow college 
student, Lola tells Oscar ‘you need to let it go,’ later explaining to Yunior that he ‘gets like this 
sometimes.’324 Similarly, when Oscar’s mother visits him in hospital, he starts to cry, prompting her 
to say ‘you’ll be doing a lot more than crying when I get through with you.’325 Of course, this shame 
and anxiety about confessing experiences of mental illness can lead not only to the repression of 
such experiences, but also to further mental health problems – another contradictory facet of Latino 
masculinity. As Ilán Stavans remarks in his essay ‘The Latin Phallus’:  
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for a culture as steeped in sexuality as our own, it is strange that the substance of our masculine 
identity remains a forbidden topic […] we are terrified of exposing the labyrinthine paths of our 
unexplained desire of engaging in what the Mexican essayist and poet Octavio Paz once called 
“the shameful art of abrirse” – opening up and losing control, admitting our insecurities, allowing 
ourselves to be exposed, unprotected, unsafe.326 
 
In refusing to open up or admit vulnerabilities, characters in Díaz’s work end up caught in cycles that 
reiterate and reinforce themselves, rejecting the behaviour of fathers and forefathers in principle, 
yet enacting it in practice. Indeed, in Oscar Wao erasure and the denial of feeling (and in fact any 
history at all) is personified in a male figure – that of the Faceless Man. In his introduction to Muy 
Macho, Ray González notes that for the Latino men willing to confront and write their masculinity, 
‘the fear and anxiety of confessing too many personal things [changes] to relief and 
enlightenment.’327 Yet for the vast majority of Díaz’s male characters, this anxiety about showing and 
feeling anxiety, about opening up, means performances of hypermasculine behaviour persist. 
Although González argues that ‘the caricatures of the rebellious street punk and the Latin lover, who 
beds as many women as he can, no longer fit the mold’ when it comes to portrayals of Latino men, 
Díaz’s work deliberately and repeatedly employs these caricatures precisely to question why such a 
mould exists, and whether it can truly be broken out of completely – questions that can also be 
applied extra-textually in relation to contemporary debates about being a ‘good’ man.328   
 
The Shadow of the Father 
 
While in most instances, the anxiety Díaz’s characters feel about masculinity is not expressed in 
literal terms, and rather, can be inferred from behaviour, conversation, and narration, when it 
comes to fathers, this anxiety is clear. Although David Cowart observes that diasporic writing such as 
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Díaz’s is governed by a ‘thematics of absence’ whereby ‘the one condition (fatherlessness) 
compounds the other (displacement),’ this absence is never total, as fathers in Díaz’s work have a 
habit of casting long, inescapable shadows.329 As such, Yunior’s father’s physical absence proves 
relieving, as it removes a source of violence: ‘we rarely talked about our father. Me, I was just happy 
not to be getting my ass kicked in anymore.’330 Although he describes his father’s ‘Last Great 
Absence,’ capitalised to indicate the fundamental place these absences occupy in his life’s narrative, 
his father continues to be mentioned throughout the text, present through the anxiety he causes, 
while appearing in person only in the short story ‘Invierno’ (Winter).331 The story’s title speaks to the 
nature of his father’s cold and fleeting presence: narrating as a young child, Yunior explains he 
‘didn’t know’ his father, commenting that ‘his narrow face [was] still unfamiliar’ because of their 
five-year separation, during which time his father worked in the US while Yunior, Rafa, and their 
mother remained in Santo Domingo.332  Indeed, it is in the state of complete unknowing that Yunior 
is most comfortable with his father, imagining him as being ‘seven feet tall with enough money to 
buy our entire barrio.’333  This image is quickly shattered by the reality of the father’s ‘average 
height’ and harsh discipline, encapsulated in his obsession with neatly-tied shoelaces – a task with 
which Yunior struggles.334 His performance anxiety in this setting is obvious: 
 
Rafa showed me how, and I said, Fine, and had no problems in front of him, but when Papi was 
breathing down my neck, his hand on a belt, I couldn’t perform; I looked at my father like my laces 
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As well as exemplifying Yunior’s father’s aggression and violence, this extract highlights the 
transference of masculine anxiety from father to son, with the neat tying of shoelaces signifying 
suitability for work and ability to generate income for the family. The phrase ‘I couldn’t perform’ also 
speaks to a prevalent masculine anxiety surrounding sexual performance. Kimmel goes as far as to 
argue that the stereotypical ‘male sex role’ led men to view sex as work – a ‘dangerous encounter’ 
operating as the ‘ultimate test of masculinity;’ an opportunity to prove oneself and achieve sexual 
pleasure, but also a precarious task that risks exposing a man’s failure to be masculine. 336 
In failing to ‘perform’ successfully for his father, masculinity itself is constituted as a kind of 
performance anxiety, with a convincing performance contingent on fulfilling hypermasculine 
stereotypes – turning stereotypes into spectacles that are conspicuous in their visibility. This 
conspicuousness is heightened as such spectacles border on simulacra – yet simulacra that have no 
real source material, given that a single definition or version of masculinity that inspires all others 
does not exist. There is an inherent narcissism at play here, as the father seems to want his children 
to be well presented in order to demonstrate his own ability to work hard and care for his family 
(although at this point, the father is refusing to let his children out of the house, meaning this is only 
an internal performance, a kind of competition between male family members). This masculine 
‘preparation,’ as it were, for his sons to enter the outside world, comes as a result of the way in 
which a father is measured by his sons, and the extent to which he can replicate a certain 
masculinity through both nature and nurture. Edelman points to the necessity of replication for 
heterosexuality, or at least heteronormativity, to replicate itself for survival in his description of the 
‘heterosexual alibi of reproductive necessity.’337 He argues that heterosexuality is ‘impregnated’ 
‘with the future of signification’ because it has conferred upon it the ‘cultural burden of signifying 
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futurity.’338 Framing heterosexuality in this way confers a particular power to it, as through this 
framing, it is a necessity – the future of humanity depends upon it, and heterosexual reproduction 
must, by this logic, continue to guarantee survival. Threatened by his father’s hypermasculine 
display, which is predicated on this logic, Yunior cannot satisfy the stereotypical image of a strong, 
dependable Latino male migrant (an image he has conjured, and previously imagined his father to 
uphold) – he is too overwhelmed by the figurative prospect of being shocked by his laces. In this 
overlaying of the mundane with the hazardous, Yunior captures his father’s fickleness and 
unpredictability (themselves symptoms of anxiety), while also confirming the state of panic he 
enters in his presence.  
The extent of this panic is later confirmed when Rafa, who is usually very cruel to Yunior, 
watches his brother dress himself, leading to the only explicit expression of anxiety by a character in 
all of Díaz’s work: ‘[Rafa’s] mouth was tight. I started to feel anxious. What’s your problem? I said.’339 
Ironically, it is masculine care that provokes Yunior here, or at least allows him to consciously feel an 
anxiety that is more dispersed and repressed at other times, as he is so unused to being cared for. In 
making a direct admission of anxiety, he confirms how central father figures are to anxiety about 
masculinity, as well as masculine attention, which might compromise performances of 
hypermasculinity. Indeed, the act of being looked at, and of looking, are charged with anxiety here: 
both boys feel uneasy, and Yunior’s irritation at being watched frames Rafa’s looking as a ‘problem’ 
that is provoked by the male gaze, speaking to an undercurrent of fear about being accused of 
homosexuality: earlier in the story, Yunior glances at his father, only to be told ‘Don’t eye me,’ and 
later ‘don’t you look at me.’340 Rafa proceeds to tie Yunior’s laces for him, responding to his own 
anxiety about how his father will respond to Yunior’s appearance, especially given that his hair is a 
‘Caribbean grandparent’s dream,’ while Yunior’s ‘had enough of the African to condemn [him] to 
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endless combings.’341 While Rafa’s hair satisfies his Dominican family’s beauty standards, Yunior’s is 
seen to reveal mixed heritage that must be repressed and tamed through brushing and cutting, 
placing him beneath his brother who is seen as ‘wholly’ Dominican, with greater capacity to satisfy 
ideals of Dominican masculinity. Both brothers, then, are anxious about their failure to meet their 
father’s standards, though this anxiety ultimately results in both men mirroring his behaviour, which 
is turn an expression of the father’s own anxieties.  
Nancy Chodorow argues that responses to parental judgement and violence are inherently 
gendered, with ‘the girl or women [trying] to rid herself of the mother in her mind; [and] the boy or 
man [trying] to rid himself of the father out there,’ engaging in ‘external violence against an object 
experienced as being without.’342 Yet this logic only points to the contradictory nature of masculine 
anxiety surrounding fathers – in trying to shake their father’s violent and emotionally abusive 
treatment, Yunior and Rafa end up enacting the same external violence by directing the anxiety they 
experienced elsewhere, mistreating women and each other, and bringing themselves closer to that 
which they hoped to escape or deny. Indeed, in failing to shake their father’s violence and influence 
more generally, Yunior and Rafa adhere to the Oedipal ‘first hatred and first murderous wish against 
[their] father.’343 Freud argues that to succeed in avoiding becoming psychoneurotic, we must 
‘[forget] our jealousy of our fathers,’ but in their youthful state, the brothers are unable to do so, or 
something has got stuck, simultaneously despising and becoming their father in Freudian 
ambivalence – ‘the symmetrical development of contradictory pairs of partial drives.’344  This 
ambivalence, too, is inherently anxious, as the co-existence of fear, disdain, anger, but also a desire 
to please the father later leads Yunior and Rafa to act both as he asks and as he does, knowingly and 
unknowingly – Rafa ‘obeyed [his father] with a scrupulousness he had never shown anybody,’ while 
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Yunior ‘wanted [his] father to like [him] too’ but ‘wasn’t in an obedient mood.’345 While Rafa’s 
anxious ambivalence makes him pliant, Yunior is still very young and his anxieties do not prevent 
him from stepping out of line and disobeying his father. Despite this, he, too, later mimics his father, 
though he grapples with whether this is an inevitability and outside of his control, or because of 
causalities (the anxiety his father caused, and the complex network of feelings his behavior 
prompted).   
 Oscar, on the other hand, never gets to know his father at all. The only information provided 
about him throughout the novel is that he met Oscar’s mother Belicia on her plane from Santo 
Domingo to the US, and that ‘after two years together he [left] her, her third and final heartbreak, 
and she would never love again.’346  In a text governed by curses, folklore, and omens, most notably 
the ‘Fukú Americanus […] the Curse and the Doom of the New World,’ there is particular resonance 
to this meeting occurring in transit.347 The plane acts as a symbol of imminent male departure, 
particularly given that the vast majority of fathers in Díaz’s work migrate to the US for work, initially 
(and often permanently) leaving their families behind. Contemplating the origins of paternal absence 
as a societal problem, Susan Faludi remarks that it is ‘in the wake of World War II [that] the 
vanishing father […] displaced the authoritarian father as the central male “problem.”’348 Indeed, this 
speaks to another masculine contradiction, as during the Second World War and its aftermath, ‘a 
new generation of men [were] raised with both the heightened expectations of a father-knows-best 
culture that promised too much and the anguish of having fathers physically and psychologically 
lost.’349 In turn, this is complicated by ‘fears of femininization’ which ‘only partially cloaked a 
simmering homophobic fear’ rising in the 1950s and 60s. 350  As more women entered the workplace, 
particularly white-collar workplaces, the role of man as breadwinner was challenged and partially 
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devalued. This perceived threat to a space that was previously predominantly masculine coincided 
with a more general feeling of lack of purpose at work, an ‘empty anxiety that sprung directly from 
the blind pursuit of a marketplace masculinity.’351 In the specific context of Dominican-Americans, 
the developments Faludi outlines come after the US’ first occupation of the Dominican Republic, 
while Kimmel’s observations precede its 1965 intervention in Santo Domingo. For Dominicans, then, 
their cultural contexts had already been massively disturbed, with indigenous populations 
emasculated by colonisation and inevitably contributing to a built-in Latino hypermasculinity, 
partially constructed to compensate for a significantly more violent disruption of masculinity than 
that described by Kimmel.  
Although Díaz’s writing comes decades later, these same anxieties and contradictions 
remain, particularly given that even when fathers are absent, like Oscar’s, male perspectives and 
macho behaviour are still valued and revered above all else, with behaviour to the contrary 
derogatively labelled as feminine and/or indicative of homosexuality.352 While Beli is strict and 
overbearing with her daughter Lola, she takes a softer approach with Oscar, allowing Tío Rudolfo to 
guide him instead. Rudolfo is a deeply problematic father figure, addicted to drugs and in trouble 
with the law, with his ‘four kids by three different women’ securing his status as ‘the family’s 
resident méteselo expert.’353 Under his so-called ‘tutelage,’ offered while he is living with Beli, Lola, 
and Oscar, he advises that Oscar’s failure to ‘[pull] in the bitches with both hands’ like a ‘normal’ 
Dominican man can be rectified by ‘grabbing] a muchacha, y méteselo,’ which will apparently ‘take 
care of everything.’354 Here, Díaz is representing an offensive, caricatured version of Dominican 
masculinity, toying with stereotypes about Latino men being sexually aggressive. Rudolfo argues 
plainly that rape will solve Oscar’s problems – a recommendation so hyperbolic it cannot be taken at 
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face value. It is difficult to ascertain whether Oscar is completely unwilling to participate in such 
violent and misogynistic behaviour, as he does not explicitly condemn it, demonstrating, as Rafa and 
Yunior do, a Freudian ambivalence in his handling of hypermasculinity. However, in his defiance 
(conscious or not) of the exaggerated Latino male persona embodied by those around him, he is able 
to break the masculine mould through his interest in video games and anime, his inability to 
participate in violent or sexual displays, and his general bookishness.   
This mould-breaking comes at a high price, however – Horn argues that Oscar’s death comes 
directly as ‘a result of his overstepping the scripts of hegemonic masculinity in the Dominican 
Republic.’355 More than this, though, his enactment of a persona that stands as such a direct 
antithesis to expected Latino masculinity also causes him to feel both anxious and depressed – 
physically and psychologically painful emotional states that are expressed in language and through 
the text’s fragmented, non-chronological narrative -  a symbol of the emotional and historical weight 
the text is bearing, and the difficulty Yunior experiences in piecing the aftermath of dictatorship and 
Oscar’s life and death together. Although he is proud of being a ‘smart bookish boy of colour in a 
contemporary US ghetto,’ Yunior remarks that this is equivalent to having ‘bat wings or a pair of 
tentacles growing out of your chest,’ echoing the superheroic characterisation of outcasts in Díaz’s 
Drown.356 Oscar’s intelligence only deepens his othering by his peers, and while he ‘wanted to blame 
the books, the sci-fi, […] he couldn’t – he loved them too much.’357 His failure to denounce his 
interests and be more Dominican, which is bound up with his inability to get a girlfriend or have sex 
with a woman, appears to be the main source of his anxiety, as well as causing him to be increasingly 
depressed. Regurgitating the paternal ‘advice’ issued by Rudolfo, he tells Yunior that ‘[he] has heard 
from a reliable source that no Dominican male has ever died a virgin,’ asking in all seriousness if this 
is true, and saying he is ‘worried’ by this notion.358 Of course, this logic is unsurprising given that the 
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only real paternal guidance he has received has been that sex will solve his problems, as when 
Rudolfo responds to Oscar’s ‘triple-zero batting average with the ladies’ by suggesting being with a 
woman will ‘take care of everything.’359 Thus, while Oscar is free of direct anxiety about fathers, as 
his played no meaningful part in his life, he is nonetheless subject to the same pressure to be macho, 
exerted instead by his male tutor or mentor Rudolfo, albeit without violence, as in the case of Yunior 
and Rafa’s father. 
Further, while Oscar’s father is not present, both Oscar and Yunior also feel the dominating, 
spectral presence of past Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo. Haunting much of Díaz’s work both 
implicitly and explicitly, he acts as a patriarchal father figure that is ever-present through menancing 
violence, serving as the pinnacle of hypermasculine performance, and provoking intense anxiety in 
life and death, particularly given his influence on Oscar’s family over the years. His control over 
‘nearly every aspect of the DR’s political, cultural, social, and economic life’ was, according to Yunior, 
cemented through ‘a potent (and familiar) mixture of violence, intimidation, massacre, rape, co-
optation, and terror,’ pointing to the centrality of anxiety and hypermasculinity to his rule through 
the production of anxiety in his subjects.360 Although Yunior observes that Oscar had ‘no kind of 
father to show him the masculine ropes,’ using this a partial explanation for his lack of ‘all aggressive 
and martial tendencies’ and ‘zero combat rating,’ Trujillo is described as ‘running the country like it 
was a marine boot camp,’ and ‘insisting on absolute veneration from his pueblo.’361 Indeed, Yunior 
remarks that Trujillo used ‘Dios y Trujillo’ as his national slogan, deliberately shaping himself as a 
God-like, omnipotent, and paternal figure whose domination was so total that he built ‘one of the 
largest militaries in the hemisphere […]; fucking every hot girl in sight.’362 These performatively 
exaggerated displays of masculinity are facilitated through provoking anxiety in Dominicans, abusing 
what Yunior describes as the superstitious nature of the older generation to such an extent that ‘it 
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was believed, even in educated circles, that anyone who plotted against Trujillo would incur a fukú 
most powerful.’363 Serving as a ‘curse or doom of some kind,’ and referred to in full as fukú 
Americanus (teasing at ‘fuck you Americans’, which itself has connotations of rape), the concept of 
fukú epitomizes the anxiety Dominican people felt about his dictatorial rule, while also acting as a 
convenient means for Trujillo to exploit people’s anxieties further, encouraging the logic that bad 
thoughts about him, whether voiced or not, would result in being cursed.364 
Despite Yunior’s sense that Oscar has no aggressive tendencies, it is clear that he does learn 
some stereotypical Dominican masculine ropes from Trujillo, as a curious symmetry is implied 
between Oscar and Trujillo’s son Ramfis, ‘who during his childhood amused himself by blowing the 
heads off chickens with a .44 revolver.’365 Hurt by having listened to Ana, with whom he is 
infatuated, talk about her boyfriend Manny’s poor treatment of her, Oscar proceeds to stand 
outside his apartment with Rudolfo’s ‘antique Virginia Dragoon,’ a ‘First Nation-exterminating Colt 
.44.’366 In using revolvers of the same caliber, Ramfis and Oscar are linked in their violence. Holding 
revolvers, themselves phallic power symbols, both act in accordance with Trujillo’s hypermasculine 
influence, though to very different degrees as Trujillo is Ramfis’ actual father. Oscar’s handling of a 
gun that is associated with the slaughter of indigenous peoples echoes not only Trujillo’s dictatorial 
violence, but the trauma, anger, and anxiety of the erasure of minority voices – Rudolfo’s possession 
of such a weapon may also represent a desire for violent revenge against those who colonized the 
Dominican Republic. In representing even Oscar, who otherwise acts as an exception to stereotypes 
about Dominican men as violent cheaters, Díaz also reflects on the compulsion Maja Horn highlights 
to always paint one’s own actions, one’s own masculinity, as less harmful and problematic than 
another’s, particularly the Dominican Republic’s. As she observes, ‘the emasculating experience of 
US occupation’ led to an even closer link between ‘patriotism and masculinity […]in the Dominican 
 
363 Díaz, Oscar Wao, p. 3. 
364 Díaz, Oscar Wao, p. 1. 
365 Díaz, Oscar Wao, p. 99. 
366 Díaz, Oscar Wao, p. 46. 
 117 
national imaginary,’ which was cemented in ‘the Trujillato’s political discourse of hyperbolic virile 
masculinity as part of a new nationalist project;’ a project that has subsequently been used as a 
means of justifying stereotypes about the aggressive masculinity of Dominicans, and which applies in 
many discourses of emergent nationhood and patriotism, from postcolonial Africa to post-Cold War 
Eastern Europe.367 
The performativity of this hypermasculinity is clear in the way it dominates the Dominican 
Republic’s social and political discourses. Trujillo is described as the ‘Dictatingest Dictator who ever 
Dictated,’ acting ‘like he owned everything and everyone,’ and his far-reaching patriarchal, paternal, 
and sexual influence is emphasized by Yunior’s description of the Dominican Republic as a ‘Chivato 
Nation [Trujillo] helped spawn.’368 Yet despite symbolically fathering a nation of informants who 
grew up and lived in a constant state of anxiety about being informed on (as exemplified by the 
repeated metaphorical description of Trujillo as the all-seeing Eye of Sauron from Tolkien’s The Lord 
of the Rings, an act that is mirrored at a micro-level when Yunior’s father watches him tie his 
shoelaces), or being made subject to the Trujillato’s physical and sexual violence, ‘like every Dark 
Lord worth his Shadow he had the devotion of his people.’369 Upon his death, Beli hears ‘a grade of 
grief unlike any she’d encountered before […] being uncoiled, a cacophony of wails that seemed to 
have torn free from the cracked soul of humanity itself.’370 Although Freud observes that ‘the 
emotional attitude towards rulers includes […] a powerful unconscious element of hostility’ that is 
directly linked to the father complex (emotions towards the father, including oedipal drives, and the 
fear of castration), for many, this hostility appears to be overruled by a complex form of communal 
love for Trujillo – a love that itself could also be performative, anxiously enacted to feign grief, avoid 
speculation of dissidence, and offset a potential fukú curse.371 This love is also present towards the 
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father, though as with the love people demonstrate towards Trujillo, it is ambiguous, and rooted in 
fear. Yet as Kimmel notes, this fear of the father as a ‘bigger, stronger, more sexually powerful’ 
figure ‘forces the young boy to renounce his identification with mother and seek to identify with the 
being who is the actual source of his fear, his father.’372 As a result, ‘the boy becomes gendered 
(masculine) and heterosexual at the same time.’373 There is undoubtedly admiration at play here, yet 
the admiration comes from a place of anxiety in the face of the father’s power. The soundscape that 
follows Trujillo’s death is almost Hellish, emerging from a damaged soul that has been governed by a 
dark and oppressive power. Fathering an exaggerated masculinity among his people, Trujillo’s status 
as a paternal figure is, of course, fraught, but his influence in this sense is undeniable. 
 
                             Homosexuality and the Threat of the Feminine 
 
Despite Trujillo’s overwhelmingly heteronormative and homophobic behavior, he encouraged men 
and women alike to worship him, which in Díaz’s writing, leads Beli’s father Abelard to ‘cover 
[Trujillo] in the warm effusion of his adoration,’ which in turn prompts Yunior to add ‘if you think the 
Trujillato was not homoerotic, then, to quote the Priest, you got another thing coming.’374 However, 
encouraging such behavior can be thought of as another means of reiterating his own particularly 
masculine form of control, as it allows him to accuse others of homosexuality, contributing to an 
already intense anxiety about homosexuality among Díaz’s male characters and a wider sense of 
homosexuality as a threat to the nation. Rudolfo represents this anxiety bluntly when, upon Oscar’s 
departure for university, he hands him a box of condoms, saying: ‘use them all, he said, and then 
added: on girls.’375  By enforcing heterosexuality in this way, Rudolfo highlights a broader American 
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anxiety about emasculation and feminisation, which gained particular prominence during the 1940s 
following the publication of Philip Wylie’s controversial non-fictional text, Generation of Vipers 
(1942). Anxiety about these topics is, of course, entangled with anxiety about homosexuality and 
feminisation, with Wylie’s text denigrating the perceived emasculation of men at the hands of 
mothers, who, through an apparent combination of coddling and controlling behaviour, cause ‘the 
good-looking men and boys [to be] rounded up and beaten or sucked into pliability.’376 
Contemplating the figure of ‘mom,’ Wylie observes she is ‘a great little guy’ who is able to 
‘keep her captive son or sons in a state of automatic adoration of herself,’ leading Wylie to 
ultimately ask: ‘But where [is] man’s freedom?’377 Of course, Wylie’s concern here about the 
feminine absorbing the masculine (with ‘mom’ becoming a ‘guy’) is in itself a part of his anxiety 
about men being robbed of their strength and freedom, allegedly because of their submission at the 
hands of the mother. His anxiety about the feminine is thus also a form of homophobia, and a 
homophobia that operates misogynistically. In the context of Díaz’s writing, the maternal influence 
Wylie fears is intensified by the absence of meaningful father figures. Similarly, Trujillo’s tactical 
manipulation of homoeroticism (in which homosexuality is framed as a threat to heteromasculinity 
and its performance, while male adoration of him as a leader is also strongly encouraged) poses the 
threat of emasculation, as well as the risk of death at the Trujillato’s hands. In this sense, if 
masculine homoeroticism is directed at, or enacted by Trujillo, it is deemed acceptable, as his 
control extends to a control of the erotic, but this also means he is able to pick and choose what is 
and is not ‘acceptable,’ and can weaponize homosexuality. When Abelard is arrested by the Secret 
Police, the guards inform the other prisoners that he is ‘a homosexual and a Communist’ in order to 
turn them against him, which results in him being harassed and having ‘most of his clothes’ stripped 
from his body.378 
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In response to anxieties about the emasculation of men (and connected anxieties about 
homosexuality and feminisation,) we begin to witness what Susan Jeffords refers to as ‘the 
remasculinization of American culture,’ occurring in celebration of the ‘mythos of masculine 
bonding,’ and framing ‘the survival of masculinity itself […] as depending on the exclusion of women 
and the feminine.’379  Jeffords reflects on how the experiences of Vietnam veterans were exploited 
in order to frame them as oppressed,  
 
insert[ing] this characterization into an already formulated cultural attitude towards the 
victimized that had been established in relation to civil rights and women’s movements, 
to the point that hiring quotas and organizations like NOW were seen as depriving men 
of their “rights.” The final step in this process was to transfer the accumulated negative 
features of the feminine to the government itself, the primary vehicle for legislated and 
enforced changes in civil rights […] all men could declare their suffering at the hands of 
a government biased towards and operating under the aegis of the feminine.380  
 
 
The logic Jeffords criticises takes anxieties such as Wylie’s and uses them as justification for the 
need for binaristic gender categories, using the perceived downtrodden status of veterans to 
argue that women’s liberation has ‘gone too far.’ This feeling of emasculation that led to 
remasculinization during and after the Vietnam war echoes the emasculation that Horn highlights 
as a result of repeated American occupation in the Dominican Republic – in both cases, the result 
is a reiteration of the need for traditionally masculine values and behaviours from men, and by 
men. Yet as Jeffords observes, in America, it is ‘primarily the white male’ that is used as an 
emblem of emasculation: ‘although remasculinization works primarily to the benefit of white 
males […] all men would, to some extent, benefit from this process. But in spite of the ideology of 
collectivity, remasculinization is not a project of equivalence;’ that is to say, the benefits 
remasculinization may bring to men (a reiteration of male dominance and power) apply to a lesser 
degree to black and mixed-race people, as well as to immigrants.381  
 
379 Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), p. 168. 
380 Jeffords, p. 169. 
381 Jeffords, p. 168 and p. 204 respectively. 
 121 
It is interesting to note, however, that this remasculinization relies heavily on male 
bonding, as an exclusion of all things feminine (including women) could in and of itself be used as 
part of an accusation of homosexuality – a lack of interest in women that could cause suspicion. 
These various threads further complicate the performance of masculinity for figures like Oscar 
and Yunior, who must grapple with masculine expectations from two countries, one of which 
prioritises the masculinity of white people, and the other of which reactively exaggerates its 
collective masculinity and the masculinity of individual men in order to challenge its past 
domination at American hands. These performances must not only account for their particular 
racial identities, but also for a number of contradictory messages about masculine performance – 
engaging with as many women as possible sexually, but also rejecting the feminine, befriending 
other men, but not too much, emphasising one’s vulnerability in order to (re)gain status and 
power, but also being careful not to appear weak as a result.  These opposing behavioural 
requirements in masculine performance speak to the need to develop a double consciousness, or 
indeed to operate in hysterical time, as the performer is required to be many things, indeed, many 
people, at once, and in Kristeva’s terms, existing in this time provokes dissociation.  
When Yunior criticises Oscar for putting a sign saying ‘Speak, friend, and enter,’ on his dorm 
room door, saying ‘De León, you gotta be kidding, Elvish?,’ Oscar corrects him, saying it’s Sindarin, 
only for Yunior’s friend Melvin to say ‘Actually […] it’s gay-hay-hay.’382 As on other occasions, the 
only guidance Rudolfo feels able to give Oscar is to have sex, with his earlier clarification that this 
should be with women emphasising both how Dominican masculinity tends to be structured in 
relation to a disavowal of same-sex desire, and his specific anxiety that Oscar’s failure to conform to 
ideals of Dominican masculinity is caused by homosexuality. Indeed, in this sense, the imagined 
threat of homosexuality is central to the construction and performance of heteromasculinity, with 
homophobia operating as ‘a mechanism for regulating the behavior of the many by the specific 
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oppression of the few,’ and also as ‘a central organizing principle of our cultural definition of 
manhood.’383 Given that homosexuality is the only explanation Rudolfo can think of, it is clear that 
failure to adhere to macho stereotypes is rare – indeed, Ray González notes that drinking, stealing, 
and learning about sex are ‘timeless rites of initiation’ for Latino men, who must ‘come to terms with 
the consequences of growing up in a society that produces a high rate of substance and sexual 
abuse.’384 He adds that men with such backgrounds ‘[influence] the way Latino males behave, treat 
women, and deteriorate their own culture,’ while also acknowledging that ‘some of these negative 
aspects of life were forced upon Latino men by mainstream society and social policies that 
influenced the environment in which many of these young men grew up.’385  
Oscar has not even skimmed the surface of such initiations, investing himself instead in 
fantasy novels, comics, tabletop games, and anime films. These interests, too, lead to accusations of 
homosexuality, with Yunior calling Oscar’s university residence ‘Demarest Homo Hall’ because of its 
demographic of ‘weirdos and losers and freaks.’386 This again demonstrates Oscar’s Latino peers’ 
clear discomfort with his position outside established parameters of Dominican masculinity. Living in 
this way can be thought of as provoking an anxiety about exposing the hyperbolically performative 
nature of their own masculinity, which relies on displays of physical strength and sexual virility, as 
well as language that belittles women and anyone else who fails to join in with the performance - as 
Butler argues, those who do not participate in established performances of gender are punished and 
excluded. Yunior is frank about the fact he ‘would have hidden from a Caliban like [Oscar]’ if not for 
the fact that he was desperate for somewhere to live, and that rooming with Oscar would bring him 
closer to Oscar’s sister Lola, adding that he’d ‘never in [his] life met a Dominican like [Oscar].’387 
Oscar’s exclusion is so severe that he describes himself as ‘cursed,’ an assertion that is catalyzed by 
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his peers’ denial of his heritage: when he is asked ‘you ever eat toto?’ and answers no, his friend 
Harold insists ‘tú no eres nada de dominicano.’388 Oscar’s inability to have sexual contact with a 
woman leads to his friends refusing his heritage, as the performance of Dominican masculinity must 
involve heterosexual sexual virility. It is interesting to note the use of the term ‘dominicano’ in this 
context, which is gendered male – that is to say, there is nothing that is male and Dominican in 
Oscar, in Harold’s view. Oscar’s friends regularly infer he is gay, and in saying he is completely 
unmasculine, the novel’s homophobia is presented as a variant of misogyny, as an anxiety about the 
female within the male, or about men acting outside of the unwritten codes of acceptable masculine 
behaviour. More broadly, this anxiety is about the blurring or complete collapse of gender binaries, 
and of heterosexual desire, as well as the threat presented by this. In denying the presence of 
anything feminine apart from in brief sexual encounters, or abusive relationships, Díaz’s male 
characters demonstrate their anxiety about being perceived as feminine, and indeed about women 
having any agency or autonomy. There are very few women with agency in Díaz’s work, and even 
those who do possess some independence and intelligence, such as Nilda in This Is How You Lose 
Her and Lola and Beli in Oscar Wao are characterized by and through infidelities and sexual violence 
at the hands of men. Intra- and extra-textually, this demonstrates a difficulty in acknowledging the 
feminine without the influence of the masculine, while also highlighting the anxiety about the 
feminine and feminization that is at the heart of Díaz’s writing and the masculine performances in 
which his characters participate.  
When the anxiety prompted by accusations or insinuations of femininity or homosexuality 
prove too much, those who are able may incorporate props into their masculine performance. Such 
props, however, require a level of privilege not afforded to Dominican migrants to the US. Brenda 
Boudreau thinks about how ‘consumer capitalism courts […] men relentlessly, convincing them that 
their very masculinity is threatened without an expensive, flashy car, designer clothes, perfect hair 
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and skin, and a lavishly furnished apartment.’389 Given that these items are only available to those 
who can afford them, Díaz’s characters, typically poor Dominican migrants into the US, cannot 
participate in such displays of masculinity, explaining the perceived need, instead, to perform 
masculinity through physical and sexual violence, as they lack the agency to participate in other 
aspects of American masculinity. In any case, both objects and behaviours form part of the 
performance of masculinity, and as Boudreau notes, ‘if masculinity is a display […] it is also 
vulnerable to being revealed as false.’390  For Boudreau, the ultimate challenge to this performance 
comes when the ‘ability to perform sexually is questioned,’ yet for Oscar, almost every aspect of his 
character leads to accusations of homosexuality, from his appearance and interests through to his 
creative writing and manner of speaking. Indeed, Oscar’s very name in the title of the novel, Oscar 
Wao, comes from a joke Yunior makes at his expense, announcing to him and his friends that ‘he 
looked like that fat homo Oscar Wilde.’391 This results in the nickname Oscar Wao (based on a 
Spanish pronunciation of Wilde) sticking to such an extent that Oscar begins to answer to it, 
accepting the offensive homosexual labels his peers use to tease him despite his own certainty that 
he is both ‘truly’ a Dominican and heterosexual. Here, too, homosexuality and the feminine are 
linked, as it is Oscar’s interest in writing fiction (and thus in expressing himself) that leads to this 
nickname: indeed, there is a strong precedent for anxiety about writing and the 
feminine/homosexuality, with authors such as Ernest Hemingway and Charles Bukowski expressing 
real paranoia about the association between writing, emotional vulnerability, and femininity.392  
Although the terms ‘fag,’ ‘homo’ and ‘pato’ (queer) are used regularly as insults in Díaz’s 
work, he only features one actual homosexual relationship, which occurs in his short story ‘Drown.’ 
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Here, an unnamed narrator is non-consensually masturbated by his friend Beto, prompting him to 
shout ‘what the fuck are you doing?,’ ejaculate, start to shake, and then flee.393 The narrator does 
later appear to have consensual sex with Beto, but in retrospect, describes him as a ‘pato’  (which is 
phonetically connected to Beto’s name) and has a sexual encounter with a woman that mirrors his 
first encounter with Beto.  He also begins to spend time with men who drive past what he refers to 
as the ‘fag bar,’ calling over those who go there to ‘point [a] plastic pistol at them, just to see if 
they’ll run or shit their pants.’394 The aggression of this homophobia serves to reiterate the level of 
anxiety many Dominican men feel about being labeled gay, as well as to emphasise the childlike and 
theatrical manifestation of homophobic violence in Díaz’s writing and the idea that oppression is 
necessarily feminising. While in the main, the LGBTQ community is pushed to the peripheries of 
Díaz’s narratives because of the aggressively and exaggeratedly heterosexual performances that are 
expected of Dominican men, and because of the anxiety and shame homosexuality appears to 
provoke, following Trujillo’s death in Oscar Wao, a footnote reveals that the stretch of land where 
he dies ‘was the haunt of what El Jefe worried about the most: los maricones.’395 Although this is not 
revealed in the main body of the novel’s text, reiterating the exclusion of LGBTQ people within the 
Dominican Republic under Trujillo, their choice to occupy his place of death constitutes a small but 
significant act of resistance against the kind of hypermasculinity he practiced and encouraged in 
others. 
It is Oscar’s inability to have romantic or sexual relationships with women, and thus prove 
his heterosexuality and his Dominican-ness, that highlights his desperation to participate in 
Dominican masculine performance. His failures in this regard exacerbate his depression and anxiety 
to such an extent that he attempts suicide, telling Yunior that he is desperate to change his life, but 
that ‘nothing [he’s] tried has been ameliorative.’396 However, in practice, his motivation wanes – he 
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is understandably unwilling to give up on his interest in books, which provide great comfort to him, 
and he only manages a few days of physical exercise. What does remain, however, is his motivation 
to be with a woman – but motivation alone cannot help him to be deemed masculine in the eyes of 
his peers, as this stereotype hinges on actual sexual contact. The contradictory nature of this 
masculinity is highlighted in James Baldwin’s essay ‘Freaks and the Ideal of Manhood’ (1985), which 
describes the ‘American ideal of masculinity’ as something which has created  
 
cowboys and Indians, good guys and bad guys, punks and studs, tough guys and softies, butch 
and faggot, black and white. It is an ideal so paralytically infantile that it is virtually forbidden – 




The difficulties highlighted here apply to an even greater degree when it comes to the experience of 
immigrants, who are already split or caught between two identities without the additional 
complication of expectations to present as hypermasculine. If these binaristic expectations apply to 
those born in the US, there is no room for manoeuvre in the performance of Dominican masculinity, 
particularly when attempting to prove oneself in new environments among people who are more 
financially stable (and thus able to ‘prove’ their masculinity through consumer objects) – the man 
must adhere to the performance completely, or else he is the complete opposite of masculine, in 
stereotypical terms – effeminate, weak, a ‘freak’ like Oscar.398 As ever, the pressure to conform to 
expectations of masculinity is heightened yet also problematised for Dominican immigrants, framed 
as the ‘bad guys’ in comparison to American men, and yet also unable to conform to the ideal that 
Baldwin highlights by virtue of existing between some of the categories outlined. 
Despite enduring endless slurs from other men, it is a disparaging comment from a woman 
that catalyses Oscar’s ‘killer depression at the end of sophomore year,’ as he attempts suicide by 
drinking ‘two bottles of 151 because some girl dissed him - almost fucking killing himself and his sick 
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mother in the process.’399  Later, having caught Jenni Muñoz, a female friend who Oscar has feelings 
for, with another man, Oscar toasts ‘to my virginity!’, drinks three bottles of Cisco, and ‘[throws] 
himself down into the darkness’ off a bridge near New Brunswick train station.400 In both suicide 
attempts, Oscar feels his masculinity has been threatened by female rejection.  This reiterates his 
uncle Rudolfo’s expectation that he may not be able to sleep with women, as well as the toxicity of 
these expectations and sarcastic comments about homosexuality, given the mental anguish they 
have caused Oscar, pointing to the anxiety that men also cause Oscar, as he doesn’t want his male 
peers to view him as a sexual failure. Despite all this, even after rushing to his side at the hospital 
and asking ‘What the fuck were you thinking, O?,’ Yunior still returns almost immediately to Oscar’s 
virginity: ‘you don’t want to be dead. Take it from me. No-pussy is bad. But dead is like no-pussy 
times ten.’401 Although this is supposed to provide comfort, ultimately, it only reinforces the notion 
that Oscar has, at this point, failed as a Dominican man, adding to his anxieties about this subject. 
Though Oscar does want to be identified as Dominican, and to be able to sleep with women, 
his general refusal (and inability) to actually participate in stereotypically masculine behaviour can 
be thought of as a form of disidentification, a term coined by José Esteban Muñoz to describe an act 
of resistance that parodies toxic representations of minorities, re-appropriating phobic objects in 
order to undermine stereotypes. Muñoz considers disidentification in the context of queer 
performance, citing as an opening example a performance by gay women which ‘luxuriates in the 
seemingly homophobic image of the truck-driving closeted diesel dykes,’ acting out the stereotype in 
a ‘campy [and] over-the-top’ scene that reconfigures the stereotype ‘as sexy and glamorous, and not 
as the pathetic and abject spectacle that it appears to be in the eyes of heteronormative culture.’402 
The purpose of such disidentification resonates with Oscar’s position outside of Dominican 
masculine stereotypes: ‘disidentification is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the 
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minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that 
continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of 
normative citizenship.’403 To an extent, Oscar’s status as an overweight, proudly ‘nerdy,’ and usually 
unaggressive man can be thought of as an act of performative defiance against the hegemonic 
model of Dominican masculinity. His inability to fight other men, charm and sleep with women, and 
generally be stereotypically macho, can actually be thought of as a way of speaking back to a 
performance which reinforces outdated and binaristic conceptions of gender, encourages the abuse 
of women, and also pushes men further towards identity crisis, given the potential consequences of 
failing to perform masculinity. Muñoz notes that disidentification can be ‘a survival strategy that 
works within and outside the dominant public sphere simultaneously,’ and in Oscar’s case, this is 
especially true – almost as soon as he is actually successful in sleeping with a woman, Ybón, he is 
murdered by the capitán, ‘one of those very bad men that not even postmodernism can explain 
away.’404  Thus, Oscar’s success in finally becoming a ‘real’ Dominican, in embarking upon ‘the 
proper path of Dominican male-itude,’ places him in more danger than the act of resisting them, 
resulting in his death at the hands of a man Yunior is at pains to emphasise is morally ‘worse’ than 
him, in a way that cannot be justified by any form of scholarship.405   
 
                                         Violently Macho: Shows of Strength 
 
Anxiety about proving strength (especially physical strength) and asserting dominance is a far more 
complex aspect of masculine anxiety, and the performance of masculinity. Although violent 
behaviour is part of the unpleasant tapestry that is stereotypical Dominican/Latino masculinity, 
which many of Díaz’s male characters feel anxious about embodying, to frame this violence as a 
result or symptom of anxiety is, of course, problematic, as it could be thought of as an attempt to 
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understand this violence. Equally, in enacting this violence, men fall into what Maggie McKinley 
describes as the trap of ‘paradoxically [reinforcing] the oppressions [they] seek to overturn,’ – 
oppressions that, for Díaz’s male characters, come from their own fathers, the legacy of Trujillo’s 
dictatorial regime, and white men in the US, who position themselves as superior and less 
damagingly masculine than Dominican men.406  Although masculinity can never be a ‘solid, 
immovable construction […][because] from moment to moment, forces redictate, replace, and 
reimagine its constructing,’ in the context of Dominican masculinity, its performance relies heavily 
on displays of strength through violence, as when Yunior and Rafa’s father forces them to ‘kneel 
down on the cutting side of a coconut grater’ when they misbehave to assert his dominance, when 
Rafa starts beating people during his chemotherapy, and when a boy organizes against Trujillo and 
has ‘an eye gouged out with electric shocks,’ to name but a few examples.407 Of course, this anxious 
desire to perform violently relates to the disavowal of the feminine as part of Dominican identity 
construction – a desire that is amplified when it comes to black masculinity, because ‘as black men, 
[…] characters immediately experience an existential and gendered crisis […], their masculinity is 
questioned as a consequence of their race and ethnicities.’408   
As I have already argued, although the process of remasculinization, of performing 
masculinity in order to fit in and reiterate one’s own power, can benefit a wide range of men, these 
benefits still operate on a spectrum in which a black person (or any person of colour) must work 
harder to prove his masculinity, despite this performance itself helping to shape racist stereotypes 
about black violence – another crisis of masculinity that is shaped by longstanding stereotypes that 
black people are predisposed to violence and sexually charged crime. As Fanon argues: ‘the Negro 
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symbolizes biological danger […] whoever says rape says Negro.’409 Despite having ‘lost eighty 
pounds to chemo,’ a week after leaving hospital, Yunior’s brother Rafa ‘cracked this illegal Peruvian 
kid in the face with a hammer and two hours later threw down at the Pathmark because he thought 
some fool was talking shit about him, popped said fool in the piehole with a weak overhand right 
before a bunch of us could break it up.’410 As well as emulating the behaviour of his violent father, 
here, Rafa is accounting for his own physical weakness as a result of his cancer, overcompensating 
by performing a highly violent and visible kind of masculinity that is centered around male-on-male 
violence and that is rich in pathos. This kind of violence acts as a very literal denial of homosexuality, 
even of the homosocial, in Sedgwick’s terms – Yunior is enacting the ‘obligatory heterosexuality’ that 
is ‘built into male dominated kinship systems.’411 Indeed, Sedgwick remarks that patriarchal 
structures ‘group together all the bonds that link males to males, and by which males enhance the 
status of males,’ yet it is ‘impossible to imagine a form of the patriarchy that is not homophobic.’412 
Men can enhance each other’s status through homosocial bonds, though operating through the 
exaggeratedly patriarchal lens of Dominican masculinity, such bonds are especially hard to navigate 
because of the risk of being viewed as homosexual. As such, Rafa rejects such bonds outright, 
enforcing his own ‘obligatory heterosexuality’ in the most overt manner possible, enhancing his own 
masculine status while also establishing his particular dominance as a Dominican man through his 
attack on a Peruvian child. 
 Abelard, Beli, and Oscar are each victims of extreme violence of the Trujillato and/or the 
Dominican police, with the physical beatings they suffer each speaking to anxieties about 
masculinity that arise throughout the novel. Abelard denies Trujillo access to his beautiful daughter, 
and also writes a book about the extent of his power – provoking Trujillo’s anxiety about being 
toppled, as well as challenging the all-encompassing nature of his virility. This results in him being 
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connected to an ‘electrical contraption’ known as ‘the pulpo,’ being ‘beaten […] mercilessly with 
leather truncheons’ leaving ‘one of his testicles […] permanently shriveled,’ and ultimately, in him 
being driven mad by pain and becoming ‘a vegetable.’413 The use of a leather truncheon by male 
guards adds a homoerotic and sexual dimension to Abelard’s abuse, while the centrality of his sexual 
organs to his abuse demonstrates the centrality of sexual organs to Dominican male conceptions of 
self – it is the threat to Abelard’s virility that tips him over the edge. Abelard is stripped of his 
intellect, his sexuality, and his own body – denying him any ability to engage in masculine 
performance and linking him to Peter Abelard, who was castrated following his relationship with 
Héloise d’Argenteuil.  
Beli, having had a relationship with Trujillo’s sister’s husband, is made to endure violence so 
severe that Yunior ‘report[s] instead on the damage inflicted: her clavicle, chicken-boned; her right 
humerus, a triple fracture; […] five ribs, broken; left kidney, bruised; liver, bruised; right lung, 
collapsed; front teeth, blown out. About 167 points of damage in total.’414 In threatening the Trujillo 
family’s reputation, Beli pays the ultimate price, as she loses the child she is expecting. This 
constitutes a sustantial denial of the feminine, a clear and categorical act of masculine violence at 
the hand of Trujillo’s henchmen which reiterates the dictator’s complete dominance. Oscar faces 
two bouts of extreme violence as a result of his relationship with Ybón, whose abusive ex-partner 
seeks revenge – first, ‘the beating to end all beatings’ leaving him with a ‘broken nose, shattered 
zygomatic arch, crushed seventh cranial nerve, three of his teeth snapped off at the gum, 
concussion,’ and later, his murder at the hands of the ex-partner’s hired assassins.415  As Maja Horn 
argues of Oscar’s murder, ‘the military policeman’s murderous violence is not simply a case of 
individual pathology. Rather, as the narrative clearly suggests, it responds to the social logic that 
taking a woman from another man profoundly challenges his masculinity and its prerogatives.’416 
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Each of these acts of torture occurs in the Dominican Republic rather than in the US, reiterating the 
especially physical and corporeal nature of the construction and performance of the country’s 
masculinity. In Oscar’s case, his successful interaction with this masculine performance, as a man 
who does not fit into the mould of who should act out this performance (an attractive, powerful, 
ever-sexually virile Dominican), cannot be allowed to continue. Having failed to be stereotypically 
masculine, he is not the intended performer, and his actions are deemed all the more insulting 
because of this.  As he shares his first kiss with Ybón, ‘there were lights all around them and he 
thought I’m going to transcend,’ yet he suddenly realizes that ‘the two plainclothes who had pulled 
them over […] were beaming flashlights into the car.’417 Thus, Oscar’s transcendence from his 
apparently un-Dominican chasteness is almost immediately halted, with the lights not representing 
joy but the danger of being seen, as with an ‘expression of sheer murder’ Ybón’s ex-partner the 
capitán ends Oscar’s moment of fitting the Dominican masculine stereotype.418  
 
Saying Too Much: Exposing Hypermasculine Performance 
 
One of many reasons that Oscar is ultimately denied the opportunity to continue his engagement 
with Dominican hypermasculinity (having remarked to Yunior in a letter sent before his death that 
‘he couldn’t believe he’d had to wait for [sex] so goddamn long,’ adding, ‘so this is what everybody’s 
always talking about!’), is that he is too emotionally open and expressive.419 Whereas Yunior 
represses his anxiety about his father and his expectations of him, saying ‘I didn’t have the words,’ 
and Rafa ‘wouldn’t say a word’ in his dying days, Oscar is blunt about his inability to cope, and about 
his struggles with anxiety and depression as a result of his virginity and his social isolation, solidified 
by his peers’ refusal to acknowledge him as a ‘real’ Dominican.420 Following his suicide attempt, he 
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cries in the hospital, and when his sister asks ‘are you OK?’ he ‘shook his head: No.’421 Although the 
haunting figure of the Faceless Man, an apparent embodiment of the fukú curse, appears at 
moments of extreme violence in Oscar Wao to symbolically represent the erasure of those who do 
not conform to Trujillo’s regime (and in Oscar’s case, to stereotypical notions of Dominican 
masculinity and its performance), he can also be thought of as representing the silence that must 
accompany a full performance of Dominican hypermasculinity. The failure or willful refusal to 
express one’s feelings is often itself a form of violence, provoking further anxiety while attempting 
to allay the fear of the feminine.  
However, as much as the Faceless man, who Mahler argues is, in fact, the ghost of Trujillo, 
wishes to leave the Dominican Republic and the people within it with nothing but a ‘página en 
blanco,’ Oscar’s final letter does eventually reach Yunior, allowing him to write the Cabral family’s 
story, which operates in book form as ‘a zafa of sorts. My very own counterspell.’422  This action of 
the ‘hero-writer’s taking up of the pen,’ is, in Mahler’s view, ‘a counter-gesture in which the 
placement of ink on the page reveals that which the tyrannical power seeks to suppress.’423 While 
she is speaking here of violent omissions occurring as a result of Colonial dominance, this argument 
can also be applied to emotional openness. While Yunior has usually failed in expressing or 
addressing his emotions, which is part of the hypermasculine, strong, and unaffected male persona 
Trujillo encouraged Dominican men to perform in his image, receiving Oscar’s final letter and writing 
their intertwining stories allows him to understand his own emotions without fear of being 
perceived as feminine. While framing Yunior, and writers in general, as ‘heroic’ offers rather too 
much credit to a figure who has repeatedly engaged in misogynistic, homophobic, and generally 
bullying behaviours (albeit as part of a hypermasculine performance), Oscar’s disidentification and 
Yunior’s eventual attempt at penance through writing each demonstrate means of employing one’s 
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dual-existence, one’s existence in hysterical time, as a means of untangling oneself from expected 
masculine gender performances, and the anxieties that drive and arise from such performances. 
Indeed, in this sense, writing can be thought of as a disidentificatory practice that speaks back to 
Colonial dominance and narrow, stereotypical models of masculinity, for as Munõz argues, 
‘disidentification is about cultural, material, and psychic survival’ while also being a ‘response to 
state and global power apparatuses that employ systems of racial, sexual, and national 
subjugation.’424 
 Despite having resigned as Chairman of the Pulitzer Prize board following the allegations 
made against him, in November 2018, following an independent review of these allegations, Junot 
Díaz was re-appointed to his old role.425 He also maintained roles at the Boston Review and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Contemplating America’s ‘tender spot for men who 
admit their flaws,’ Lili Loofbourow identifies Díaz as having participated in acts of male self-pardon 
that have become increasingly common in light of the #MeToo movement.426  Not only does she 
view his piece on his childhood sexual abuse as self-pardon, she also sees the sympathetic portrayal 
of characters such as Yunior as acts of pardoning, too, drawing attention to his ‘I’m not a bad guy…’ 
speech at the beginning of This Is How You Lose Her as an example of Díaz’s lenience or excuse-
making regarding misogynistic or generally abusive male behaviour. In turn, this can be linked to 
Yunior’s writing in This is How You Lose Her and Oscar Wao, as he uses the act of writing to frame 
and justify his so-called reinvention: ‘These days I write a lot […] Learned that from Oscar. I’m a new 
man, you see, a new man, a new man.’427  Loofbourow adds that ‘the regular speculation about if 
and when the men of #MeToo will make their comebacks arises from a culture steeped in the belief 
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that men should basically be able to self-pardon,’ a ‘ritual that tends to exclude the injured party.’428  
In turn, this reiterates Jeffords’ argument that men claim to have ‘paid the price for women’s 
equality, both in their careers and in their self-definition.’429  Of course, this logic is used as 
justification for the need for remasculinization, as well as an explanation for hypermasculine 
behaviour, and both Oscar Wao and This Is How You Lose Her are texts that are overly sympathetic 
and forgiving towards their male characters. While both texts do critique the hypermasculinity that 
is expected of their characters, very little attention is given in the text to the social and political 
conditions that led to performances of masculinity being considered necessary. Equally, although 
the texts highlight anxieties about fathers, homosexuality, the feminine, displays of strength, and 
emotive language, as well as about the performance of masculinity itself, it is only Oscar who 
actually subverts and toys with the expectation of such a performance, despite the obvious damage 
it causes to those who engage in it (as demonstrated by Yunior, Rafa, and his father, among many 
others). The actual manifestation of these anxieties and their longer-lasting repercussions are also 
largely ignored, with the engagement in certain hypermasculine behaviours serving as the most 
obvious indicator of anxiety surrounding masculinity. Indeed, although conceptions of gender are 
generally less binary than ever, the crisis in and of masculinity is also being exploited to justify and 
pardon sexual harassment and abuse, amidst accusations that our interpretation of misogynistic 
male behaviour in the past and present is overly ‘politically correct’, and making it difficult for men 
to know what to do, and how to be. While such behaviour continues to be pardoned by the general 
public and political figures alike, the crisis in masculinity will only continue, as we move no closer to 
meaningful answers to the question of what, precisely, positive masculinity may look like, and when, 
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Chemically Troubled Times’: Traumatic Futures, Anxious Futures 
 
 
With the Cold War receding and “post-9/11” on the rise as a periodization of the present, does 
it make sense to speak of a perpetual interwar in referring to our own moment? To be sure, 
the prospect of a worldwide war that would both mobilize and target whole populations 
seems more remote than it once did. Other doomsday scenarios occupy us more urgently. Yet 
despite our not having plunged into global conflict since the Second World War, few 
populations have enjoyed an uncomplicated peacetime in recent years […] U.S. armed forces 
are deployed at present in over 150 countries, most of them in Middle Eastern combat zones 
associated with the “war on terror.430 
 
 
In Studies on Hysteria, Breuer and Freud expand contemporary definitions of trauma to include what 
they describe as ‘psychical traumas [-] any experience which calls up distressing affects – such as 
those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain.’431 The word trauma has particular physical 
resonance in Breuer and Freud’s work, and as such, in this formulation, anxiety is an experience that 
can be simultaneously physically and psychically traumatic. Their definition also speaks to the 
complex and disruptive ways in which anxiety may at one point be felt physically, and at another 
point, psychologically – a kind of traumatic switch that may be especially challenging to bear. Later, 
Freud posits that ‘the individual will make an important advance in his capacity for self-preservation 
if he can foresee and expect a traumatic situation,’ adding that ‘anxiety is the original reaction to 
helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the danger-situation as a signal for help.’432 
Whereas the former definition describes anxiety as one of various affects that could lead to, or 
constitute, psychic trauma, the latter proposition suggests that anxiety is both preparation for, and 
reaction to, trauma. Yet this preparation is still strongly linked to lived experience; the ‘signal’ of 
anxiety announces that ‘The present situation reminds me of one of the traumatic experiences I 
have had before. Therefore I will anticipate the trauma and behave as though it had already come, 
while there is yet time to turn it aside.’433 However, in the context of the current state of ‘perpetual 
 
430 Paul K. Saint-Amour, Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 311-12.  
431 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, ‘On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary 
Communication,’ in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume 2, 
Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895), ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), p. 6.  
432 Sigmund Freud, ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety,’ p. 166 and p. 166-67 respectively. 
433 Freud, ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety,’ p. 166.  
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interwar’ in the US and elsewhere described by Saint-Amour, a state punctuated by anxieties about 
a multitude of doomsday scenarios, anxiety’s anticipatory qualities, its purported ability to allow for 
the avoidance or prevention of further trauma in the future, does not and cannot apply. By virtue of 
the futurity of these scenarios, the ability to remember or imagine what they might be like is at least 
partially negated, and this negation is furthered by our uncertainty about whether there is, indeed, 
‘time to turn [these scenarios] aside,’ particularly as action at an individual level could never do so. 
Equally, existence in a state of continuous crisis disrupts any sense of futurity. Whether these crisis 
scenarios involve armed and/or nuclear conflict, impending environmental catastrophe, terrorism, 
pandemic, the rise of automation and artificial intelligence, or a more personal yet general sense of 
hopelessness about the future, particularly under neoliberal capitalism, anxiety surrounding such 
uncertain future traumas defies Freudian formulations, which typically link trauma to memory and 
the past. While Freud argues that anxiety is produced through experiences that resonate with past 
traumas, the anxieties this chapter will consider can be thought of as shaping a new, future-oriented 
form of trauma with its own set of physical, psychological, and textual iterations that are, 
nonetheless, informed by a relationship to traumatic pasts, whether experienced directly or not. 
As such, this chapter will position anxiety about the future as this unique form of future-
oriented trauma, which operates as a pre-emptive form of haunting, occurring before the future has 
been completely denied or cancelled while still demonstrating the many dangers that could lead to 
such an eventuality. Instead of being traumatised by an event that has already happened, this kind 
of trauma centres around events and experiences that are yet to come, psychically painful anxieties 
that feel, at times, overwhelmingly real. Literature provides a particularly interesting and prescient 
frame through which to contemplate these ideas, because it allows for the precise linguistic and 
affective tracing of these trauma-inflected anxieties as they unfold. This trauma also draws particular 
attention to anxiety’s influence on temporality and narrative time – to the speeding up and slowing 
down this anxiety prompts for characters’ sense of time, and the way in which anxiety ruptures 
established narratives and chronologies, as discussed in Chapter 1. In order to think through the 
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features of this anxious future-trauma further, this chapter will focus on two main texts: David 
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996) and Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American (2008), with 
references too to Hustvedt’s autobiographically-inspired novel Memories of the Future (2019).  
Rather than attempting to draw direct correlations between these very different texts (one 
of which occurs prior to 9/11, the other of which addresses this event directly on several occasions), 
this chapter will fall into two distinct sections which consider both texts’ relationships to temporality 
and to technology, and the anxieties about the future that these subjects provoke. These sections 
will interpret anxieties about the passage of time and the future with attention to Matthew Ratcliffe 
et al’s ‘sense of a foreshortened future’ (that is, ‘a sense that the future is bereft of positive, 
meaningful life events […] a sense that one’s meaningful life is in the past’) as well as Saint-Amour’s 
concept of a ‘pre-traumatic stress syndrome whose symptoms [arise] in response to a potentially 
oncoming rather than an already realized catastrophe.’434 In the former, the sense of a 
foreshortened future arises following traumatic events, broadly conceived by Ratcliffe et al as 
‘occurrences that would cause almost anyone great distress,’ which as a result destroy a ‘previously 
intact (or largely intact) sense of trust,’ especially in the future.435 In the latter, the pre-traumatic 
stress syndrome is ‘the experience of an apparently inescapable future’ through a ‘mass-traumatic 
anticipation of violence’ that is shaped by violence that has occurred in the past and present.436 
What differs, then, between these concepts and the anxiety and trauma at hand in this chapter is 
both the idea that future-anxiety can occur without the subject having knowingly or directly 
experienced a traumatic event in the past or present, and that it can arise intensely at an individual 
level as well as on a mass scale. Many of the characters this chapter considers are not traumatised in 
overt ways by specific events; rather, they exist in unstable and precarious conditions that 
traumatise incrementally, meaning that the future becomes an increasing source of anxiety. It is 
 
434 Matthew Ratcliffe, Mark Ruddell, and Benedict Smith, ‘What is a “sense of a foreshortened future?” A 
phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time,’ Frontiers in Psychology, 5, article 1026 (2014), 1-11, p. 1 
and p. 2 respectively, and Saint-Amour, Tense Future, p. 7-8. 
435 Ratcliffe et al, p. 2.  
436 Saint-Amour, Tense Future, 20. 
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important to emphasise, however, that this future-anxiety must have a referent of some kind – it 
may not have a specific object, but it does not arise from nowhere, either – it always exceeds its 
object, and the reasons why and how this exceeding occurs must be unpacked in order to 
understand the anxiety fully. It may arise because of one’s own experience of trauma, but it may 
also arise out of knowledge of another’s trauma – knowledge that has been gained from historical 
accounts, personal testimony, contemporary news coverage, or even social media. The experience 
of future-anxiety is also contingent on a particular set of political, sociological, and cultural factors 
that provoke the sense that the future can only be negative, arising first at an individual level as a 
kind of pre-traumatic stress in the anticipation of a mass-scale disaster. Despite featuring 
significantly different plots and themes, both Sorrows of an American and Infinite Jest demonstrate 
the way in which such anxieties alter and disrupt speeds of mental processing in light of the pressure 
a sense of a shortened, denied, or cancelled future exerts. In turn, this specific kind of anxiety, 
arising as it does as trauma that is oriented towards the future, offers new means of interpreting the 
temporalities, narratives, forms, and affective structures of the literary texts at hand. 
  The aforementioned iterations of future-trauma can only be read through the lens of the 
widening gap between ‘the richest of the rich and the poorest of the poor, between highly educated 
and illiterate,’ and as Marc Augé argues, ‘fear of falling down on the excluded side is today very 
widespread, [feeding] anxiety over the immediate future.’437 Franco Berardi goes as far as to say that 
‘the future is over,’ that the ‘slow cancellation of the future got underway in the 1970s and 1980s,’ 
and that this ‘collapse of the future is rooted in the acceleration of psychic and cognitive rhythm.’438 
This speeding up of the mind, and the pace of life more generally, is itself inevitably linked to the 
increasing influence and prevalence of technology and 24 hour media cycles. Mark Fisher notes that 
young people he taught in the classroom had an ‘inability to synthesize time into any coherent 
 
437 Marc Augé, p. 52. It is also interesting to note here that there is a sense of anxiety, within a neoliberal 
capitalist system, about social mobility going in all directions, rather than just upwards – that one might end 
up in freefall, in direct opposition to neoliberal preoccupations with growth, particularly economic growth.  
438 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, p. 18, p. 18 and p. 23 respectively.  
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narrative,’ a symptom not of demotivation but being a ‘generation born into that ahistorical, anti-
mnemonic blip culture – a generation, that is to say, for whom time has always come ready-cut into 
digital micro-slices.’439 This is a phenomenon he describes as ‘a pathology of late capitalism – a 
consequence of being wired into the entertainment-control circuits of hypermediated consumer 
culture.’440  William Davies suggests that ‘as we become more attuned to ‘real time’ events and 
media,’ our ‘speed of reaction often takes precedence over slower and more cautious assessments,’ 
adding that ‘the threat lurking in this is that otherwise peaceful situations can come to feel 
dangerous, until eventually they really are.’441 That is to say, as more and more causes to be anxious 
about the future arise, the way in which the future is thought of and imagined, if there is to be a 
future at all, is vastly accelerated by the technology vast swathes of the global North rely upon to 
receive, send, and share information. This acceleration then risks making all future scenarios seem 
anxious, which, as Davies notes, can make otherwise peaceful situations actually threatening. Our 
ability to concentrate, and, indeed, to think for ourselves is challenged; evidence suggests that 
positive feedback on social media (or ‘rewarding social stimuli’) causes the activation of ‘the same 
dopaminergic reward pathways’ as drug use, with this neurological response being exploited by 
companies to ‘keep us using their products for as long as possible.’442  
Existing anxieties about the future are thus heightened by the speed with which it’s possible 
to receive news of new threats, as well as the speed of our own thoughts, with a racing mind itself 
constituting an anxious symptom.443 Yet despite all of this information about potential dangers and 
threats, anxiety about the future is as much about unknowing as knowing. Anxiety may turn the 
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peaceful situations Davies highlights, situations that are known to us, into something threatening 
and unknown. Anxieties about different catastrophic scenarios usually lack the specificity that would 
be required to act to stop them, and where that specificity is available, individuals are unlikely to 
have the political power to enact the change that is necessary, particularly without the support of 
elected officials or major corporations. Equally, it is often difficult to predict when and how these 
catastrophes would unfold. Anxiety about the future may also be more formless and free-flowing: a 
general sense of dread about what comes next, or whether there is a next to come. 
 It is this oxymoronic relationship between knowing and unknowing in anxiety about the 
future that binds it to theories of trauma. Although trauma is usually associated with memory, 
history, and the past, Cathy Caruth also notes that ‘trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or 
original event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature – the 
way it was precisely not known in the first instance – returns to haunt the survivor later on.’444 Here, 
trauma is directly characterised as embodying the unknown, at least at first – it is any given event’s 
physical and psychological resonances that are most significant, rather than the event itself. This is 
particularly evident in Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, translations of which include ‘“deferred 
action”, “après-coup”, “afterwardsness”, “retroactive temporality”, [and] “belatedness”.’445 
Describing an example of this concept, which, as its various translations exemplify, has particular 
temporal significance, Freud notes that: 
 
the patient under analysis, at an age of over twenty-five years, was putting the impressions 
and impulses of his fourth year into words which he would never have found at that time […] 
at the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable to react 
adequately; he is only able to understand it and be moved by it when the impression is revived 
in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp 
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For Freud, the patient here demonstrates how trauma is often not processed as the trauma-inducing 
event occurs, but rather, arises unexpectedly and surprisingly at some unknown point in the future. 
Yet one cannot predict when this might be, because the point at which this trauma is recognised as 
such is unpredictable, which once again partially negates Freud’s argument that anxiety might allow 
for the anticipation of traumas that have not yet occurred. References to the future in Freud and 
Caruth’s work, as well as the work of many other significant trauma theorists, are scarce, 
highlighting the need for further analysis of the tangled relationship between anxiety, trauma, and 
the future.447 Contemplating Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, she does remark that ‘the 
traumatic structure of monotheism at the heart of this question [What does it mean to be chosen?] 
signifies a history of Jewish survival that is both an endless crisis and the endless possibility of a new 
future,’ defining genocidal trauma through a constant bind between the potential for repeated 
pasts, or different futures. 448 This idea is echoed in contemporary terms in Janet Roitman’s work, in 
which she observes that ‘crisis is posited as an epistemological impasse’ that ‘found[s] the possibility 
for other historical trajectories or even for a (new) future’: while crisis might well be traumatic, 
potentially locking societies into the state of perpetual interwar Saint-Amour discusses, it also offers 
the possibility of breaking out of established temporalities, opening up the possibility of a different 
future.449 Once again, however, how this possibility is actually unlocked is not addressed.  
In the preface to Literature in the Ashes of History, Caruth contemplates the link between 
trauma and the future further, noting that after ‘a profound political disruption in the United States’ 
and ‘the opening decade of a new, already deeply troubled, century’ the ‘language of life must be 
 
447 In their consideration of the history of trauma, Shoshana Ringel and Jerrold R. Brandell argue that Jean 
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reread, and understood anew, through the losses, and disappearances, of an era in which the very 
possibility of the future is fundamentally in doubt.’450 Although Caruth goes on to write that ‘this 
would also be the challenge for the theory of trauma […] as it passes on its own languages of death 
and survival into the new, and changing, dangers of the twenty-first century,’ this question remains 
largely unresolved in her work, and in trauma theory generally.451 Whereas Caruth does not link this 
doubt about the future to a specific trauma or kind of trauma, but rather to a more general sense of 
loss and political unrest, Roger Luckhurst, having also remarked that ‘trauma studies […] has not 
been much concerned with the future,’ adds that ‘unprocessed trauma might be figured as that 
which puts pressure on the very possibility of a future.’ However, he, too, makes this point 
speculatively, remarking that the field of trauma studies itself is ‘beginning to reflect on its future 
directions.’452 That is to say, while he suggests that it is unprocessed trauma, in particular, that leads 
to a sense that the future may not arrive, his focus remains on the direction of the field of trauma 
studies itself, rather than the specific relationship between anxieties about the future and trauma 
which this chapter will proceed to consider.    
 
The Future’s Anxious Temporalities 
 
Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American is a text rife with traumatic themes and experiences. Its 
cast of characters bear complicated psychological burdens, many of which are interrelated through 
familial bonds and shared lives. The text’s narrator, Erik Davidsen, frequently experiences ‘sudden 
rushes of anxiety,’ characterised as ‘a speeding internal engine that wouldn’t turn off,’ while his 
sister, Inga, suffers from migraines, episodes of trembling, and ‘neurological crashes.’453 In turn, 
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Erik’s niece, Sonia, is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder induced by having closely 
witnessed 9/11, as well as having lost her father, leading her to yearn for her past life – to ‘face 
those ghosts again’ and ‘change now to then.’454 Although each of these characters do have trauma 
in their pasts that contributes to their anxious states, they also share anxieties about traumatic 
futures and what will come next in ‘a world in which buildings fell down and wars were fought for no 
reason.’455 In Erik’s case, his anxiety spans through past, present, and future. His narration of the 
text is broken up by dreams, ghostly visitations, and autobiographical accounts written by his father, 
Lars, which are themselves ‘taken directly from [Hustvedt’s] father’s [memoir] with only a few 
editorial and name changes.’456 This immediately introduces layers of chronology to the text, as 
although its narrative generally proceeds in a linear fashion, it does also jump between past and 
present, and is itself a retelling from Erik’s perspective as he recalls the ‘year of secrets […] a time 
not of what was there, but of what wasn’t,’ a line that encapsulates Freud’s Nachträglichkeit 
through its focus on trauma that is not yet recognised.457 The anxiety Erik feels about this state of 
unknowing, as well as his anxiety about the reliability of his narrative (which he repeatedly 
anticipates with observations that ‘every memoir is full of holes,’ that ‘history is made by amnesia,’ 
and that ‘there is no clear border between remembering and imagining,’) point to a wider sense of 
trauma about how he will be received and remembered in future, as well as about aging into a world 
where he may be alone.  Similarly, Memories of the Future sees the semi-autobiographical narrator 
S.H. recalling a ‘dream or night terror or hallucination’ experienced at age five in which her ‘house is 
falling’ first as a twenty-four year old, and then again at sixty-two.458 Although at twenty-four, S.H. 
‘imagines she is writing her future,’ at sixty-two, she remarks ‘it is frightening here in the present, in 
February 2017. The house is falling down.’459 S.H. initially believes that writing will secure her future, 
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and will offer her a way of making time progress naturally and fluidly, as when ‘in old movies […] a 
wind rises out of nowhere and blows each month off a calendar that hangs on the wall.’460 Although 
both Erik and S.H. write in the hope of addressing their trauma and reclaiming a sense of control 
over their lives, S.H. finds that in the present, she is simply reliving the trauma of the past: the house 
is still falling down, despite all her writing, and the future her twenty-four year old self imagined has 
not come. Given their past experiences of loss, death, and violence, Erik and his family are all  
experiencing Saint-Amour’s pre-traumatic stress syndrome at an individual level, an ‘anxious and 
even wounding sense of futurity’ that prompts a ‘sense of time stretched out of its usual modes.’461 
This stretching out (and sometimes, condensing) of time is overtly referenced at several anxious 
moments in the text, particularly when Erik’s tenant Miranda’s daughter Eggy is admitted to 
hospital, prompting Erik to observe that he is ‘on the inert side of medicine, where neither heroism 
nor failure is possible, where time expands and ordinary numbers on a clock can’t register it.’462  
 While Infinite Jest (1996) does not explore such overt trauma, it does, nonetheless, feature a 
wide range of characters bearing all manner of difficult pasts. These pasts are not always clearly 
articulated in-text, echoing concepts in trauma theory around trauma not necessarily emerging at an 
obvious point in time, while also highlighting the unspeakability of this trauma and the difficulty of 
situating it in a neat, chronological narrative. Here, anxiety about the future takes precedence at the 
micro- and macro- level, with characters and the narrative structure of the novel itself bearing the 
temporal weight of this anxiety. The most obvious indication of this is the way in which time is 
divided and sponsored in the novel, categorised as the ‘CHRONOLOGY OF ORGANIZATION OF NORTH 
AMERICAN NATIONS’ REVENUE-ENHANCING SUBSIDIZED TIMETM, BY YEAR,’ including ‘Year of the 
Whopper,’ ‘Year of the Perdue Wonderchicken,’ and ‘Year of Dairy Products from the American 
Heartland.’463 Of course, this is predominantly capitalistic in its drive, but it also speaks to a need to 
 
460 Hustvedt, Memories of the Future, p. 98-99. 
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‘name’ time, to attempt to master and control it, to try and write and define what comes next. In his 
work Lived Time (1970), Eugène Minkowski reflects on this desire to give meaning to time, arguing 
that ‘our life is essentially oriented towards the future,’ and that ‘through its activity the living being 
carries itself forward, tends towards the future, creates it in front of itself.’464 However, in the case 
of, for example, a state of depression that prompts what Minkowski refers to as ‘obsessive 
phenomena, such as the tendency to count, to check, to ruminate,’ the ‘flow of time is only slowed 
down,’ because such phenomena ‘express the impossibility of advancing.’465 Minkowski adds that 
these phenomena ‘can give rise to the idea of a progression – a mechanical progression, that is – of 
time.’466 The ironic bind that anxiety causes in this formulation is that as an activity, anxious 
rumination about the future will deny not only the specific future(s) this anxiety relates to, but the 
future in general, as it consumes time that could be spent on activity that generates a meaningful 
sense of forward motion.467 Instead, anxious rumination provides an illusion of having control over 
time and the future, when in fact it is giving a false sense of presence to time, and is trapping the 
subject by filling time with that very time’s denial. As such, the obsessive need to count years 
through superficial products highlights the unproductive and indeed ironic nature of anxious 
rumination, as spending time categorising years in this way spends time that could be used to 
address the potential causes of future-trauma and move forward from them. 
 A general sense of unease about the future is heightened by the novel’s reference to the 
‘chemically troubled times’ in which its characters are living; while there is no specific large-scale 
disaster referenced as having happened, the potential imminence of such an event floats throughout 
the novel, buoyed by the incompetent political leadership of figures such as Rush Limbaugh and 
Johnny Gentle, as well as the state the US is in environmentally: ‘the years around the millennium 
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being a terrible time U.S. time for waste, then, ozone-wise and landfill-wise and shoddily-disposed-
of-dioxins wise.’468 This unease is described as being experienced on a mass scale, with President 
Gentle promising to ‘hose down our chemically troubled streets and to sleep darn little until he’d 
fashioned a way to rid the American psychosphere of the unpleasant debris of a throw-away past.’469 
The idea of a ‘throw-away past’ here operates at two levels: it both describes a past in which people 
were wasteful and unconcerned about the environment, living without paying attention to it, but it 
also implies that for Gentle, the past is something that can be discarded, ironically leading him to 
adopt the same throw-away attitude of his predecessors.470 Gentle’s party is named the ‘Clean U.S. 
Party,’ and his thinking on the subject of the U.S.’ waste is so overt that his first political platform is 
‘Let’s Shoot Our Wastes Into Space.’471 Although this refers specifically to waste from the ‘new 
landfills and toxic repositories the People demanded in every area but their own,’ Gentle’s logic also 
seems to apply to the ‘unpleasant debris’ that lingers psychologically for the American people.472 
Without offering any specific solutions to the anxiety and depression these people are experiencing, 
he promises ‘an end to atomized Americans’ fractious blaming of one another for our terrible 
internal troubles,’ troubles for which ‘the actual term employed is downer-type.’473 In his 
unsympathetic and unproductive approach to the nation’s mental health, Gentle implies that mental 
unrest, or ‘psychological waste,’ can be easily discarded , too – that trauma experienced on a mass 
scale can be rinsed away by severing the country’s relationship with its past. The notion of 
psychological waste also implies that, in Gentle’s view, the minds of American people are doing 
unnecessary work, raising questions of production and productivity that imply a precarity which he 
would rather avoid and dispel in order to ensure the US’s image, as well as landscape, is clean. It is 
noteworthy, too,  that his initial platform describes ‘Wastes’ in the plural, indicating that physical 
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and psychological waste can be dispelled from the planet itself, and that these problems can be 
solved through this ultimate act of disposing of the past.474 Yet, as the ‘toxic effluvia choking our 
highways and littering our byways and grungeing up our sunsets and cruddying those harbors’ 
remain unaddressed, Gentle’s request that people ‘sit back and enjoy the show’ offers very little 
hope for the future – indeed, it feeds future-anxiety, contributing to the many ‘psychic storms’ 
present in the novel.475  
Such anxieties are made considerably more specific at an individual level, as when Hal 
Incandenza tells Kent Blott his concerns about pursuing a career in professional tennis:  
 
I look at these guys that’ve been here six, seven years, eight years, still suffering, hurt, beat 
up, so tired, just like I feel tired and suffer, I feel this what, dread, this dread, I see seven or 
eight years of unhappiness every day and day after day of tiredness and stress and suffering 
stretching ahead, and for what, for a chance at a like a pro career that I’m starting to get this 




The repetitious nature of Hal’s expression, as well as the life he imagines for himself, emphasises the 
slowness of this particular anxiety – the future stretches hopelessly out in front of him and seems to 
mean only further suffering. In this case, Ratcliffe’s sense of a foreshortened future is apt, for it 
represents ‘a change in how time is experienced’ whereby ‘one confronts a world that is 
incompatible with the possibility of an open and progressive life story.’477 Many students at the 
Enfield Tennis Academy (E.T.A.) are described as ‘manag[ing] their internal weathers chemically,’ 
highlighting the second meaning of the novel’s chemically troubled times.478 While an unknown 
narrator comments that many E.T.A. students ‘are involved with recreational substances,’ adding 
‘Like who isn’t, at some life-stage, in the U.S.A. and Interdependent regions, in these troubled 
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times,’ for the students, these substances have specific temporal significance.479 For a ‘traditionally 
smaller and harder-core set’ of its students, there is a development of reliance ‘on personal 
chemistry to manage E.T.A.’s special demands.’480  
These demands are of course physical and psychological, with the dread Hal associates with 
the Show (the students’ phrase for a career in professional tennis) prompting those who regularly 
take drugs to fall into a ‘circular routine’ of stimulation and tranquilisation: 
 
Dexedrine or low-volt methedrine before matches and benzodiazapenes to come back down after 
matches with Mudslides or Blue Flames at some understanding Comm. Ave. nightspot or beers or 
bongs in some discreet Academy corner at night to short-circuit the up-and-down cycle, mushrooms 
or X or something from the Mild Designer class – or maybe occasionally a little Black Star, whenever 
there’s a match-and-demand-free weekend, to basically short out the whole motherboard and blow 
out all the circuits and slowly recover and be almost neurologically reborn and start the gradual cycle 
all over again.481 
 
 
Narrated in a sparsely punctuated and breathless voice, this passage mirrors the fluctuating 
temporalities of anxious drives (from the acute pace of panic in matches to the more drawn-out, 
chronic pace of weekend binges and recovery), while also highlighting the students’ desire to escape 
certain temporalities and enter others at different points in their weekly routines – something these 
students find themselves incapable of doing without the assistance of drugs. Although the majority 
of those engaged in this routine rely on amphetamines pre-match, a footnote reveals that Michael 
Pemulis ‘rarely ingests any ‘drines before a match, reserving them for recreation – some people are 
wired to find heart-pounding eye-wobbling ‘drine stimulation recreational.’482 As such, it is not as 
straightforward as to say that students want a quickened pace for matches, and a slowed pace for 
outside of matches. Indeed, the pinnacle of this cycle is to escape time (and anxiety) altogether, to 
‘blow out all the circuits’ and be ‘neurologically reborn,’ before eventually re-encountering both and 
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beginning the cycle again.483 This complete denial of past and future, if temporary, calls to mind 
Gentle’s tactic of sending all waste(s) to space, escaping trauma and future-anxiety in a 
hallucinogenic haze. Again, this calls to mind Minkowski’s notion of rumination giving a false sense 
of forward movement to time, and to his idea that ‘what is lacking in [a] manic patient is unfolding in 
time.’484 That is to say, there is a sense that the future has become inaccessible. Minkowski argues 
that ‘a person in a state of manic excitement lives only in the now, and this is a now which limits his 
contact with the environment; he has no present anymore.’485 In the ETA students’ drug-fuelled 
attempts to escape time (attempts that are driven by anxiety about the present and future), they in 
fact trap themselves in time, denying themselves the ability to engage with their current 
surroundings while also locking themselves into perpetual loops of overdose and recovery that deny 
them the ability to move forward normally in time, or create a potentially comforting sense of 
teleology for themselves. Despite their neurological rebirth, given that the cycle recurs, it is clear 
that neither past nor future can be denied, particularly when both revolve around preparing for a 
Show that many students are unsure they wish to be in.  
 
 Sonia’s experience and recollections of 9/11 demonstrate how trauma is always 
simultaneously concerned with the past and future in affective terms. Having been ‘just blocks from 
the burning towers,’ she sees the scene unfold from her schoolroom window, but despite this, and 
her father’s death, Erik observes that she didn’t cry, instead ‘retreat[ing] into compulsive 
orderliness,’ ‘clean[ing] and straighten[ing] and stud[ying] far into the night.’486 Erik’s analysis is that 
she is at ‘an age of inner and outer revolutions,’ making ‘structures built to fend off the ugly truths 
of chaos, death, and decay.’487 This recalls Jennifer Yusin’s argument that ‘as a wound that results 
from a piercing to the body and psyche, trauma derives from the inseparable embrace between our 
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inside and outside worlds,’ linking Erik’s interpretation of Sonia’s experience of adolescence with 
traumatic experience.488 While it may be that Sonia uses tidying as a form of distraction from her 
past trauma, structuring her space in the way that she does can also be thought of as an anxiety 
about the future – she is ensuring that she is prepared for whatever may come next, from her 
‘perfectly folded sweaters organized by colour’ to ‘her radiant report cards,’ ensuring that the world 
and the future is as open as possible for her.489 However, this does not prove to be enough, and she 
instead turns to poetic expression to make sense of what has happened to her. Initially, her poetry 
reveals her desire to return to the past, as discussed previously, and the only words she is able to 
write about 9/11 are ‘a big empty spot with only the date,’ referencing Ground Zero and pointing to 
the spatial and temporal absence left in the wake of the attack. In his essay reflecting on 9/11 soon 
after the event, Don DeLillo remarked that ‘the future has yielded, for now, to medieval experience, 
to the old slow furies of cut throat religion […] we have fallen back in space and time.’490 This sense 
of being frozen in time, of being outside of modernity’s sense of a progressive future, is echoed in 
Sonia’s poetry, which is overt about her traumatic return – ‘a twin ablaze inside of me / the burn 
recast in memory.’491 While previously, Sonia was readying herself through organization, here, it is as 
though she is psychologically unable to move on, as she has embodied that which she saw and is 
now replaying it within her body and mind. In reincarnating one of the twin towers as a twin child 
burning inside her, Sonia also summons and kills a future that could have been, instead turning this 
possibility for new life into a vivid reminder of life lost. The extent of the violence she witnessed has 
made it impossible for her to imagine the future, with poetry, too, proving unsuccessful in helping 
her process her trauma.  
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As well as a falling back through space and time, Sonia’s writing also locks her trauma into 
memory, casting it eternally into the present and binding it to herself, as she signs the poem with 
her name underneath: ‘Sonia Blaustein.’492 In an attempt to dispel this memory, and perhaps to set a 
clean slate for the future, Sonia proceeds to post the poem under Erik’s door, so that it is no longer 
stored in the order of her bedroom. In stark contrast, Erik ‘folded the paper carefully and put it 
inside [his] journal,’ continuing the preservation of Sonia’s traumatic memories. At this point in the 
novel, Sonia is unable to imagine a future in which she is free of the flames that haunt her, and thus 
attempts to break this traumatic cycle by physically parting with her own recalled narrative. In 
Memories of the Future, writing is framed as redemptive even in the most awful of futures: as S.H. 
ponders, over many years, what might have happened if she killed the son of one of her friends and 
was imprisoned for the crime, she says that ‘when she was optimistic, she wrote many books during 
her life sentence, but when she was pessimistic, she dwindled away in her cell to next to nothing, a 
wan and wasted being, drained of the future altogether.’493 Although S.H. never does commit this 
crime, it is interesting to note that her anxiety around the future this might have prompted is 
contingent on her writing: unlike for Sonia, here, writing is redemptive, and to be without it means 
that the future is snatched from S.H., despite writing not actually offering the control over the future 
that she hopes it will in her youth. 
Sonia’s anxiety about the future eventually becomes overwhelming, as on the second 
anniversary of 9/11 she ‘put her hands on either side of her face and shouted, “I don’t want this 
world! I don’t want it!”,’ and proceeds to sob uncontrollably.494 Erik’s narration denies us Sonia’s 
own voice at this point, but his analysis is that this episode ‘opened an internal crack in Sonia,’ 
helping her to realise that although her ‘memories wouldn’t leave her,’ she ‘knew she could survive 
the power of her own emotion.’495 Here, her denial of the future leads to a moment of breakdown, a 
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coalescence of her trauma from the past, and relating to the future, leading her to cry for the first 
time since both her father’s death and the attack on the twin towers. Although her anxiety, her 
future-trauma, has not disappeared, there is a slowing here of her narrative, a sense of acceptance 
of memory, as well as what comes next, through the word ‘survive’. Whereas after the attack, she 
was operating at an urgent pace that relied on order and creative output (reflecting DeLillo’s view 
that after 9/11, ‘time [was] scarcer,’ and that there was a ‘sense of compression, [of] plans made 
hurriedly, [of] time [being] forced and distorted’), she reaches a point where she is no longer 
perpetually anxious about a world in which buildings fall down.496  
This may fall into the category of what Žižek calls renormalization, whereby 
 
An event first experienced as real but impossible (the prospect of a forthcoming catastrophe 
which, however probable it may be, is effectively dismissed as impossible) becomes real and 
no longer impossible (once the catastrophe occurs, it is “renormalized,” perceived as part of 
the normal run of things, as always already having been possible. The gap which makes these 
paradoxes possible is that between knowledge and belief: we know the (ecological) 




Although this argument is applied here to ecological crises, the same logic can be applied to 
many other traumatic futures – entering a state of protective denial, dispelling anxieties about 
potential crises in order to slow down thought processes and allowing ourselves to enter 
states of disbelief that will precede further future-traumas. This also relates to coping 
mechanisms for what Alvin Toffler described in 1970 as ‘future shock’: ‘the distress, both 
physical and psychological, that arises from an overload of the human organism’s physical 
adaptive systems and its decision-making processes […] the human response to 
overstimulation.’ Although Toffler’s concept does not relate directly to trauma, but rather, as 
above, to overstimulation, like Žižek, he notes that ‘one widespread response to high-speed 
change is outright denial.’498 The ‘Denier,’ in Toffler’s formulation, ‘flatly refuses to take in 
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new information. Like the disaster victim whose face registers total disbelief, the Denier, too, 
cannot accept the evidence of his senses. Thus he concludes that things really are the same, 
and that all evidences of change are merely superficial.’499 In his film HyperNormalisation, 
Adam Curtis extends these ideas to argue that as people living in the neoliberal global north, 
we have begun to live not just in a state of disbelief, but in a fantasy world, albeit one whose 
falsity is known to those within it:  
 
over the past 40 years, politicians, financiers, and technological utopians, rather than face up 
to the real complexities of the world, retreated. Instead, they constructed a simpler version of 
the world in order to hang on to power. And as this fake world grew, all of us went along with 
it, because the simplicity is reassuring.500 
 
 
Of course, this is a broad and perhaps over-simplified interpretation, but it is useful in summarising 
the motivation behind existing in a suspended state of denial in the face of future-anxiety. In turn, 
this idea of the simplicity of a fake world chimes with Mark Fisher’s notion of a pathology of late 
capitalism – in this case, a pathological state of mass complicity in ambivalence that pushes the 
question and concept of the future out of view, leaving it to be addressed at another time or by 
someone else. As Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek argue, while the catastrophes that politicians 
should be addressing are ‘ever-accelerating,’ politics itself ‘is beset with an inability to generate the 
new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to transform our societies to confront and resolve 
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Technology and Future-Trauma 
 
Having unpacked the anxious relationships characters in The Sorrows of an American and 
Infinite Jest have with time, as well as the ways in which the novels’ narratives are affected by future 
traumas, this chapter will now consider the specific influence of technology upon anxiety and its 
manifestation as a form of future-trauma. I am using the term ‘technology’ here to indicate both 
machinery and equipment in an industrial sense, and media technology such as the television, 
computers, and mobile phones. All of these technologies have contributed to the speeding up of our 
lives, our culture, and our sense of time more generally. Thinking about the relationship between 
time and geographic space, Virilio suggests that ‘with the supersonic vector (airplane, rocket, 
airwaves), penetration and destruction become one,’ adding that ‘the instantaneousness of action at 
a distance corresponds to the defeat of the unprepared adversary, but also, and especially, to the 
defeat of the world as a field, as distance, as matter’.502 He later remarks that “’without the violence 
of speed, that of weapons would not be so fearsome,’ pointing to the damage that anxious 
temporalities can cause through their creation of (sometimes false or misinterpreted) potential 
catastrophes.503 Similarly, Mark Fisher remarks that ‘the internet and mobile telecommunications 
have altered the texture of everyday experience beyond all recognition […] there is no present to 
grasp and articulate any more.’504 This acceleration, then, is not only a symptom of anxiety but a 
cause of it, prompting an urgent sense of threat or danger that could strike anywhere at any time. In 
Fisher’s terms, this acceleration is so immense in all aspects of our lives that the present, much like 
the future, is negated, leaving us ‘desperately short of time, energy, and attention’ and ‘demand[ing] 
quick fixes.’505 Indeed, he laments that the potential of technology has not been harnessed to 
challenge systems of neoliberal capitalism: ‘what haunts is the spectre of a world in which all the 
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marvels of communicative technology could be combined with a sense of solidarity much stronger 
than anything social democracy could muster.’506  
While technology, then, could have been framed as a gateway into a more socially just or 
responsible future, it has, instead, intensified existing anxieties about the future being denied us 
altogether, allowing this message to be disseminated at increasing speed and to an ever-increasing 
audience. Srnicek and Williams note that ‘capitalism has begun to constrain the productive forces of 
technology, or at least, direct them towards needlessly narrow ends,’ such that ‘rather than a world 
of space travel, future shock, and revolutionary technological potential, we exist in a time where the 
only thing that develops is marginally better consumer gadgetry.’507 This means that ‘the true 
transformative potentials of much of our technological and scientific research remain[s] 
unexploited.’508 Benjamin Noys argues that in this sense, the media ‘exploit[s] the sensational and 
attack[s] us with shock tactics […] [using] the speed of modern media technologies to overcome our 
capacities for response and [leave] us reeling.’509 Indeed, he goes as far as to argue that technology 
not only leaves us reeling, but suppresses and entraps us: ‘the relief that technology was supposed 
to bring from labour merely leaves less labor doing more work. No longer, as in Marx’s day, are we 
all chained to factory machines, but now some of us carry our chains around with us, in the form of 
laptops and phones.’510 As such, technologies have then reformulated capitalism, rather than evened 
out its inequalities or rendered capitalism itself obsolete altogether. 
 Fisher’s concerns about the failings of communicative technology are particularly evident in 
Infinite Jest’s video-telephoning (or videophony) technology, which, ‘having enjoyed an interval of 
huge consumer popularity,’ lost many of its users: ‘within like 16 months or 5 sales quarters, the 
tumescent demand for ‘videophony’ suddenly collapsed like a kicked tent.’511 This constitutes a self-
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inflicted denial of futurity in the sense that consumers made an active choice not to continue using 
the technology, though in line with Fisher’s comments, it also highlights how the capacity for 
solidarity and community-building is swiftly undermined – in this case, because of ‘(1) emotional 
stress, (2) physical vanity, (3) a certain queer kind of self-obliterating logic in the micro-economics of 
consumer high tech’ Users of videophony realised ‘they had to compose the same sort of earnest, 
slightly overintense listener’s expression they had to compose for in-person exchanges,’ resulting in 
‘videophonic stress.’ Such thought processes demonstrate an anticipatory social anxiety that is 
exacerbated by the performative nature of this communication: ‘the videophonic stress was even 
worse if you were at all vain. I.e. if you are worried at all about how you looked. As in to other 
people. Which all joking aside who doesn’t.’512 So intense is the anxiety that people felt seeing the 
‘shiny pallid indefiniteness’ of their faces, deemed to make them appear ‘evasive, furtive, 
untrustworthy, unlikeable,’ that it becomes a syndrome in itself: ‘Video-Physiognomic Disorder.’513 
That a face appears indefinite in itself speaks to fears about transience and ceasing to be, and the 
fact that a platform for face-to-face communication ends up generating a syndrome that relates to 
one’s own appearance, reiterates a process of individuation which makes people ever more 
vulnerable to the threats of the future – ever more conscious of themselves, and ever more anxious, 
to the detriment of their ability to function effectively in everyday life. Here, a technological fantasy 
that promised a more intimate level of connectivity with others has in fact resulted in anxiety-
induced introversion.  
Bifo expresses particular concern about the influence of technology on communication, 
arguing that ‘millions of phones are calling each other,’ but that in fact this ends up postponing 
meaningful contact. This then means that ‘there is no longer time to get close to each other; there is 
no more time for caresses, for the pleasure and slowness of whispered words […] desire turns into 
anxiety, and time contracts.’514 Wallace’s writing emphasises the falseness and emptiness in modern 
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communication further through the introduction of ‘High Definition Masking,’ first through the use 
of photographic imaging, screening a ‘wildly attractive high-def broadcastable composite of a face 
wearing an earnest, slightly overintense expression of complete attention’ to the receiver of the call, 
and later through encouraging users to get casts of their own enhanced facial images which, when 
not in use, ‘simply hung on a small hook on the side of a TP’s phone-console, admittedly looking 
maybe a bit surreal and discomfiting when detached and hanging there empty and wrinkled.’515 
Despite users’ awareness of the falsity of this form of communication, usage persists, though people 
‘began preferring and then outright demanding videophone masks that were really quite a lot 
better-looking than they themselves were in person.’516 In turn, this led to further social anxiety:  
 
enormous psychosocial stress began to result, large numbers of phone-users suddenly 
reluctant to leave home and interface personally with people who, they feared, were now 
habituated to seeing their far-better looking masked selves on the phone and would on 
seeing them in person suffer (so went the callers’ phobia) […] illusion-shattering aesthetic 
disappointment.517 
 
It is clear from this extract how technology has altered the fabric of human communication in the 
novel’s world, with an in-person meeting deemed a form of ‘interfacing,’ albeit a terrible one which 
poses the risk of one’s real face being exposed and found lacking. The futurity of this technology 
thus becomes its own undoing, breeding new anxieties as it develops, even in its ultimate shift into 
obsolescence, as ‘a return to good old telephoning’ occurred ‘not only dictated by common 
consumer sense but actually after a while [a] culturally approved […] kind of chic integrity,’ with the 
telephone becoming ‘a status-symbol of anti-vanity, such that only callers utterly lacking in self-
awareness continued to use videophony.’518 Once again, a denial of that which the future has 
brought is deemed necessary to offset the anxieties that it has prompted – there is a safety in 
technology that is more familiar, though after the traumas prompted by videophony, this safety still 
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comes with caveats in the sense that choosing the telephone is itself an anticipatory act performed 
to portray a sense of integrity and sincerity. In speaking on the phone, characters hope that they are 
interpreted as above the vanity of videophony, and as especially invested in the conversation they 
are having, rather than how they appear when that conversation is taking place, although, of course, 
this hope is still almost completely driven by an anxiety about how one’s actions will be perceived by 
others.  
 Hustvedt’s work does not deal anywhere near as closely with developing technologies, but 
its engagement with existing technology, most notably photography, also speaks volumes about 
future-anxiety. Just as in Infinite Jest, the telephone comes to offer a newfound sense of safety and 
security, Susan Sontag argues that in the late 1970s, photography ‘is not practiced by most people as 
an art. It is mainly a social rite, a defence against anxiety, and a tool of power.’519 As an example, she 
notes that the camera becomes a symbol of, and tool for, successful family life, such that ‘not to 
take pictures of one’s children […] is a sign of parental indifference,’ and that ‘through photographs, 
each family constructs a portrait chronicle of itself – a portable set of images that bears witness to 
its connectedness.’520 This speaks to the anticipatory anxiety that much technology provokes – an 
anxiety that one may miss out if one does not participate in a certain practice, and in this case, that 
failing to decisively chronicle family life might indicate a personal and emotional failing, or lack of 
care. She also draws specific parallels between photography and trauma, noting that ‘people robbed 
of their past seem to make the most fervent picture takers, at home and abroad. Everyone who lives 
in an industrialized society is obliged gradually to give up the past, but in certain countries, such as 
the United States and Japan, the break with the past has been particularly traumatic,’ because of the 
extent of large-scale conflict in which these countries have been involved.521 In this sense, for 
Sontag, photography provides a means of clarifying and validating the present, so that once that 
present becomes past, it cannot be lost – it ‘proves’ one’s life is interesting, ‘becom[ing] one of the 
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principal devices for experiencing something, for giving an appearance of participation.’522 Although 
these arguments apply to an extent to Jeffrey Lane’s photography exhibit ‘Jeff’s Lives: Multiple 
Fictions, or an Excursion into DID,’ his use of photography seems far more preoccupied with using 
images to manipulate the future, and to address his anxieties about that future.523  
 Jeffrey’s photo exhibit does document his past, which has been a traumatic one (both his 
parents died in a car accident, which he represents in the exhibit with a screen ‘replay[ing] a typical 
crash from some Hollywood movie,’) but its most provocative images are in the ‘Stalker’ and ‘Father’ 
series, which feature photographs he has taken and doctored. On viewing these photographs, Erik 
observes ‘not [himself] but a blank where [he] should have been, a white cut-out that walked with 
Miranda and Eglantine toward the park.’524 He also notes an ‘unsettling image of Miranda without 
eyes,’ along with a photo of himself captioned ‘Head Doctor Goes Insane.’525 On closer viewing, Erik 
notices that this photograph has been doctored, too: ‘I noticed that the picture appeared to have 
been taken outside rather than from the stairs above the second-floor hallway […] Lane had altered 
the setting […] the photograph made it appear as if I had been raving half naked in the street, 
wielding a hammer. Beside it was an image of Lane with a large bruise on his forehead.’ In reality, 
Jeffrey had taken this photograph of Erik when intruding in his home, and Erik had been wielding the 
hammer in self-defence, having heard someone enter. While this is certainly an attempt to reclaim 
the past, Jeffrey’s doctoring of the photo is also an act of power, as Sontag puts it – an attempt to 
change a future he fears. In advance of the exhibition, Miranda, who is Jeffrey’s on-off romantic 
partner, warns Erik that one of Jeffrey’s photographs is likely to offend him, later adding that ‘Jeff’s 
been so jealous’ of their friendship, and of Erik’s clear attraction to Miranda.526 In order to address 
his anxiety about losing Miranda, and by extension, their daughter, Eggy, Jeffrey enacts a 
simultaneous romanticisation of the past, and exertion of control over the potential future narrative 
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of a relationship between Miranda and Erik – an anxiety that is exacerbated by Erik’s closeness to 
Eggy. Reflecting on ‘dead relatives and friends preserved in the family album,’ Sontag remarks that 
the presence of those lost in photographs ‘exorcises some of the anxiety and remorse prompted by 
their disappearance […] supply[ing] our pocket relation to the past.’527  
In Jeffrey’s case, his ‘Lover’ series documents the stark reality and intensity of their 
relationship: ‘Miranda crying, an angry Miranda waving her first at the camera, Miranda dancing in 
some nightspot, Miranda on a swing,’ – what Erik views as ‘the documentation of a real love affair,’ 
‘intimate pictures of a Miranda [he] didn’t know.’528 Given their relative estrangement, this can be 
thought of as Jeffrey’s exorcism of anxiety about Miranda’s absence from his life, as the series serves 
as proof of their intimacy, reinforced by photographs of the physical and emotional signature 
Miranda left behind: ‘at the bottom of the rectangle were twenty or thirty pictures of the empty bed 
[…] the sheets were configured differently. After she left him, the man would wake up in the 
morning and photograph the empty bed.’529 This is a curious attempt at relieving his anxiety, 
however, as photographing and exhibiting these scenes both emphasises Jeffrey’s affection for 
Miranda, while also serving as a visual record of what he has lost. In removing Miranda’s eyes from 
another photograph in the exhibit, Jeffrey removes a portion of her agency, preventing her from 
seeing anything again, meaning that visually, she can rely only on memory, and what she has seen in 
a past that they shared. While Miranda is, in the space of the gallery, trapped in the past, Erik is 
erased from the past and present, quite literally cut out of images in an act of defensive severance. 
Jeffrey’s jealousy surrounding Erik and the alleged emotional threat he poses is encapsulated in 
‘Head Doctor Goes Insane,’ which is a deliberate attempt to deny Erik a future with Miranda, and 
indeed, a continuing career as a psychiatrist.  
In this sense, Erik’s future is threatened, as the doctored image presents him as violent and 
crazed, and the image is seen by one of his most vulnerable patients. The accompanying image of a 
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bruised Lane, along with ‘a photo of George Bush, the Twin Towers, a hospital corridor, and war 
images from Iraq’ reinforces Jeffrey’s narrative about Erik, while also presenting him as a foolish yet 
destructive force engaged in unnecessary conflict – that is, a threat to Jeffrey and Miranda’s 
future.530 This combination of images also reiterates Jeffrey’s desire to erase Erik from this future, 
and from his life generally. Fully aware of the potential consequences of the exhibit, Erik finds 
himself ‘suddenly nauseated’ and ‘stagger[ing] out into the bright light of Twenty-fifth Street, where 
[he] squatted on the sidewalk for a moment with [his] head lowered to prevent the oncoming 
faint.’531 Having overcome the overwhelming physical symptoms of his anxiety in this moment, Erik 
attaches this anxiety to the future, contemplating a lawsuit against Jeffrey while also imagining 
‘other patients and colleagues standing in front of the photograph and laughing.’532 Although Erik’s 
lawyer is eventually able to have ‘a black square put over the face of Head Doctor Goes Insane,’ on 
the grounds that Jeffrey had doctored the photograph ‘to create the illusion it had been taken in a 
public rather than a private space,’ for Erik, ‘the photograph lived on,’ projecting itself into his 
future, and to his anxious mind at this point in the text, altering and narrowing it, as Jeffrey had 
intended.533 
The challenge that all the scenarios and experiences of future-anxiety considered thus far 
present is the relationship between anxiety, trauma, and direct experience. However, it is very 
difficult to determine what actually constitutes direct experience when contemplating future-
anxiety, particularly as psychoanalysis bases its whole system on the impossibility of distinguishing 
external reality from the workings of internal reality.534 In his consideration of trauma in 
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contemporary American novels, Alan Gibbs reflects on the potentially ‘’problematic distinction’ 
between absence and loss’ in conceptions of trauma, noting that the texts he considers are united 
by ‘the infringement or incursion of large-scale historical events […] into the personal.’535 He adds 
that this ‘potentially violent irruption of the global-political into the personal-familial […] echoes the 
anxieties of post-9/11 America.’536 This binary between absence and loss, and, by extension, absence 
and presence, as presence must precede loss, while generally unhelpful in the theorization of 
trauma, does speak to a bind arising in Saint-Amour, Fisher, Davies, and Ratcliffe et al’s work: 
namely, the question of whether one needs to have directly experienced trauma in order to feel the 
sense of a foreshortened or cancelled future that leads to future-anxiety.  Lyndsey Stonebridge 
posits that in Freudian terms, ‘anxiety is a ‘protection’ against trauma; it is a way of staying in 
relation to history without being consumed by it,’ adding that ‘while anxiety might work as a 
prophylactic against trauma, as a sort of psychic defence against history, it is not an emotion that 
has much truck with a concept of history perceived in terms of linear time.’537 However, for 
Stonebridge, at least from a psychoanalytic point of view, anxiety is always looking backwards and 
forwards simultaneously – future-anxiety, or ‘’dreading forward,’’ as she puts it, ‘also mean[s] 
recycling versions of the past.’538 In turn, this raises questions about the point at which this anxiety is 
most present: whether the future-anxiety is in fact greater in the period of in-between when an 
individual, community, or population is aware that the possibility of a future is slipping away, but is 
also aware that there is a chance of redeeming it. In this state of in-between, which also operates as 
a locational in-between, the most common response to future-anxiety seems to be that of 
expulsion.  
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Having directly experienced a wide range of traumas, from 9/11, to parental loss, to 
relationship breakdown, characters in Sorrows of an American have strikingly tangible reasons to 
feel anxious about the future. While this does apply to characters in Infinite Jest, too, many other 
characters have not experienced traumas that are specific to them, but rather, have felt the 
traumatic pressure exerted by anxiety-inducing technologies and ecological crises that anxiously call 
into question the nature of the future that may (or may not) follow. Yet in both cases, following 
Žižek’s logic of renormalization, characters enter self-perpetuating anxious cycles with fluctuating 
temporalities, cycles of realization of trauma, followed by anxiety, followed by denial, followed by 
further anxiety, a kind of acceptance, and then a return, once again, to anxiety and denial. For Sonia, 
this operates at the micro-level of disposing of her poetry at Erik’s house, while for President Gentle, 
it operates at the most maximal level of blasting toxic waste that threatens his country’s future into 
space. Both examples operate as physical denials of trauma, but also psychological denials of anxiety 
about futures that can only be terrible. Such cycles call to mind Eric Cazdyn’s argument that 
existence in a state of permanent crisis brings us into the new chronic: ‘a certain mode of time – one 
that resists viewing the future as anything other than an extension of the present.’539 In this mode of 
time, one never actually reaches the point at which the terrible future that beckons occurs, and in 
this denial of direct immanence, one is trapped in stasis. This, in turn, speaks to how anxiety 
operates as something ‘stuck’ – a failure to adequately orientate oneself to the future, because, in 
Minkowski’s terms, rumination has occupied time that could be spent on this orientation through 
the false promise of forward-movement. 
This sense that anxious symptoms causes the processing of trauma, and indeed of the 
future, to become stuck, speaks to the need for a different orientation towards both past and future, 
and fiction operates as a particularly suitable space for the representation both of traumatic returns, 
and, through anxious forms, the possibility of other futures, both within the imaginative frame of 
 
539 Eric Cazdyn, p. 14. 
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the novels in question, and in their readers, too. Hustvedt speaks to this duality of past and future in 
literary space directly in Memories of the Future, as its narrator S.H. reflects that 
 
Every book is a withdrawal from immediacy into reflection. Every book contains a perverse 
wish to  foul up time, to cheat its inevitable pull. Blah, blah, blah and hum-da-di-hum. What 
am I looking for? Where am I going? Am I vainly searching for the moment when the future 
that is now the past beckoned me with its vast, empty face, and I cowered or tripped or ran 
in the wrong direction? Do my memories, painful and joyous, provide tenuous proof of my 
existence? Do the revolutions of memory, that circling from year eight to year twenty to year 
fifty-one, provide an illusion of more time? Are they a way of tricking myself into believing 
that mortality can be put off, and then put off again?540 
 
If activity is what moves us as living beings towards the future, then writing, as Hustvedt notes, is an 
additional push towards exerting control over time, as well as to reflect on when certain futures 
were cancelled or taken away from us. For S.H., traumatic return and reflection is painful, but it also 
provides the illusory comfort of having more time, of being able to defer – though this deferral acts 
to repeat cycles of memory that end up holding the future at bay. As Freud posits, anxiety is a 
symptom that emerges from trauma in the past, but it is also, as Stonebridge notes, always a 
symptom that relates to the future, and an attempt to imagine another kind of future in which there 
is ‘yet time to turn it aside.’ 541 However, as I have argued, future-oriented anxiety is contradictory 
and sticky in that both imagines other futures, and frustrates one’s ability to turn these futures 
aside. For Stonebridge, ‘the writing of anxiety […] can be read as describing a kind of historiography 
of trauma; a writing which treats history not so much as enigmatic or unrepresentable,’ but ‘as a 
form of imaginative provocation.’542 Further, ‘the writing of anxiety has its own kind of awkward and 
compromised historical agency; it at least allows us to dream on, as Bowen said, to ‘complete’ 
ourselves ‘in some way.’543 With this in mind, perhaps it is not that one needs to have experienced a 
major traumatic event in the past in order to be traumatised in the present and feel traumatised 
about the future. Rather, literature provides a space in which past, present, and future coexist – 
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anxiety is always concerned with the future, and this future is, in the texts examined here, felt as 
inherently traumatic, whether one has experienced trauma or not. Trauma-oriented futures operate 
as a form of anxiety in literary texts precisely because, for both characters and readers, these texts 
provide room for the imagination of other futures, futures that have not yet been denied – we are 



























The thing is I get scared it won’t come. I’m back to thinking IJ was a fluke. I feel nothing lapidary inside. 
‘Until there is commitment, there is only ineffectiveness, delay – Goethe. How to make a commitment – 
to writing, to a somewhat healthy relationship, to myself. How to schedule things so that a certain 
portion of each day is devoted to writing. […] I’m now scared. I’m now starting to want to run. I don’t 
know what to do. Go to FedEx and movie. Fun after tennis. Play tennis well. Sit and relax. This seems 




Throughout this thesis I have analysed anxiety’s presence in a range of contemporary American texts 
in order to suggest its interaction with, and effect on literature in general. In using the term literary 
anxiety, then, I refer not to an anxiety of writing literature (although, as Wallace’s journal entry 
above attests, this anxiety may well be prevalent for writers), but rather, to the relationship 
between anxiety and literature, to the specific qualities of anxiety in literature, and to its 
transformative impact upon literature. Through the use of the term literary anxiety, I also 
acknowledge, as I have during the course of my analysis, that literature is a particularly appropriate 
vehicle for the expression and representation of anxiety, especially through its establishment of 
spaces and time to consider it. Literature provides new ways of thinking about and understanding 
anxiety. As such, in drawing conclusions here, I hope, by extension, to lay down some foundations 
for a theory of literary anxiety.  
  In developing this theory, it has been important to attend to a variety of fictional and non-
fictional texts by Auster, Hustvedt, Díaz, and Wallace, all of which address a variety of anxious 
experiences from 1990-present. In each of these writers’ work, anxiety is always situated, even 
when it feels free-floating. Just as Yasmin Gunaratnam argues that ‘pain needs a body’ and ‘relies 
upon flesh to receive it and to register it,’ anxiety must find its mind and/or body in a particular 
subject.545 This subject will shape the nature of the anxieties it bears, as well as how that anxiety 
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manifests itself, while also serving as a site in which the ‘constituency and temporality of pain’ can 
be ‘approached as a complex, moving heterogeneity that [includes] the social, psychological, and the 
spiritual.’546 As the thesis’ first chapter argues, anxiety blurs the boundaries between fiction and 
non-fiction and between imagination and fantasy, contributing to the sense of ‘formlessness’ that 
Wallace feels when writing of his own anxieties.547  Just as anxiety itself might attach or adapt to a 
variety of forms, there is also, then, the anxiety of finding a form. Panic in particular may prompt a 
radical change or indeed complete rupture of established tone and narrative(s): the feelings of 
entrapment, of ‘want[ing] to run,’ and of ‘nothing [being] in sight anyplace’ speak to the challenges 
inherent in bearing anxiety in a single body, particularly a previously healthy or ‘well’ body that once 
offered false promises of wholeness encapsulated within a linear story and trajectory.548 With 
attention to Arthur Frank’s idea that ‘the [ill] body sets in motion the need for new stories when its 
disease disrupts the old stories […] so that the changed body can become once again familiar in 
these stories,’ I have argued that the anxious body defies such familiarity: indeed, it becomes 
troublingly alien.549 As such, the strict narrative categories that Frank outlines in The Wounded 
Storyteller cannot and will not apply – the psychological pain wrought by anxiety provokes a 
necessary multiplicity of body and narrative. The struggle to create a tangible story for the ill body 
that may restore a sense of unity or at least a semblance of control to and over the ill body is central 
to Siri Hustvedt’s and Paul Auster’s illness narratives, yet for both writers, anxiety wreaks havoc on 
these stories, prompting metaphorical transformations of the bodies they inhabit and imagine 
themselves as inhabiting.  
In his consideration of disabled bodies, Ato Quayson remarks that ‘corporeal difference is 
part of a structure of power, and its meanings are governed by the unmarked regularities of the 
normate […] there are various elements of this complex relationship that do not disclose themselves 
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as elements of power as such, but rather as forms of anxiety, dissonance, and disorder.’550 Working 
through these anxieties may be a route to finding a ‘body’, whether corporally or within a corpus of 
literary work. Quayson adds that ‘the impairment is often taken to be the physical manifestation of 
the exact opposite of order,’ and that ‘the recognition of this radical contingency produces features 
of a primal scene of extreme anxiety whose roots lie in barely acknowledged vertiginous fears of loss 
of control over the body itself.’551 While anxiety may not qualify as a disability, it may prove 
disabling. As Quayson notes, existing with corporeal difference and/or an impairment prompts 
further anxiety and emphasises feelings of powerlessness and disorder. Anxieties around a loss of 
control over the body are present in experiences of disability and illness more generally, contributing 
to the aesthetic nervousness that ‘can be discerned in the suspension, collapse, or general short-
circuiting of the hitherto dominant protocols of representation that may have governed the text.’552 I 
have argued that this short-circuiting of representative protocols also occurs when anxiety is 
introduced in-text, particularly when this anxiety manifests itself as panic or a panic attack. I frame 
this narrative collapse in light of anxiety as an event in the illness narratives I have analysed: an 
event which typically constitutes the introduction of metaphorical proxy bodies that highlight the 
fluid and subjective nature of fictional boundaries, as well as the pitfalls inherent in Phillippe 
Lejeune’s autobiographical pact in the context of illness narratives.  
Not only do these anxiety-events subvert reader’s expectations of receiving ‘truthful,’ 
broadly realist accounts in illness narratives, they also disrupt understandings of the literary event as 
a whole. Michael Sayeau argues that ‘to start a story is to enter into an implicit contract with your 
listener or reader that, at some point soon, something will happen and this something will be 
meaningful, whether banally or profoundly, simply or complexly,’ and that ‘works of literature are 
predicated on eventfulness, whatever the specific dynamics of the form in question.’553 Although it 
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cannot be denied that the anxiety-events I explore in Chapter 1 are meaningful and constitute a 
significant ‘something’ within the texts’ narratives, they do not offer the kind of narrative resolution 
or certainty associated with evental structures. Of course, anxiety does not offer this either: it may 
dissipate, but it is rarely resolved within its own anxious structures. In both Hustvedt’s and Auster’s 
narratives, where few answers and no cures are established, anxiety-events defy previously 
established tone and style, prompting a shift in form that establishes new timelines and 
chronologies of anxiety. Through a series of phenomenological close readings, then, I begin to 
unpack anxiety’s ability to catalyse bodily and psychological change and to create new bodies and 
spaces in which Hustvedt and Auster can bear and contemplate their anxieties outside of the 
confines of their original bodies. The aim is to find a body in which narrative time can bear the 
anxiety as something that can be thought about rather than enacted. This analysis allows for the 
thesis’ first contemplation of the narratology of anxiety, which forms one strand of the theory of 
literary anxiety this thesis seeks to outline.  
Of course, this narratology of anxiety is inherently bound up with questions of form, which is 
why the thesis’ second chapter moves to consider the short story’s particular suitability for the 
representation of anxiety. Whereas the thesis’ first chapter thinks about anxiety’s influence on form, 
in Chapter 2 I have specifically chosen the short story form, which plays a significant part in the 
American literary tradition, to demonstrate how certain literary forms may influence how anxiety is 
represented. I then move to consider the recurring images of masks and masking that Díaz and 
Wallace conjure in their short stories in order to address racialised anxieties arising in these works. 
Through these two analytical threads, I have argued that the sense of claustrophobia that is induced 
by the short story form and by the motif of masking contributes to the overall uncertainty prompted 
by the bathos and/or narrative collapse that features and occurs so often in this form. Drawing on 
Cathy Caruth’s idea that trauma is prompted by a ‘lack of preparedness to take in a stimulus that 
comes too quickly,’ and Freud’s assertion that anxiety is ‘a particular state of expecting the danger 
or preparing for it,’ I note that the uncertainty of the short story and the anxiety such uncertainty 
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and unpreparedness causes produces further anxiety, meaning an already anxious form’s anxiety is 
reiterated in its content, too.554 In turn, this means the short story may operate as a performance of 
Eric Cazdyn’s new chronic, enacting the logic that everything will remain the same with its tendency 
towards inconclusiveness. Just as Auster and Hustvedt’s illness narratives implicate the reader in the 
anxieties therein, Díaz’s and Wallace’s short stories are fraught, claustrophobic, and generally 
unresolved, leaving characters and readers in a futureless limbo which is all the more unsettling due 
to the featured characters’ young ages.  
I have also used Chapter 2 to reflect on the varied temporalities of anxiety, ranging from the 
polar ends of the chronic and the acute (which, in the case of anxiety, often manifests itself as a 
panic attack). I continue this analysis in the thesis’ final chapter, which politicises these temporalities 
in the context of a technologically advanced Global North that operates largely under and within 
systems of neoliberal capitalism. Within Chapter 2, I conclude that microfiction and the short story, 
by virtue of their brevity, enact a temporal acceleration that reiterates the temporality of panic as 
well as the quickening pace of our existence facilitated by technology and the increasing socio-
political pressure to perform well and produce more in our working lives. Just as Wallace, in his diary 
extract, is at pains to feel productive and creatively ‘effective’ following the success of Infinite Jest 
(demonstrated by the visible speeding up and clipping of his thought processes in the extract), the 
stories I consider in Chapter 2 feature characters who are anxious about fulfilling certain roles and 
who exist in anxious worlds. The younger characters in these stories may also enhance the anxiety 
readers experience when encountering them, as the denial of a young future and the destruction of 
youthful innocence is especially painful and uncomfortable to witness. At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that a reader may also feel a sense of satisfaction in ‘working through’ such anxieties. 
Having thought through the significance of masking in the short story in relation to 
Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of the face-to-face and its connection to anxious and traumatic 
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experiences, as well as how this relates more broadly to ideas of a lost or cancelled future and, in 
Mark Fisher’s terms, the ‘crushing sense of finitude and exhaustion’ the 21st century encapsulates, I 
return to the chapter’s central assertion that the short story is especially useful for the 
representation of panic and anxiety.555 Although Fisher’s formulation here is more grounded in 
depression than anxiety, both conditions are linked to a sense that time cannot be used. In 
depression, we can observe an excess of time that is slow, sluggish, and that won’t pass, while in 
anxiety, it is a rush of time that feels overwhelming, and which emphasises the finitude of the 
future. As well as laying foundations for later chapters’ consideration of the relationship between 
anxiety, technology, temporality, and trauma, I have established further threads in the theory of 
literary anxiety. These pertain to the ways in which literary form interacts with anxiety and vice 
versa, the ways in which anxiety may be experienced by a reader when encountering anxiety, 
anxiety’s complex temporalities, and the relationship between trauma and anxiety. 
In the thesis’ third chapter, I have investigated the relationship between anxiety, 
hypermasculinity, and the performance of masculinity in Díaz’s work, with attention to the #MeToo 
movement and allegations of sexual assault made against Díaz in 2018. Developments in critical 
masculinity studies have led to the formulation of ‘an actual history of American masculinity as 
crisis,’ explicitly linking experiences of masculinity with experiences of anxiety.556 Díaz’s male 
characters perform an exaggerated and often violent version of Dominican masculinity, which, 
unlike in Butler’s conceptualisation of gender as ‘a construction that regularly conceals its genesis,’ is 
clearly inherited from peers and family members.557 Characters such as Yunior highlight how it is a 
necessity to demonstrate adherence to this kind of performance in order to keep up appearances 
and appease any anxiety about being perceived as weak, effeminate, or homosexual. These anxieties 
are paired with a racialised dual existence, which prompts Díaz’s characters to fulfil both American 
and Dominican stereotypes of masculinity in order to attempt to assimilate while also satisfying 
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Dominican peers. For Yunior, Oscar, and other male characters in Díaz’s work, anxiety about 
masculinity is closely bound up with anxieties about diasporic experience, racial identity, and 
ethnicity, and becomes, in turn, an anxiety about being anxious, which would betray these 
characters’ hypermasculine performances.  
From absent fathers, to existence under Rafael Trujillo’s dictatorship, to ‘proving’ 
heterosexuality and refuting claims of homosexuality at all costs, to demonstrating physical strength, 
to avoiding appearing emotional or expressive, Díaz’s male characters have a wide range of anxieties 
that are related to the continuation of hypermasculine performances, and the avoidance of any 
source of shame. While Díaz’s writing is attentive to the problematic nature of stereotypes of 
Dominican (and more broadly, Latino) men, his work also employs and reinforces such stereotypes 
in order to suggest that it may be impossible to entirely depart from such models of masculinity. 
Anxiety is very rarely named or labelled specifically as such in Díaz’s work, yet it is ever-present in 
characters’ behaviours and language, and is neatly encapsulated in the Freudian resonances of 
characters’ challenging relationships with their abusive, hypermasculine fathers. I have argued that 
characters’ failure to perform Dominican hypermasculinity operates as an act of disidentification – a 
‘survival [strategy] the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public 
sphere that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the 
phantasm of normative citizenship,’ in José Esteban Muñoz’s words.558 Indeed, his eventual 
conformity to Dominican hypermasculinity through sleeping with a woman who was previously 
sexually involved with a gangster results in his murder. Several members of Oscar’s family also 
succumb to such violence, which is, of course another form of hypermasculine performance: and 
one that sometimes has homoerotic elements in order to further ‘humiliate’ the victim into a 
position of weakness and effeminacy. Torture methods used by the Trujillato, apart from violent 
beatings, include the use of leather truncheons and a focus on genitalia as a site of torture. While 
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Yunior’s writing is eventually presented as partially redemptive of his previously hypermasculine 
behaviour, it does not address the anxieties that prompted it in the first place, nor does it 
interrogate the meaning or ramifications of such behaviour. Nonetheless, in analysing Díaz’s male 
protagonists, and particularly in considering Oscar’s partially unintentional acts of resistance against 
hypermasculine performance, I have begun to unpack how gender and race will influence both what 
one is anxious about, and how that anxiety finds and settles in its mind and body, in Gunaratnam’s 
terms. 
Finally, I have attended to the relationship between trauma and anxiety, particularly in the 
context of work by Paul Saint-Amour, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Eric Cazdyn, and Mark Fisher on the 
notion of a suspended, denied, or cancelled future. In thinking through this relationship, I have 
concluded that anxiety (particularly around technology and temporality) operates as a form of 
future-oriented trauma, that unlike depression, is overwhelming because time is moving us too 
quickly towards this future. Anxiety here constitutes a mourning for lives we will not lead because of 
the wide range of threats our world now faces. A literary approach has allowed me to pay particular 
attention to the language of these trauma-inflected anxieties, which in turn, provides a clearer 
picture of the affective resonances of these anxieties. A character or writer may be acutely aware of 
the risks that will result in the future being cancelled, and yet is very unlikely to have the means to 
prevent these risks from being actualised. As such, a close focus on language also reveals how 
anxiety interacts with temporality and narrative time, speeding up and slowing down a character’s 
experiences as they face ‘an apparently inescapable future’ in an act of ‘mass-traumatic anticipation 
of violence.’559 In the case of future-anxiety, this anticipation can operate at an individual as well as 
collective level, and does not necessarily rely on overt experiences of trauma and catastrophe: 
indeed, the anxiety surrounding a denied future may even be heightened by the uncertainty around 
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how it will be denied, and an inability, through lack of direct experience, to meaningfully anticipate 
what the trauma that is to come will be like or how it will feel to experience it. 
Hustvedt’s characters in Sorrows of an American and Memories of the Future overtly 
reference their trauma and its resonances, and these resonances often manifest themselves as 
anxiety about the future. On the other hand, central characters in Infinite Jest generally do not 
acknowledge themselves as having experienced trauma, despite many of them having had very 
difficult pasts. They do, however, share a sense of anxiety and dread about the future, bearing the 
temporal weight of this anxiety, which is itself highlighted by the non-chronological, scrambled 
nature of the entire text. Here, characters are existing in ‘chemically troubled times,’ meaning they 
are acutely aware of the unstable nature of their existence, particularly under the leadership of 
incompetent political figures who have ruined the country’s environment.560 At an individual level, 
Hal Incandenza’s descriptions of his time at the Enfield Tennis Academy (ETA) are often narrated 
with an urgent, scarcely punctuated voice that speaks to the anxieties he experiences around 
sporting performance and his future. Equally, Hustvedt’s Sonia, having witnessed 9/11, fails to 
acknowledge or imagine the future, which eventually leads her to an anxious breakdown during 
which she denies the world she lives in. However, in acknowledging the relationship between her 
trauma and her anxiety about the future, she is able to slow the pace of her own narrative, at least 
temporarily.  
I have also considered the specific influence that technology has on anxious temporalities, 
with technologies constantly accelerating the pace of life and causing further anxiety through this 
acceleration. In turn, this acceleration has contributed to the feeling that the future has been 
cancelled, and has also, according to Benjamin Noys, contributed to a placating and neutralising 
sense of overwhelm, exploiting ‘the speed of modern media technologies to overcome our 
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capacities for response and [leave] us reeling.’561 From Infinite Jest’s videophony to Sorrows of an 
American’s photo editing, technologies in both novels are utilised so that characters feel a sense of 
control over their own lives – yet in both cases this proves insufficient in dispelling future-anxiety 
altogether, or in actually changing or tackling the traumatic futures that may be coming. Yet, by 
virtue of these future-anxieties being represented in a literary sphere, there is always the 
opportunity for another interpretation, and there is always space to imagine a different future that 
is divorced from traumatic pasts and the traumatic futures these pasts threaten. In this sense, 
literary form may offer the capacity for another kind of time. 
With all of this in mind, we can outline a theory of literary anxiety that attends to anxiety’s 
place in literature, as well as the ways it interacts with and disrupts literature. Anxiety may, by 
producing its own aesthetic anxiousness, rupture established narratives and call in to question the 
suitability of particular forms and particular bodies to bear it. Literary anxiety, then, shines a light on 
how form responds to anxiety, and how anxiety responds to form. It may induce a kind of 
transmission of affect, to borrow from Teresa Brennan, whereby anxiety on the page is felt by the 
reader holding the book, or it may, through the breakdown of certain narratives and formal shifts, 
make the reader feel anxious because of its ability to speed up or slow down a text’s pace. In a 
psychoanalytic sense, then, the page or text itself may ‘contain’ anxiety. Literary anxiety also speaks 
to the relationship between trauma and anxiety, particularly when this trauma manifests itself as 
anxiety about the future that is linked to traumatic pasts. It allows, too, for a more nuanced 
consideration of gendered and racialised experiences of anxiety, which are shaped by different 
sources and symptoms of anxiety too. Literature provides an apt space to consider anxiety’s 
relationships to technology, to time, and, as I have stated, to unsettling, uncertain, or denied futures 
in contexts of global unrest. Perhaps most crucially, literary anxiety unfolds in an imaginative sphere: 
 
561 Benjamin Noys, The Culture of Death, p. 107. It is worth noting here that this is a critique of accelerationist 




it lets us see how an affect and a condition that can be experienced in all manner of ways, both 
physically and psychologically, appears and operates outside of the confines of clinical definitions. 
We are thus able to discern all manner of additional details about anxiety’s effect on language and 
literary technique, on form, on narrative – on the very fabric of a text and the characters that inhabit 
it – about its structures of feeling, which ‘[define] forms and conventions in art and literature as 
inalienable elements of a social material process’.562 This is, of course, a mutual relationship, so in 
turn, our understanding of anxiety is affected by these features. This insight speaks to anxiety’s 
multiplicities and its power to alter not only the person it affects, but the structures that exist 
around them, too. In a world that seems to become ever more uncertain, and in times that seem to 
unfold at an ever-accelerating pace, yet simultaneously, in Lisa Baraitser’s formulation, are 
experienced as ‘stuck, perpetually present and unable to change,’ these insights into the anxiety 
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